[(Commencing as in Form No. 10689.)]2 For that the said Thomas Bryan, in the county and State aforesaid, on the third day of January, in the year eighteen hundred and seventy, did then and there unlawfully employ Mitchell Daniel, colored, the servant of one Philip West, during the term for which he was employed, the said Thomas Bryan knowing, then and there, that the said servant, Mitchell Daniel, colored, was then in the employment of said Philip West, and that his term of service had not expired, contrary [(concluding as in Form No. 10689).]2 Form No. 13624. (Precedent in State v. Harwood, 104 N. Car. 725.)3 [(Caption as in Form No. 10711.)]2 The jurors upon their oath present, that H. L. Harwood and L. B. White, late of the county of Wayne, on the 19th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-nine, at and in the county aforesaid, unlawfully and willfully did entice, persuade and procure Will Humphrey, Sam Womble and Wayland Tutor, servants, who had heretofore contracted with the Wayne Agricultural Works a company incorporated under the laws of North Carolina to serve said Wayne Agricultural Works as servants and laborers, which contract was then in force and subsisting, to unlawfully leave the service of the said Wayne Agricultural Works (the employers aforesaid of the said servants Will Humphrey, Sam Womble and Wayland Tutor), against the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State. And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do present, that the said H. L. Howard and L. B. White, on the day and year aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did harbor and detain in their own service Will Humphrey, Sam Womble and Wayland Tutor, servants of the Wayne Agricultural Works, a company aforesaid incorporated under the laws of North Carolina, which servants had theretofore left the service of the said Wayne Agricultural Works, their employers, against the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State. [(Signature and indorsements as in Form No. 10711.)]2 b. Intimidating Servant. Form No. 13625. (Precedent in Com. v. Dyer, 128 Mass. 70.) [(Commencing as in Form No. 10699, and continuing down to *)]2 one Horace S. Andrews did unlawfully and wilfully intimidate, and did 1. This indictment was held sufficient. See, generally, supra, note 1, p. 63. 2. The matter to be supplied within [] will not be found in the reported case. 3. Judgment of conviction in this case was affirmed. See, generally, supra, note 1, p. 63. 4. It was held that a motion to quash this indictment was properly overruled. The indictment was drawn under Mass. Stat. (1875), c. 211 (Mass. Pub. Stat. (1882), c. 74, § 2). seek to intimidate, and by force and intimidation did seek to prevent from continuing in the employment of a corporation, to wit, the Weetamoe Mills, a corporation then and there duly incorporated under the laws of said Commonwealth and having its usual place of business in said Fall River, he the said Horace S. Andrews being then and there employed by and in the employment of said corporation as a spinner in the mill of said corporation; against the peace of said Commonwealth and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. [(Signature and indorsements as in Form No. 10699.)]1 Similar statutes exist as follows, to North Dakota. - Rev. Codes (1895), Dak. Comp. Laws 1. The matter to be supplied within [] will not be found in the reported case. 65 Volume 12. MASTERS IN CHANCERY. See the title REFERENCES. MAYHEM. BY W. R. BUCKMINSTER. 1. MAIMING OTHERS, 66. 1. In General, 67. a. Malicious Mayhem, 68. 2. Cutting Private Parts, 72. a. Castrating, 72. b. Of Female, 73. 3. In Hazing, 74. 4. In Prize Fight, 74. 5. Under Circumstances which would Constitute Murder or Man slaughter if Death should Ensue, 74. 6. Wound Less than Mayhem, 75. II. MAIMING SELF, 76. 1. To Obtain Alms, 76. 2. To Escape Legal Duty, 76. CROSS-REFERENCES. For Forms of Indictments for Assault with Intent to Maim, see the title ASSAULT, vol. 2, p. 228. I. MAIMING OTHERS.1 Gen 1. Requisites of Indictment, etc. erally. For the formal parts of an indictment, information or criminal complaint in a particular jurisdiction consult the titles INDICTMENTS, vol. 9, p. 615; INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, vol. 9, p. 768; CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS, vol. 5, p. 930. For statutes of the various states relating to mayhem see as as follows, to wit: Alabama.. Crim. Code (1896), § 5095. Arizona. Pen. Code (1887), §§ 297. 298. Arkansas. Sand. & H. Dig. (1894), §§ 1737-1744. Nevada. Gen. Stat. (1895), p. New Mexico. - Comp. Laws (1897), §1082. Wisconsin. Stat. (1898), § 4372. Wyoming. Rev. Stat. (1887), § 881. United States. Rev. Stat. (1878), § 1342, art. 58; § 5348. Maliciously means on purpose and with evil intent, but not necessarily with intent to commit that particular mayhem. Molette v. State, 49 Ala. 18. Maliciously," in the California statute and indictments under it, does not mean with premeditated malice. A malicious intent, formed upon the instant, is sufficient. People v. Wright, 93 Cal. 564. Feloniously. The word "feloniously "need not be employed to characterize the acts. State v. Absence, 4 Port. (Ala.) 397. Premeditated Design. - While necessary, under the statute, to aver that the act of mayhem was committed with "premeditated design," the indictment need not aver the manner in which the premeditated design was evinced. Tully v. People, 67 N. Y. 15. Intent. In a prosecution for maiming, under the Minnesota code, the injury must have been wilfully inflicted "with intent to injure, disfigure or disable." State v. Hair, 37 Minn. 351. In the Ohio statute, which provides that certain injuries inflicted with malicious intent to maim or disfigure" shall be punishable, the word "maim" is used in its technical sense. Therefore the offense should be characterized as "with intent to maim" only when the wound is a common-law mayhem. Otherwise, as in the case of biting off an ear, the offense should be characterized in the indictment as "with intent to disfigure." State v. Johnson, 58 Ohio St. 417. a. Malicious Mayhem. Form No. 13626. (3 Chit. Cr. L. (5th Am, from 2d Lond. ed.) 787.)1 Essex, to wit. The jurors for our lord the king upon their oath present, that John Doe, late of Hatfield, in the parish of Chelmsford, in the county of Essex, laborer, and John Fen, late of said Hatfield, in the lip" cannot be employed as equivalent. People v. Demasters, 105 Cal. 669. "Mayhem" or "Maimed."-Although the Oregon statute does not use the word "mayhem," yet that word may be used in the indictment to designate the offense. State v. Vowels, 4 Oregon 324. But the crime may be charged by describing the acts and injuries in the words of the statute, and it need not be alleged that the injured person was "maimed." Guest v. State, 19 Ark. 405. Contra Chick v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 161. Nor need the word "mayhem" be used in the indictment. State v. Absence, 4 Port. (Ala.) 397. That Party was Maimed or Disfigured. — An indictment under U. S. Rev. Stat. (1878), § 5348, which follows the language of the statute, need not allege that by reason of and means of the facts alleged therein, the complainant was maimed and disfigured." U. S. v. Gunther, 5 Dak. 234. Description of Injury. An indict ment for mayhem by biting off an ear need not state whether it was the right or the left ear. State v. Green, 7 Ired. L. (29 N. Car.) 39. This was not the case at common law. Archb. Cr. Pl. 315. Negativing Lesser Offense. - The Colorado statute defining the crime of mayhem (Mills' Anno. Stat. (1891), § 1210), contains a proviso reducing the crime to a lower grade under certain circumstances. It is unnecessary, however, in an indictment for the crime of the higher degree, to negative the circumstances set out in the proviso. And the same indictment may be used to obtain a conviction for the crime of the lower degree. Foster v. People, I Colo. 293. maim and disfigure him, and that Apollo Mairs with a knife which he held in his right hand, did on purpose and of his malice aforethought, by lying in wait, feloniously cut off the nose of the said William Wilds, with an intent to disfigure and maim him; and that David Mairs was present at the time, and unlawfully and feloniously, knowing and being privy, and criminally aiding and abetting the said Apollo Mairs, to commit the said felony; and that the said Apollo and David on the day aforesaid of their malice aforethought, by lying in wait, did commit the felony aforesaid, unlawfully and feloniously, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided." In State v. Vowels, 4 Oregon 324, an approved form of indictment charges the defendant with the crime of mayhem, committed as follows: "The said Samuel Vowels, on the twenty-fifth day of December, 1870, in the county of Multnomah and state of Oregon, did purposely, maliciously and feloniously, tear off the left ear of Joseph Taylor." An indictment charging in a single count that the defendant "unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously, did slit, cut off and bite off, the ear of John Tarwater, whereby the said John Tarwater is maimed and disfigured," is not bad upon the ground of charging two offenses in one count. State v. Ailey, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 8. For other forms see 6 Harg. St. Tr. Appendix 60; West 103, 104; Cro. C. A. 219; I Leach 55, 259; Cook's Code Crim. Proc. N. Y. (1898), p. 415, No. 148; Godfrey v. People, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 369; Davis v. State, 22 Tex. App. 45. 1. Coventry Act. This form is drawn under the Coventry act, 22 & 23 Car. II, c. I. This act was passed in consequence of an assault upon Sir John Coventry by partisans of the king, who set upon him and slit his nose. The deed was in retaliation for a speech in parliament in which Sir John Coventry criticised the profligate life of the king. As the law then stood, this assault was |
