RELATING TO POOR LAW, CRIMINAL LAW, LICENSING, RATING, THE DUTIES AND OFFICE OF MAGISTRATES, DECIDED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, THE COURT OF APPEAL, STEVENS AND SONS, LIMITED, 119 & 120 CHANCERY LANE, LONDON ; Law Publishers and Booksellers. 1898, CASES RELATING TO POOR LAW, CRIMINAL LAW, LICENSING, RATING, AND OTHER SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE DUTIES AND OFFICE OF MAGISTRATES DECIDED IN ALL THE COURTS Metropolis-Notice to Set Back Building -Forecourt-London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 13, sub-s. 1; ss. 14 and 200, sub-s. 2. Section 14 of the London Building Act, 1894, does not apply to all the offences created by section 13, sub-section 1, and where the external boundary of a "forecourt" is within the prescribed distance from the centre of a roadway, the County Council has no power under section 14 to serve a notice upon the owner or occupier requiring him to set back the forecourt so that every part of the external boundary thereof shall be at a distance from the centre of the roadway not less than the distance permitted by the Act. Case stated by a Metropolitan police magistrate. The respondents appeared before the magistrate in answer to a complaint made by the London County Council that they, on March 20, 1897, on the south side of Moscow Road, at the corner of Palace Court, in the parish of Paddington, did, contrary to sections 14 and 200, sub1894, neglect to comply with a notice duly section 2 of the London Building Act, served upon them by the London County Council on February 19, 1897, requiring them to cause the space between the external wall of a certain new building and the roadway of Moscow Road to be set back so that every part of the external fence or boundary of such space should be at a distance in every direction not less than the prescribed distance from the centre of the roadway. It was proved that the notice was served by the appellants on the respondents, and that they had failed to comply with it, and that no consent had been given by the appellants to the erection of the building with any forecourt or space between the external wall of such building and the roadway of Moscow Road in the manner complained of. The respondents had erected a new building at the corner of Moscow Road and Palace Court with a B LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL v. AYLESBURY DAIRY Co. frontage to Moscow Road of fifty-four feet and a frontage to Palace Court of one hundred feet, with the entrance from Moscow Road. The external wall of the building fronting Moscow Road was at a distance of not less than twenty feet from the centre of the roadway of Moscow Road, which is a highway and a street used for the purpose of carriage traffic. At the time when the building was erected and for many years-probably thirty years prior thereto, there existed a boundary wall which had been the boundary wall of a garden, a portion of which wall was left standing, and after the completion of the building the space between it and the portion of the old wall was enclosed by the respondents by means of iron railings which were affixed to the wall, but as to the fixing of these no complaint was made. Such wall had probably for the past thirty years formed the external fence or boundary of the space between the external wall of the building and the roadway of Moscow Road, and is at a distance less than twenty feetnamely, thirteen feet-from the centre of Moscow Road. It was admitted before the magistrate that the complaint of the appellants was not to the new railings, which the respondents offered to remove, but to the ancient wall. It was also proved that at the date when the notice was served by the appellants, the respondents were the occupiers and tenants at will of the space between the building and the old wall; but it appeared that on or about March 12, 1897, the respondents had given up possession to the owners in accordance with a notice to quit. It was contended by the appellants that the respondents had offended against the provisions of sections 13, 14, and 200, sub-section 2 of the London Building Act, 1894.1 (1) By section 13, sub-section 1 of the London Building Act, 1894: "No person shall erect any new building or new structure or any part thereof or extend any building or structure or any part thereof in such manner that any external wall of any such building or structure or (if there be a forecourt or other space between such external wall and the roadway) any part of the external fence or boundary of such forecourt or other space shall without the consent in writing of the council be in any direction at a distance less than the prescribed distance It was contended by the respondents that as the external wall of the building was at a distance of twenty feet from the centre of the roadway, and as no new building or new structure had been erected within that distance, sections 14 and 200, sub-section 2, did not apply. The magistrate held that the contention of the respondents was well founded, and that section 14 did not apply, and dismissed the summons. The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the magistrate's decision was right. Avory, for the appellants.-Section 14 of the London Building Act, 1894, must have been intended to apply to every offence created by section 13, sub-section 1, and if so it covers the present case, for the wall which formed the external boundary of this forecourt was at a distance less than the prescribed distance from the centre of the roadway. The respondents were therefore liable to be convicted under section 200, sub-section 2. The Court is not asked to create any new offence. The offence is created by section 13, sub-section 1, and section 14 merely points out the procedure to be adopted in case of non-compliance with the preceding section. Unless the word "forecourt" is to be read into the first part of section 14, the words "such forecourt" in the latter part of the section are meaningless. The section ought to be construed so as to give effect to the obvious intention of the Legislature. [He referred to Reg. v. Hulme [1870].2] from the centre of the roadway of any street or way (being a highway)." By section 14: "In every case where any new building or new structure is erected at a distance in any direction from the centre of the roadway of any street or way less than the distance permitted under this part of this Act .. the council may serve a notice upon the owner or occupier of the said building or structure or upon the builder requiring him to cause such building structure forecourt or space or any part thereof to be set back so that every part of any external wall of such building or structure or of the external fence or boundary of such forecourt or space shall be at a distance in every direction from the centre of the roadway of such street or way not less than the distance so permitted. . . .” (2) 39 L. J. Q.B. 149; L. R. 5 Q.B. 377. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL v. AYLESBURY DAIRY CO. J. F. P. Rawlinson, for the respondents, was not called upon to argue. 3 WRIGHT, J.-I think that counsel for the appellants is probably right in saying that section 14 was intended to cover the case which has occurred, and probably also intended to cover the case, not merely of new buildings, but of extensions of old buildings, although it has not been necessary to argue that in the present case. But the mere fact that it might have been better to extend the section to those cases is not enough to justify us in putting a construction on the section which we could only put upon it by reading into it the words we have been asked to read in. It is clear to me that if we were to do that, as was said by the Court in Underhill v. Longridge [1859], we should really be legislating, or, to use the words of Lord Justice James in a somewhat similar case -Sneezum, In re; Davis, ex parte [1876], "That is a provision which might perhaps be very properly made by the Legislature; but, to my mind, to insert it in this way by implication would not be to construe the Act of Parliament, but to alter it; it might be to improve it, according to the view which some persons take of the matter, but it would certainly be altering the Act of Parliament, and enlarging still further the provisions which the Legislature has thought fit to make with respect to such contracts." We are the more strongly driven to that conclusion because, without the alteration of the section which we are asked to make, this proceeding, which is a penal proceeding involving penal consequences, could not be prosecuted at all. I have certainly always understood it to be the rule that where there is any enactment which may entail penal consequences, the Court ought not to do violence to the language in order to bring people within it, but ought to take care that no one is brought within it who is not within it in express language. I think that the magistrate was right, and that if there be mischief consequent upon the ruling, which we are bound to adopt, (3) 29 L. J. M.C. 65. (4) 45 L. J. Bk. 137; 3 Ch. D. 463, 472. that is something which can only be removed by application to Parliament. KENNEDY, J.-I agree. Judgment for respondents. Solicitors-W. A. Blaxland, for appellants ; Harries, Wilkinson & Raikes, for respondents. HAWKINS, J. CHANNELL, J. 1897. Dec. 6, 14. (VESTRY). [67 L. J. Q.B. 80.] Poor Rate-Exemption from Rateability Society instituted for purposes of science, literature, or fine arts exclusively" Scientific Societies Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 36), s. 1. A society, the primary object of which is the advancement of the art of music by means of a central teaching and examining body, by rewarding with academical degrees and certificates of proficiency persons proved worthy of such distinctions, and by the promotion and supervision of such musical instruction in schools as may be conducive to the dissemination of the art and encouragement of its cultivation throughout her Majesty's dominions, and which is supported wholly or in part by annual voluntary contributions, and does not make "any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money," is a society instituted for the purposes of the fine arts exclusively within section 1 of the Scientific Societies Act, 1843, and entitled to exemption from rating. Case stated by consent and by order of a Judge under the Quarter Sessions Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 45), s. 11. B 2 |
