well, because I imagine that each of those tenants probably has a number of subcontractors that it is responsible for.

Mr. OBERSTAR. This matter of strict liability for the airport operator is very troublesome, and I think burdensome. We do need to have a means of getting at security violations, but that is something I think we need to think through a little further, as we need to think further about some notes I made on compatibility of access doors.

You have a crew member that may have five stops in a day. Is that crew member going to have to have five separate cards for five separate access doors? And supposing the next day when they go to five other stops, and five other access doors. What about the burdens and the problems? What about the FBOs? How many access door cards are they going to have to have to get in?

The FAA has set an August 8 deadline for compliance, but they have not put out an advisory circular yet, according to my research on this matter, and our staff research on it.

MS. FREEMAN. On the advisory circular, we are very close to issuing an advisory circular, I would say within the next couple of weeks. It is undergoing internal coordination at this time, but, in addition, we have had continuing briefings with our FAA regional personnel on the items that are in the advisory circular, so that they can be working with the airport operators, and they are working with the airport operators to ensure implementation of the rule.

With respect to the compatibility issue, we did consider that and decided, finally, that while it is an issue of concern certainly to some of the air carrier pilots, we felt that it was an issue that should be resolved by industry rather than mandated by the Federal Government, because it would be of benefit to a few of the users of the airports and we felt would drive the system costs up tremendously, if we required one big national system.

There would also be difficulties in addressing who would be responsible for running the entire national system, and who would be accountable where there was a breach of the national system.

We understand that a committee has been set up following our presentation at the latest Airport Operators Council International (AOCI) seminar that we attended. We understand that a committee has been set up by that organization to study the feasibility of airport operators getting together and coming up with a compatible system.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is good to hear. I certainly think we need to have compatibility in this security matter, so sensitive but also so significant to aviation of all modes of transportation that move so quickly, and from north to south, east to west in this country.

There are a number of other questions I would like to pursue, but I think we have kept you here for a good long time, and we may want to call you back and pursue some points raised by other witnesses, and so at this time we will hold you excused, unless the gentleman from Arkansas has something.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. We will hold you excused at this time.

Mr. KNISELY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for your frank and straightforward statements.

[Mr. Knisely's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF ROBERT KNISELY, DEPUTY Assistant SECRETARY FOR BUDGET AND PROGRAMS, Department of TRANSPORTATION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the Department of Transportation's views concerning H.R. 1659. With me today is Ms. Darlene Freeman, Deputy Director of the FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security.

As you know, Secretary Skinner is in Europe this week to maintain the momentum of February's ICAO Aviation Conference in Montreal and build a unified approach to improved aviation security. He announced his specific agenda for security initiatives April 3, following his and the President's meetings with Pan Am 103 families. He is meeting this week with officials in Italy, West Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and France, and one subject will be the placement of explosives detection technology abroad. Use of the TNA devices overseas requires diplomatic and technical coordination, and he hopes to facilitate that process. We must be ready to place the equipment where it is most needed as soon as it is manufactured.

Before outlining the Department's views concerning H.R. 1659, I would first like to describe briefly for you several major security initiatives which Secretary Skinner has announced since his March 23 appearance before this Subcommittee. These initiatives include:

Requiring deployment of explosives detection systems such as the Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) device at the busiest airports in the U.S. and overseas where U.S. airlines operate. The U.S. will immediately initiate negotiations with foreign governments regarding installation of these systems at foreign airports, consistent with the Secretary's European initiative.

Assigning additional FAA security specialists to provide greater surveillance and assistance to U.S. carriers operating ast the busiest airports in the U.S. and over

seas.

Improving the FAA security bulletin process through which important security information is disseminated to the aviation community, in a variety of ways, including:

making compliance by U.S. air carriers with such directives mandatory; requiring acknowledged receipt within 24 hours;

requiring carriers to submit to FAA within 72 hours specific information on how they plan to carry out preventative measures; and

ensuring that specific information in security bulletins is distributed to pilots-incommand of airline flights.

Elevating standards for x-ray and metal detection equipment to assure that U.S. air carriers are using state-of-the-art equipment.

Forming a National Aviation Security Advisory Committee to provide a forum for the exchange and coordination of security programs and research and development designed to further enhance aviation security.

Conducting a top to bottom review and evaluation by FAA of how well U.S. air carriers are complying with security requirements. This effort will look at each airline's resources and general philosophy toward security.

Discussing with foreign governments new procedures for more effective coordination of the international assessment and dissemination of security information and countermeasures.

All of these measures are being address with a high sense of priority. The fight against terrorism is one of Secretary Skinner's highest priorities.

I would like to turn now to a brief discussion of H.R. 1659, which is pending before the Subcommittee. H.R. 1659 would require the FAA Administrator, within 60 days after the bill's enactment, the mandate the installation and use by air carriers, at selected airports domestically and overseas, of explosive detection equipment equivalent to or better than TNA technology. The bill would also establish a grant program through which air carriers could receive up to $200 million in reimbursement for the purchase and installation of required explosive detection equipment. The $100 million would be available commencing with $50 million in grant authority in FY 1989. The legislation would also make available an additional $170 million in grant authority ($85 million in FY 89) under the Airport Improvement Act for airports to purchase and install equipment needed to comply with FAA regulatory requirements regarding controlled access to secured areas of airports.

Although we recognize and fully appreciate your intent in proposing H.R. 1659, we do not support its enactment. The Secretary has already announced that the FAA will act to require explosive detection equipment such as the TNA at appropriate airports here and overseas. The FAA already possesses ample authority to issue such a requirement, and, as previously noted, this matter is a high priority with us. We have already begun efforts to define the nature of the equipment to be required along with a timetable and priority schedule. Legislation is not needed to facilitate our efforts in this area. We would ask only for the Subcommittee's continued support as we move forward to achieve the benefits of the state-of-the-art explosive detection technology on which we have worked for so long.

We also do not believe that there is a need for Federal funding of explosive detection equipment as contemplated by the bill's proposed $100 million grant program. The Secretary has considered various funding options for TNA-type equipment, and concluded that there is not sufficient reason to alter the existing framework under which air carriers are responsible for meeting FAA imposed security requirements. In fact, this framework is no different than that which exists for any other FAA regulatory requirements—such as TCAS collision avoidance systems—even if costs to the regulated party may be associated with their installation.

We agree that there is a need for a strong Federal presence in the security area, and the Federal Government has played a significant role. Between FY 1980 and 1989, for example, FAA has invested about $45 million for development of TNA and vapor detection technology alone. Additionally, we are increasing our security staff by 56 inspectors this year, and we are seeking in our FY 1990 budget an additional 120 security inspectors who will work closely with airports and airlines, here and abroad, to improve security. Our presence overseas will be strengthened as part of this increased staffing effort. These are legitimate facets of an appropriate Federal role, and we intend to continue to play a strong, active role in combatting the threat of terrorism.

We also do not support the bill's increased grant authority of $170 million to be made available to airport operators for purchasing and installing equipment to carry out FAA requirements related to access to secured areas. Airport operators may already use their entitlement grant fuels under existing Airport Improvement Program grant authority to defray from 75 to 90% of the costs of required security equipment if they choose. It is an airport operator's choice as to how to spend entitlement funds among various eligible projects. We do not favor provisions that would fund 100% of any eligible program, or increasing the overall grant program to assist airports in complying with FAA's recent rulemaking on secured access.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to stress that we appreciate the Subcommittee's interest in working to help improve the security of our air transportation system. We look forward to working closely with you and Members of this Subcommittee to strengthen our Nation's ability to respond to terrorist threats.

That completes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to questions you may have at this time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Our next witness is Mr. Richard Lally, Director of Security for the Air Transportation Association.

Mr. Lally, we appreciated your testimony at the March hearing of the Subcommittee on Aviation. You were very helpful and I think you presented a great deal of information that has been useful in our continuing deliberation on this matter. We respect your very long service in aviation security which has been noted in the previous hearing, and we will not repeat it here except to say that you have standing on this matter of great respect.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD F. LALLY, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have this opportunity to again discuss civil aviation security with the subcommittee, especially the legislation you have introduced, Mr. Chairman, that would require installation and use of explosives detection equipment.

In commenting on the proposed legislation, I would like to include some general observations on the quality of aviation security and the threat facing aviation security today.

First of all, I think it is very important to note that U.S. flag carrier operations are safe, and are secure, despite some misguided advice that has been circulated to the public that perhaps that is not the case.

I can assure you, from my own personal view, that U.S. air carrier operations are safe and are secure.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the gentlemen would yield at that point. I would just like to interrupt, to point out that—and I do not remember if I referred to these numbers in the previous hearing-but since 1969, U.S. airlines have screened 9.5 billion pieces of luggage, processed 9 billion passengers, detected 46,000 weapons, made 14,000 arrests, and at last count there were 1400 people serving a sentence for trying to move weapons through airports in contravention of law. That works out to a very good security record.

We went from a skyjacking every two weeks down to zero, and in fact, it is probably safer, on a statistical basis, to move through the airlines than it is to use an elevator in this country. There were more deaths from elevator failures last year than there were from skyjackings. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, sir. I agree. The record of the U.S. airlines is unmatched and it is a remarkable accomplishment in the security field. The security measures practiced by U.S. flag carriers operating out of the 45 high-risk airports in Europe and the Middle East were strengthened by the extraordinary security measures that were introduced in the summer of 1985, and were made even more stringent as the years went by.

Following the bombing of Pan Am 103, they were strengthened much more, so that today, the security measures practiced by U.S. air carriers operating out of the 45 high-threat airports in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, are clearly superior to those practiced by foreign air carriers.

We think the level of security provided by U.S. carriers is unmatched. There might be a few foreign carriers that can say, "We can do as well," but I am convinced that none can say, "We can do better."

So we feel, as mentioned earlier by the Chairman, and other members of the subcommittee, that there is a serious gap in the U.S. civil aviation security requirements. That is that the FAA regulations do not extend to the foreign air carriers, so that the same stringent security measures are not imposed on them for the same operations, from the same high-risk airports, to the United States, even though probably most of their passengers are U.S. citizens.

We think that is a serious gap and one that should be corrected, and we have so recommended, to the Executive Branch, and to this committee and to other committees of Congress.

The other point I would like to make is that over the past 3, 4, 5 years, there has been a very noticeable change in the threat facing civil aviation, and I think that the sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103 was the convincing piece of evidence, that today's threat is different from the threat that civil aviation faced in the 1960's and 1970's.

Today's threat is the threat of sabotage committed by international terrorists as opposed to the threat of hijacking committed by people who primarily wanted free transportation.

And given the nature of that threat, we think that it calls for a different response. Clearly, the terrorists who were responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 did not have a grudge against any passenger on that flight, or a crew member, or the airline itself. The target of that attack was the U.S. Government. The object of terrorist attacks, in general, is political in nature, and aimed at influencing the behavior and policies of governments.

So we feel that today's problem, today's threat, calls for a reevaluation, a reexamination, of the role of Government. Government needs to depart from and expand on its traditional regulatory response to become one of active involvement in the defenses against terrorist acts.

So we feel that the FAA should primarily provide more assistance at the high-threat locations. We suggest to FAA that the experts they have and they are truly talented experts-need to be reassigned in significant numbers to the high-risk areas of the world where they can work hand-in-hand with the airlines to provide continuous and direct assistance in accomplishing the extraordinary security requirements that are in place today.

At the same time these experts can coordinate and interact with the host governments to assure that the total security posture at those airports is adequate for U.S. air carrier operations.

In a sense, the presence of those security experts would constitute a continuing assessment of the security of those airports. They are in fact the 45 high-threat airports in the world, and if assessments are needed, they are needed at these locations more than anywhere else, and there is no reason why that presence could not constitute that continuing assessment.

The next form of Government assistance needed is covered in your bill, Mr. Chairman, that is that we need Government to expedite the availability of high technology to meet today's problem of detecting explosives.

The emergence of thermal neutron analysis equipment is the first product that has emerged out of a long-range FAA R&D program. FAA is to be commended for that accomplishment.

We think that given the nature of the threat, and the need for Government involvement, that it is appropriate that this equipment, particularly the first generation of this equipment at the high-threat airports, be funded by the Government.

So we therefore support your bill that would require the installation and use of this equipment at the high-risk airports of the world, and we support your proposal that the funding be provided by the Federal Government.

But we would make one additional observation, and that is, given the nature of the threat, and as has been mentioned here earlier, we are really facing a national security problem. So that it may be even more appropriate for this funding to come out of the general appropriations of Government, the tax structure, as has been mentioned also.

But, at any rate, we feel that Government funding of this equipment, and the presence of Federal Aviation security experts at