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Mr. Hudson. As I understand it, yes, sir.

Senator Ford. In your statement, Mr. Barry, I believe you said that you had a former official with the Israeli airline that had been advising—I believe it was your statement—that had been advising you as it relates to security.

Mr. Barry. That was Mr. Hudson's statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ford. Oh, I am sorry. I thought this was Mr. Hudson's.

But anyhow, you said the Israeli airline procedures of utilizing the security personnel was one of your recommendations, however, then?

Mr. Barry. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Ford. Now, basically we have some confidence in Secretary Skinner that he will move and within the next couple of weeks we will see some dramatic movement as it relates to cooperation.

We find that the State Department always walks on eggs, where you and I would be like a bull in a china cabinet. And I am not sure that we can ever change that attitude at the State Department, but we can change—I was brought up to treat everybody kindly, and as long as the fist stopped at the end of my nose without hitting me everything was all right. But when he hit me I could hit back, Dad told me.

I want to be as accommodating and as polite as I can with those who are dealing with a very serious situation, I say to you, Mr. Hudson and Mr. Barry. But my patience is not nearly as great as yours.

Your patience up to this period of time has been to push and to search and to try to get us to move. So your patience has been, I think, one to be admired.

At some point we are all going to lose our patience and are going to start fighting city hall. So I assure you that this committee, through its full chairman, Senator Hollings, who called this hearing today directly for this subcommittee, will be looking at the efforts that we can be making here.

I want to be sure that what we do is right. If we rush, when we make mistakes it is usually a mistake that stays in place. And I would prefer to be a little bit more conservative in our approach and to be sure that we leave no loose ends behind us.

Now we are getting to the point where things are beginning to move and we learn, as you have learned, that the TNA's are very difficult probably to come by. But we have already ordered six.

That does not amount to very many, and we need 100 in the first year and 200, and that is about the maximum of production. But it can be licensed and then we can find other producers, so maybe we can move on that, and additional research as it relates to search of the individual at the airport.

I have seen that one, and it means you have got to stand in a cage and then step back out and go forward and it is going to be, somewhat of a longer procedure than we now have. But I think that the Israeli government has indicated that a little delay for a safe trip is very little to pay for that safety.

I have no further questions, but there will be several questions to resolve. And I think one of them will be money and how we come about and how we secure those funds or where we shift those funds from to another one, because as you know we are under a overall funding cap.

We are going to have to be moving funds from one place to the other, and I think we can find sufficient funds to move forward in an expedited manner, I really do.

So let me compliment you again on your patience and your efforts here. I think what has been done to date has been the result of your recommendations, and your efforts to see that something like the Pan Am 103 does not occur again in the future.

I thank you very, very much.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

The Airport Operators Council International represents the state, local and regional bodies that own and operate the principal airports serving scheduled airlines throughout the world. AOCI's Member airports enplane more than 90 percent of passengers and cargo carried by domestic scheduled airlines and virtually all passengers and cargo carried by international airlines serving the United States.

As the local governmental entities operating airports, we quite obviously have an intense interest in the enhanced security of airports and air carriers. Our passengers are the citizens of our own communities, not to mention ourselves as travellers, who are the beneficiaries of any improvements which might be made in the airport/airline system.

Aviation security is absolutely vital to the air transportation system upon which our nation's economy depends, and it can truly be a matter of life-and-death. Aviation benefits millions of people each day, either directly for travellers or indirectly in the form of cargo or mail being transported worldwide. It is because aviation is so widely used, and because the potential for disaster is so great, that violence and interference with air transportation are so attractive to terrorists. Efforts to ensure the security of commercial aviation fall into two categories, the macro approach and the micro approach.


In the macro approach, we achieve aviation security when the reasons for a terrorist to use violence are diminished, and when the means and opportunities for doing so are removed. Relieving the impulse to commit violent acts against aviation is a political matter, appropriate for national government, including this Congress, to address. We need to focus not only on removing the means and opportunity for violence, but on cooperative governmental efforts to interdict terrorists well before they reach airports.

We must enhance the cooperation of every available national and international police and intelligence operation to identify, track and intercept the terrorist before he ever gets near the airport. The terrorist today has as his target not Airline X, but the policies and principles of the United States (or other) government, and that is the level at which government must meet the terrorist head-on. Airport operators are local, not national government, and we are not ~ and should not be—in the business of fighting international terrorism.

The federal government's role in leading and organizing the improvement of aviation security is mainly the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration. The Federal Aviation Act gives the FAA responsibility "to protect against terrorist and other criminal threats." As the threat has shifted over the last 20 years from hijacking to sabotage and terrorist


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attacks, the FAA has toughened its regulatory requirements on all U.S. airports and airlines, without regard to specific circumstances and risks. It is time to do a thorough risk assessment and focus our preventive efforts on those areas facing the most severe threats.


Under the micro approach we must focus on protecting airports and air carriers. Achieving aviation security is very complex and costly. The physical aspects of aviation security are costly because they involve construction or modification of entire facilities and the purchase of expensive, advanced technologies. Every airport has a unique situation, unique facilities and needs, and faces a unique set of threats, which multiplies the complexity, and in turn, the cost, of solutions.

U.S. airports today have complied with all safety requirements of the FAA. Until now, their requirements have been logical, meaningful, and doable, as well as generally affordable. The so-called access control rule has taken the problem outside those bounds.

No solution is permanent. Each and every initiative to remove the means or opportunity to threaten security is subject to a terrorist's attempts to circumvent that security measure.

Airport operators have not been idle. We have modified our facilities, installed new equipment, added personnel, and actively worked with airlines, law enforcement agencies and the Federal Aviation Administration to improve security.


The FAA has taken what we consider to be a precipitous action in issuing a final rule on "Access to Secured Areas of Airports", otherwise known as the access control rule. Let me state at the outset that we strongly support improved security, and, for that matter, the underlying purpose of the rule itself. It addresses a valid, but very limited possibility, that of the "threat from within" of a disgruntled or deranged employee. To our knowledge, that threat has come to fruition once in the past 60 years, in the 1987 PSA incident in California. While improved systems must certainly deal with that element, we would suggest that the infinitely greater "threat from without" — the various forms of terrorism —has gone virtually unaddressed. We submit that the vast amounts of money needed to implement this rule could be more effectively spent in other areas of airport security.

That rulemaking requires 270 major U.S. airports to institute, on an accelerated schedule, a massive program to augment and automate their systems which control access to the airport operations area (AOA) . It is a laudable goal, and one on which many airports have already begun work. But without federal research and development funding applied through a pilot program, it cannot be achieved in a sensible manner.

The reasons are many. For example, the rule does not describe what types of systems shall be acceptable in meeting FAA's yet-unpublished criteria. It does not even tell us what a "secured area" is. much less how extensive the system must be. To illustrate the dilemma we face in addressing the rule, let me guote from the rule itself:

"For the same reason that 'secured area' was not defined, the FAA was not specific regarding doors, gates, and other locations to be controlled. To do so , they said, would compromise an airport's security program. For that reason, the FAA specifically requested that airport operators not discuss in their comments specific details of current or proposed security arrangements." (Emphasis added). On the following page, however, the rule states that "since the commenters did not identify the specific issues to be considered to prevent a deterioration of security, the FAA cannot adequately respond to that concern." (Emphasis added). Bureaucracy at its finest.

Thus, 270 airports are not clear about what the government expects them to secure. The rule also assumes an average of 128 access points to be secured at Phase One airports. Chicago's O'Hare airport stopped counting at 1627; New York's JFK airport reached 1500 without adding cargo or general aviation facilities.

The industry has begun to hear from an abundance of vendors of such diverse equipment as magnetic stripe card readers, proximity readers, bar code readers, alpha-numeric key pad locks, 'PIN' key devices, laser scanners and others, all of whom profess their systems to be the least expensive, most secure, most effective, most efficient, or most flexible. All of this leads to the conclusion that a pilot program is absolutely essential to develop these systems and gain the operational experience to identify and resolve problems before we spend vast sums of money to install them at 270 airports.

The access control rule is silent on the need for compatibility among the 270 systems. The need for compatibility becomes obvious when one considers the high degree of mobility in the aviation industry, where one flight crew might require access to more than a half-dozen different airports each day, or where fired employees can access their company security system at another airport within a matter of a few hours. But such compatibility requires a great deal of development and standardization effort.

There are other problems: Should we not also be concerned about cargo and general aviation facilities? Where is the responsibility of an exclusive use tenant (airline)? How much responsibility for security passes between the airport and non-aviation tenants such as food service, concessions, or maintenance personnel? The rule does not address these.

How, then, do we identify and implement a rational, workable nationwide airport security system?

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