Killing in war

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The morality of participation in an unjust war

The doctrine of the moral equality of combatants

The traditional criterion of liability to attack in war

Can unjust combatants satisfy the principles of Jus in Bello?

The basis of moral liability to attack in war

Arguments for the moral equality of combatants

Justification and liability

Consent

The boxing match model of war

The gladiatorial combat model of war

Hypothetical consent

The epistemic argument

Institutions as sources of justification

The duty to defer to the epistemic authority of the government

The duty to sustain the efficient functioning of just institutions

Fairness to fellow participants

The collectivist approach to the morality of war

Transferred responsibility

Symmetrical disobedience

Conscientious refusal

Excuses

Sources of allegiance to the moral equality of combatants

The conflation of morality and law

The conflation of permission and excuse

Excusing conditions for unjust combatants

Duress

Epistemic limitation

Diminished responsibility

Skepticism about excusing unjust combatants

Consistency

Are unjust combatants excused by duress?

Are unjust combatants excused by epistemic limitations?

Liability and the limits of self-defense

Different types of threat

The relevance of excuses to killing in self-defense

Culpable threats

Partially excused threats

Excused threats and innocent threats

Nonresponsible threats

Justified threats and just threats

Liability to defensive attack

The moral status of unjust combatants

Liability and punishment

The relevance of excuses to the distribution of risk

Child soldiers

Civilian immunity and civilian liability

The moral and legal foundations of civilian immunity

The possible bases of civilian liability

Civilian liability to lesser and collateral harms

Can civilians be liable to intentional military attack?

Civilian liability and terrorism