...Unterscheidung ist bereits in Ausführungen von Locke enthalten. Locke hat allerdings das Erkennen definiert als „the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas". 2 ) Jedoch im zweiten Buch J ) Quatrteme partte. ') Book IV Ohap. 2 seot. 2. seines...

...in the earlier books, Locke's discussion is set by his terminology of ideas. Knowledge, he says, is "the perception of the connexion and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas." We must see that the idea of "round" "excludes" the idea of "square" to see that...

...its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate," and then defines knowledge as "nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas" - a characterization that, on the face of it, seems to rule out knowledge of anything...

...more explicit about meta-epistemology than Descartes. "Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists." (Essay, IV, 1, ii).2 In chapter 14 of Bk. 4 he is at...

...to consider it as a very important discovery. " Knowledge," says he, " seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. For since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings,...

...action is given at the beginning of the first chapter: "Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas" (IV. i. 2). There are four kinds of agreement or disagreement: identity or diversity,...

...sensation, or the work of the sensitive faculty. Condillac, inspired by Locke's definition of knowledge as 'the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas' (Essay, IV. i. 2), insisted that judgement, however complex it may seem, 'is still...

...evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists.15 This inflexible ideational circumscription dominates...

...that our knowledge is only conversant about them. §2. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though...

...activity possible, Johnson's idea of imagination reflects Locke's definition of knowledge as "nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 4. 1. 2. 522). In Johnson's model imagination...