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viser himself had a pang on this subject, for he THE NEW CODE.
seeks to alleviate matters in the next section ($ 489); WE TE have promised ourselves and our readers to but we prophesy that this latter section will require
look over the new Code, and make some sug- a great deal of construction, and give rise to a great gestions upon it. We have heretofore expressed deal of dispute. our general satisfaction with the scope and execu
Now, we approach a subject very near to our tion of the work, “without prejudice, however,” hearts, and that is the testimony of parties. We to our right to find some fault with it. Last week have heretofore expressed ourselves against the rea communication was published in these columns
strictions of the famous section 399 of the old Code, criticising the Code in several particulars, with and we are sorry to see it perpetuated and made some of which criticisms we agree. For ex
more sweeping in the new Code. The legal profesample, we heartily agree that the most salutary sion should not emulate the Bourbons, but should work of the old Code, namely, the abolition of the learn from experience. It took us a long time to old forms of pleadings should be inviolably pre- tolerate the idea of an interested person testifying served. If that end is to be at all impaired by the in his own behalf, but we embraced it by slow derequirement of a perilous prayer at the end of the grees. Then we had a still harder struggle about complaint, we are opposed to the requirement. The the same rule, as applicable to persons indicted for prayer should be a mere matter of form - not at all crimes, but at length we succumbed. Then we very of substance. Praying is not theoretically danger- reluctantly let husbands and wives testify for or ous in theology, and we should be careful not to against each other, with certain exceptions. But render it dangerous in law. Let us have no black- section 399 is our last ditch. We had remodeled, letter, magical importance attached to the form of and reformed, and reconstructed it, over and over words, by which, after stating our case, we ask for again, through a long series of years, and have not relief, but let the court grant relief according to the yet succeeded in shaping it so that it is certain what facts stated and proved. No undue advantage or
it means. Within a few days the writer has heard surprise can arise from this. Each party is equally
a cause tried at circuit, where a half a day was exnotified and equally enlightened. This has been hausted in determining whether a donee inter vivos the practice for twenty years and more, and we have came within the classes of favored persons, and the never heard any complaint of it. We think that the judge at length decided that she came within the proposed alteration will result only in giving tech-spirit, and he was inclined to think, within the letnical advantages, and we are totally and earnestly ter, as an "assignee;” and another judge told the opposed to all technicalities and all technical ad-writer that he had had a great deal of trouble in a vantages.
recent cause to determine just what “survivor" This naturally leads us to consider for a moment
It is probable that the substituted section the section on demurrers. The change above re- is a great improvement in clearness and compreferred to is also recognized in that section of the hensiveness, but our objection is radical. If a party, new Code, by the addition of the ninth and tenth or an interested person, is to be a witness at all, there grounds of demurrer, namely, “That the facts is no consistency in excluding him simply because stated in the complaint do not entitle the plaintiff his adversary has died or become incompetent to testto the judgment demanded,” and “that the plain- ify. This is a relapse into, or rather a clinging to, tiff demands judgment for two or more inconsistent the old absurd barbarism. We desire to write ourkinds of relief." In connection with this, we ob- selves down again as radically hostile to any excluject to the seventh ground of demurrer, namely, sion of any person, as a witness, ou any ground or “that causes of action have been improperly under any circumstances whatever, except as a pununited.” The old Code provided plentifully, and, ishment for crime. If a man has committed a on the whole, we think, properly, for demurrers. felony, let him be disqualified, as a penalty, but
, We are not much in favor of them. They answer, never disqualify a man, wbo is perfectly competent practically, very little of useful purpose. They to-day, from testifying to-morrow, because his ancreate delays, accumulate costs and obstruct justice tagonist has died or gone mad over night. The oftener than they do any good. The only instance inevitable struggle with common sense on this point in which a demurrer is justifiable, is where the sus- is amusingly evidenced by Supreme Court rule 88, taining of it must leave the party wholly without which, in the face of the statute prohibiting it, abany just claim or standing in court.
But we are
solutely requires husbands and wives, complainants umutterably hostile to all “marking time" in the in divorce suit, to testify to certain points. There law. What suitors demand and have a right to is is only one way to dispose of this Gordian knut, progress. Human life is too short, and the courts and that is to apply the Alexandrian remedy. There are too full of business to warrant any of this petty is no such restriction as section 399 provides, in the quibbling over forms. So we demur to any change law of Massachusetts, and we are informed by high about demurrers. It seems that the intelligent re- authority that the rule of their practice works well,
and that there is no objection to it among the pro- stock of said company to be made by the county, and fession, either on the bench or at the bar. Of course,
on the same day it was so made and certificates of
stock issued. On the 24th of March, 1868, the act of the adoption of these views would necessitate the
1859 was amended, and a branch railway authorized to striking out of several other sections of the same
be constructed by the same company, and on the 1st article.
day of January, 1859, bonds were issued by the county One other point now occurs to us, namely, the court on behalf of the county in payment of such perpetuation of the liability of a guardian, for an stock, each bond reciting that it was issued by Callainfant plaintiff, for costs. This is old doctrine, and
way county, by authority of the act of the general was preserved in our former Code, but we would assembly of the State of Missouri, approved March 10,
1859, as amended by an act approved March 24, 1868. ask, cui bono, or, rather, quo bono ? The policy of
The voters of Callaway county never gave their assent the law is to afford every facility to infants for the
to the issuing of the bonds. The constitutional proenforcement of their rights, and most jealously to vision in question has been held by the Supreme Court guard their interests. But here is a rule which ope- of Missouri to be prospective and not retroactive, and rates in precisely the reverse direction. Not only is that the charter of a company which is in existence
before its adoption is not affected by it (State v. Macon an infant prohibited from suing until he finds a
Co. Court, 41 Mo. 453), and the constitution of 1865 friend who is able and willing to pay the costs at
contains, in connection with the provision already all bazards, in case of defeat, but that friend must
quoted, the following: “All statute laws of the State be willing to go to jail if he happens not to be able now in force not inconsistent with the constitution to pay. This naturally tends to deter infants from shall continue in force until they shall expire by their bringing actions. Not only that, but how perfectly
own limitations or be amended or repealed by the genand richly absurd the idea is! No other class of
eral assembly.” In The State of Missouri v. The Cape
Girardeau and State Line Railroad, 48 Mo. 468, it was persons is restrained from suing until they furnish
held that the constitutional provision prohibiting spesecurity for costs, except non-residents. Every cial enactments did not extend to amendments of laws adult resident may sue to his heart's content, in force when it was adopted. The Federal court, whether rich or poor, and his adversary must defend therefore, held that in this case the act of March, 1868, himself at his own cost. If the plaintiff has com
referred to in the Callaway county bonds, in connection
with the act of March 10, 1859, was an amendment of pleted his twenty-one years, he may sue without let
the latter act, and that the bonds were valid, notwithor hindrance, although he is entirely destitute of
standing there was no assent by the voters of Callaway property; but if he lacks a year, or a month, or a county to their issue. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered day of that age, he must furnish a sponsor, able to the opinion of the court. Justices Miller, Davis, pay the costs, if the suit is unsuccessful, and willing Field and Bradley dissented. to suffer imprisonment if he cannot pay them, or the infant must go unremedied. We pronounce this idea ESCAPED CRIMINAL NOT ENTITLED TO a ridiculous and an outrageous one, without even a
MAINTAIN WRIT OF ERROR. homeopathic reason to support it, and entirely at The Supreme Court of the United States in the case variance with all the traditions and pretenses of the
of law. So we move to amend by striking out this
decided, refuse to hear a criminal case where the party
suing out the writ of error has placed himself without provision.
the jurisdiction of the court. Waite, C. J., in deliver
ing the opinion, says: It is clearly within our discretion WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS NOT
to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the RETROACTIVE.
convicted party suing out the writ is where he can be IN N the case of County of Callaway v. Foster, recently made to respond to any judgment we may render. In
decided by the United States Supreme Court, an this case it is admitted that the plaintiff in error has interesting question of statutory construction arose. escaped and is not within the control of the court beBy a statute of Missouri approved March 10, 1859, en- low, either actually, by being in custody, or construotitled “An act to incorporate the Louisiana and Mis- tively, by being out on ļbail. If we affirm the judge souri River Railroad Company," it was provided that ment, he is not likely to appear to submit to his senit should “be lawful for the county court of any tence. If we reverse it and order a new trial, he county in which any part of the route of said railroad will appear or not as he may consider most for his may be, to subscribe to the stock of said company, interest. Under such circumstances, we are not inand issue bonds of such county to raise funds to pay clined to hear and decide what may prove to be only a the stock thus subscribed." In July, 1865, a constitu- moot case. tional provision was adopted in Missouri in these This cause was docketed here December 29, 1870. words: “The general assembly shall not authorize In due time a brief was filed on behalf of the plaintiff any county, city or town to become a stockholder in, in error, and the cause has been regularly continued or to loan its credit to, any company, association or at every term since, no one appearing here in person corporation, unless two-thirds of the qualified voters to represent the plaintiff. At this term we dismissed of such county, city or town, at a regular or special the writ on motion of the United States, for want of election to be held therein, shall assent thereto." In prosecution, but have since reinstated it on motion of January, 1868, the county court of Callaway county, the counsel for the plaintiff in error, who now moves through which the company mentioned thereafter to have it set down for argument. This motion we built their railroad, authorized a subscription to the deny, and order that unless the plaintiff iu error sub
mit himself to the jurisdiction of the court below on formation against the property was filed in the namo or before the first day of our next term, the cause be of the United States, setting forth that the plaintiff in left off the docket after that time. The People v. this case was the owner of the property in question; Genet, 59 N. Y. 80; Leftwich's Case, 20 Gratt. 723; that he had, since the passage of the above act, held Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 544. See, also, 31 an office of honor and trust under the government of Me. 592.
the so-called Confederate States, and in various ways
had given aid and comfort to the rebellion; that the OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD NECESSARY
property had been seized in pursuance of the act, in TO CONFER JURISDICTION.
compliance with instructions from the attorney-gen
eral, and, by reason of the premises, was forfeited to UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT - OCTOBER
the United States, and should be condemned. It TERM, 1876.
closed with a prayer that process of monition might
issue against the owner or owners of the property, and WINDSOR, plaintiff in error, v. McVEigh. all persons interested or claiming an interest therein, 1. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party with
warning them at some early day “to appear and anout hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be swer" the libel; and, as the owner of the property was heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.
a non-resident and absent, that an order of publicatiou 2. The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure of property in a in the usual form be also made. Upon this libel the
proceeding rem for its condemnation for alleged forfeiture, is not to pass upon the question of forfeiture
district judge ordered process of monition to issue as absolutely, but to pass upon that question after oppor- prayed, and designated a day and place for the trial of tunity has been afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear and be heard upon the charges for
the cause, and that notice of the same, with the subwhich the forfeiture is claimed. To that end some no- stance of the libel, should be given by publication in a tification of the proceedings, beyond that arising from the seizure, prescribing the time within which the ap
newspaper of the city, and by posting at the door of pearance must be made, is essential.
the court-house. The process of monition and notice 3. In proceedings before the District Court in a confiscation case, monition and notice were issued and published,
were accordingly issued and published. Both debut the appearance of the owner, for which they called, scribed the land and mentioned its seizure, and named when made was stricken out, his right to appear being denied by the court: Held, that the subsequent sentence
the day and place fixed for the trial. The monition of contiscation of his property was as inoperative upon stated that at the trial all persons interested in the his rights as though no morition or notice had ever been issued. The legal effect of striking out his ap
land or claiming av interest might “appear and make pearance was to recall the monition and notice as to hiar.
their allegations in that behalf." The notice warned 4. The doctrine that where a court has once acquired juris
all persons to appear at the trial "to show cause why diction, it has a right to decide every question which condemnation should not be decreed, and to intervene arises in the cause, and its judgment, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when
for their interest.” the court proceeds, after acquiring jurisdiction of the The owner of the property, in response to the monicause, according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not trans
tion and notice, appeared by counsel and filed a claim cend, in the extent or character of its judgment, the to the property and in answer to the libel. Subselaw which applicable to it.
quently, on the 10th of March, 1864, the district attor
ney moved that the claim and answer, and the appearCourt of the city of Alexandria, State of Virginia. ance of the respondent by counsel, be stricken from Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the the files, on the ground that it appeared from his ancourt.
swer that he was, at the time of filing the same, "a resThis was an action of ejectment to recover certain ident within the city of Richmond, within the Confedreal property in the city of Alexandria, in the State of erate lines, and a rebel." On the same day the motion Virginia. It was brought in the corporation court of was granted, and the claim and answer ordered to be that city, and a writ of error from the Court of Ap- stricken from the files. The appearance of the repeals of the State to review the judgment obtained spondent was by his answer. The court immediately having been refused, the case was brought here direct- entered its sentence and decree, condemning the proply by a writ of error from this court. Authority for erty as forfeited to the United States, reciting that the this mode of procedure will be found stated in the case usual proclamation having been made, the default of of Gregory v. McVeigh, reported in the 23d of Wallace. all persons had been duly entered. The decree ordered
The plaintiff in the corporation court proved title in the issue of a venditioni exponas for the sale of the himself to the premises in controversy, and consequent property, returnable on the 16th day of the following right to their immediate possession, unless his life es- April. At the sale under this writ, the grantor of the tate in them had been divested by a sale under a de- defendant became the purchaser. cree of condemuation, rendered in March, 1864, by the The question for determination is whether the deDistrict Court of the United States for the Eastern cree of condemnation thus rendered, without allowing District of Virginia, upon proceedings for their contis. the owner of the property to appear in response to the cation. The defendant relied upon the deed to his monition, interpose his claim for the property, and grantor, executed by the marshal of the district upon auswer the libel, was of any validity. In other words, such sale.
the question is whether the property of the plaintiff The proceedings mentioned were instituted under could be forfeited by the sentence of the court in a the act of Congress of July 17, 1862, “ to suppress in- judicial proceeding to which he was not allowed to surrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize appear and make answer to the charges against him, and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other upon the allegation of which the forfeiture was depurposes."
manded. In July, 1863, the premises in controversy were There were several libels of information filed against seized by the marshal of the district, by order of the the property of the plaintiff at the same time with tho district attorney, actiug under instructions from the one here mentioned. They were identical in their attorney-general. In August following, a libel of in- ' allegations, except as to the property seized, and the
same motion to strike from the files the appearance, proceeding. But the denial of the right to appear claim and answer of the respondent was made in each and be heard at all is a different matter altogether. case, and on the same day, and similar orders were The position of the defendant's counsel is, that as entered and like decrees of condemnation. One of the proceeding for the confiscation of the property was these was brought here, and is reported in the 11th of one in rem, the court, by seizure of the property, acWallace. In delivering the unanimous opinion of this quired jurisdiction to determine its liability to forfeitcourt, upon reversing the decree in the case, and refer- ure, and consequently had a right to decide all quesring to the order striking out the claim and answer, tions subsequently arising in the progress of the cause, Mr. Justice Swayne said: “The order in effect denied and its decree, however erroneous, cannot, therefore, the respondent a hearing. It is alleged he was in the be collaterally assailed. In supposed support of this position of an alien enemy, and could have no locus position opinions of this court in several cases are cited, standi in that forum. If assailed there, he could de- where similar language is used respecting the power of fend there. The liability and right are inseparable. a court to pass upon questions arising after jurisdioA different result would be a blot upon our jurispru- tiou has attached. But the preliminary proposition of dence and civilization. We cannot hesitate or doubt the counsel is not correct. The jurisdiction acquired on the subject. It would be contrary to the first prin- | by the court by seizure of the res was not to condemn ciples of the social compact and of the right adminis- the property without further proceedings. The phystration of justice." 11 Wallace, 267.
ical seizure did not of itself establish the allegations of The principle stated in this terse language lies at the libel, and could not, therefore, authorize the imthe foundation of all well-ordered systems of juris- mediate forfeiture of the property seized. A sentence prudence. Wherever one is assailed in his person or rendered simply from the fact of seizure would not be his property, there he may defend, for the liability and a judicial determination of the question of forfeiture, the right are inseparable. This is a principle of nat- but a mere arbitrary edict of the judicial officer. The ural justice, recognized as such by the common intelli- seizure in a suit in rem only brings the property seized gence and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a within the custody of the court, and informs the owner court pronounced against a party without hearing him, of that fact. The theory of the law is that all propor giving bim an opportunity to be heard, is not a ju-erty is in the possession of its owner in person or by dicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled agent, and that its seizure will, therefore, operate to to respect in any other tribunal,
impart notice to him. Where notice is thus given the That there must be notice to a party of some kind, owner has the right to appear and be heard respecting actual or constructive, to a valid judgment affecting the charges for which the forfeiture is claimed. That his rights, is admitted. Until notice is given the court right must be recognized and its exercise allowed behas no jurisdiction in any case to proceed to judge fore the court can proceed beyond the seizure to judgment, whatever its authority may be, by the law of its ment. The jurisdiction acquired by the seizure is not organization, over the subjeot-matter. But notice is to pass upon the question of forfeiture absolutely, but only for the purpose of affording the party an oppor- to pass upon that question after opportunity has been tunity of being heard upon the claim or the charges afforded to its owner and parties interested to appear made; it is a summons to him to appear and speak, if and be heard upon the charges. To this end some nohe has any thing to say, why the judgment sought tification of the proceedings, beyond that arising from should not be rendered. A denial to a party of the the seizure, prescribing the time within which the apbenefit of a notice would be in effect to deny that he pearance must be made, is essential. Such notification is entitled to notice at all, and the sham and decep- is usually given by monition, publio proclamation, or tive proceeding had better be omitted altogether. It publication in some other form. The manner of the would be like saying to a party, appear and you shall notification is immaterial, but the notification itself is be heard, and when he has appeared, saying your ap- indispensable. pearance shall not be recognized and you shall not be These views find corroboration in the opinion of Mr. heard. In the present case the District Court not Justice Story in the case of Bradstreet v. Neptune Inonly in effect said this, but immediately added a de- surance Co., 3 Sumn. 601. In that case the action was cree of condemnation, reciting that the default of all upon a policy of insurance upon a vessel, the declarapersons had been duly entered. It is difficult to speak tion alleging its loss by seizure of the Mexican governof a decree thus rendered with moderation; it was in ment. The defendants admitted the seizure, but fact a mere arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of a averred that it was made and that the vessel was conjudicial sentence.
demned for violation of the revenue laws of Mexico, The law is and always has been that whenever no- and, to prove the averment, produced a transcript of tice or citation is required, the party cited has the the record of the proceedings of the Mexican court right to appear and be heard, and when the latter is against the vessel, and of the decree of condemnation. denied, the former is ineffectual for any purpose. The Among the questions considered by the court was the denial to a party in such a case of the right to appear effect of that record as proof of the laws of Mexico, is in legal effect the recall of the citation to him. The and of the jurisdiction of the court and the cause of period within which the appearance must be made and seizure and condemnation. After stating that the the right to be heard exercised, is, of course, a matter sentence of a foreign court of admiralty aud prize in of regulation, depending either upon positive law, or rem was in general conclusive, not only in respect to the rules or orders of the court, or the established the parties in interest, but also for collateral purposes practice in such cases. And if the appearance be not and in collateral suits, as to the direct matter of title made, and the right to be heard be not exercised and property in judgment, and as to the facts on which within the period thus prescribed, the default of the the tribunal professed to proceed, Mr. Justice Story party prosecuted, or possible claimants of the prop- said, that it did not strike him that any sound distincerty, may, of course, be entered, and the allegations tion could be made between a sentence pronounced in of the libel be taken as true for the purpose of the rem by a court of admiralty and prize, and a like sen
tence pronounced by a municipal court upon a seizure material to the validity of a judgment in rem that conor other proceeding in rem; that in each the sentence structive notice at least should appear to have been was conclusive as to the title and property, and it given, as that actual notice should appear before the seemed to him was equally conclusive as to the facts record of a judgment in personam. “A proceeding," on which the sentence professed to be founded. But continued the court, “professing to determine the the learned judge added that it was an essential in- right of property, where no notice, written or congredient in every case, when such effect was sought to structive, is given, whatever else it might be called, be given to the sentence, that there should have been would not be entitled to be dignified with the name of proper judicial proceedings upon which to found the a judicial proceeding. It would be a mere arbitrary decree; that is, that there should have been some cer- edict, not to be regarded anywhere as the judgment tain written allegations of the offense, or statement of of a court." the charge for which the seizure was made, avd upon In the proceedings before the District Court in the which the forfeiture was sought to be enforced; and confiscation case, monition and notice, as already that there should be some personal or public notice of stated, were issued and published, but the appearance the proceedings, so that the parties in interest, or their of the owner, for which they called, having been rerepresentatives or agents, might know what the offense fused, the subsequent sentence of confiscation of his was with which they were charged, and might have an property was as inoperative upon his rights as though opportunity to defend themselves and to disprove the no monition or notice had ever been issued. The legal
" It is a rule," said the learned judge, “founded effect of striking out his appearance was to recall the in the first principles of natural justice, that a party monition and notice as to him. His position with shall have an opportunity to be heard in his defense reference to subsequent proceedings was then not unbefore his property is condemned, and that charges on like that of a party in a personal action after the serwhich the condemnation is sought shall be specific, vice made upon him has been set aside. A service set determinate and clear. If a seizure is made and con- aside is never service by which a judgment in the demuation is passed without the allegation of any action can be upheld. specific cause of forfeiture or offense, and without any The doctrine invoked by counsel, that where a court public notice of the proceedings, so that the parties in has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide interest have no opportunity of appearing and making every question which arises in the cause-and its judga defense, the sentence is not so much a judicial sen- ment, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally astence as an arbitrary sovereign edict. It has none of sailed-is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition, the elements of a judicial proceeding, and deserves not but, like all general propositions, is subject to many the respect of ang foreign nation. It ought to have no qualifications in its application. All courts, even the intrinsic credit given to it, either for its justice or for highest, are more or less limited in their jurisdiction; its truth, by any foreign tribunal. It amounts to little they are limited to particular classes of actions, such more, in common sense and common honesty, than as civil or criminal; or to particular modes of admin. the sentence of the tribunal which first punishes and istering relief, such as legal or equitable; or to transthen hears the party – castigulque auditque. It may be actions of a special character, such as arise on navigabinding upon the subjects of that particular nation. ble waters, or relate to the testamentary disposition But upon the eternal principles of justice it ought to of estates; or to the use of particular process in the have no binding obligation upon the rights or property enforcement of these judgments. Norton v. Meador, of the subjects of other nations, for it tramples under Circuit Court for California. Though the court may foot all the doctrines of international law, and is but possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject-matter a solemu fraud, if it is clothed with all the forms of a and of the parties, it is still limited in its modes of judicial proceeding."
procedure and in the extent and character of its judgIn another part of the same opiniou the judge char- ments. It must act judicially in all things, and cannot acterized such sentences “as mere mockeries, and as then transcend the power conferred by the law. li, iu no just sense judicial proceedings;" and declared for instance, the action be upon a money demand, the that they "ought to be deemed, both ex directo in rem court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over and collaterally, to be mere arbitrary edicts or sub- the subject and parties, has no power to pass judgstantial frauds."
ment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the This language, it is true, is used with respect to pro- defendant. If the action be for a libel or personal tort, ceedings in rem of a foreign court, but it is equally the court cannot order in the case a specific performapplicable and pertinent to proceedings in rem of a ance of a contract. If the action be for the possesdomestic court, when they are taken without any sion of real property, the court is powerless to admit monition or public notice to the parties. In Woodruj | in the case the probate of a will. Instances of this v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65, the subject of proceedings in rem kind show that the general doctrine stated by counsel in our courts is elaborately considered by the Supreme is subject to many qualifications. The judgments menCourt of Vermont. After stating that in such cases tioned, given in the cases supposed, would not be notice is given to the whole world, but that, from its merely erroneous, they would be absolutely void, benature, it is to the greater part of the world construct- cause the court in rendering them would transcend ive only, and mentioning the manner in which such the limits of its authority in those cases. See the lannotice is giveu in cases of seizure for violation of the guage of Mr. Justice Miller, to the same purport, in revenue laws, by publication of the substance of the the case of Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163. So it was libel, with the order of the court thereon, specifying held by this court in Bigelow v. Forrest, 9 Wall. 351, the time and place of trial, and by proclamation for that a judgment in a confiscation case condemning the all persons interested to appear and contest the for- fee of the property was void for the remainder after feiture claimed, the court observed that in every court, the termination of the life-estate of the owner. To and in all countries where judgments were respected, the objection that the decree was conclusive that the notice of some kind was given, and that it was just as entire fee was confiscated, Mr. Justice Strong, speak