ceipt as laid in the indictment, that the bill of particulars and receipt was one entire thing, and ought all to have been set out, for that, without the particulars, the words "Received the contents above," did not show whether it was money or any other thing that was received. Judgment was respited; but in Mich. T. 1774, the judges were of opinion that the conviction was proper. The indictment stated it to be a receipt for money, and though, by the words "Received the contents above," it did not appear what was received, yet being averred he uttered or forged a receipt for money, the bill of particulars was proper evidence to prove that averment. (2 E. P. C. 926.) William Hunter was indicted for uttering a forged receipt for money, to wit, for the sum of 251. contained in a navy bill, which said forged receipt is as follows, that is to say, "William Thornton, William Hunter." The prisoner was a clerk in the navy office, and the navy bill came, in the course of business, into his hands in order to be forwarded for payment. He wrote the name Wm. Thornton, who was the person entitled to receive payment, and which, according to the course of office, was all the receipt necessary. Judgment was arrested, on the ground that it did not appear on the face of the indictment, nor did it appear by averment, that the instrument was a receipt. Buller, J. doubted, considering this to be as much a receipt as the writing a name was an indorsement on a bill of exchange. But to this it was answered, that the writing a name on the back of a bill was a complete indorsement without any thing more, whereas the name alone, as stated in the indictment, was no receipt; though the name coupled together with the navy bill might prove a receipt, but then it ought to be so stated, and the judges referred to an indictment where it was so laid. (Crown Circuit Comp. p. 405. Hunter's Case, 2 Leach, C. C. L. 711.)—Judgment was arrested. James Lyon was indicted for forging a scrip receipt for 20007. 3 per cent. consols, which the indictment charged to be a receipt for money. The form of the receipt was as follows: £2000 3 per cent. annuities, 1793. By virtue of a resolution of the House of Commons, for raising £4,500,000 for the service of the year 1793. Received of the sum of £144 for the deposit of £10 per cent. on £1440 subscribed by him in pursuance of the above resolution; and upon due payment of the remaining £90 per cent. of the said sum of £1440, the said subscriber or his assigns, by indorsement hereon, will, on exchange for this RECEIPT, become entitled to £2000 joint stock of 3 per cent. annuities, which was consolidated at the bank of England by certain acts, &c., the interest to commence from 5th Jan. 1795, witness my hand this 4th day of April, 1793, Ent. W. Johnson. T. Thompson. T. Thompson. Το To this indictment there was a demurrer, and the objection taken was, that there was no name from whom the money was received, and that therefore it was not a receipt for money. After argument the judges held that it was not a receipt for money within the meaning of the stat. 2 Geo. 2. c. 25. It was the duty of the cashier appointed by the bank to fill up the blanks in the printed paper with the subscribers' names, and until that blank was so filled up it did not become an acknowledgment of payment, or in other words a receipt for money; while in such a state it was no more a receipt than if the sum professed to be received were omitted. It hath been determined, that the entry of the receipt Harrison's case, of money or notes made by a cashier of the bank of England Cases C. L. 166. in the bank book of a creditor, is an accountable receipt for Receipt. the payment of money within the statute 7 Geo. 2. c. 22. and that altering the principal sum of any such entry, by prefixing a figure to increase its numeration, is forging a receipt within that statute. It has been decided that tendering false receipts merely as vouchers in the settlement of an account is within the statute 2 Geo. 2. c. 25. (Thomas's Case, 2 E. P. C. 984.) Warrant or Order for Payment of Money or Delivery of Goods. It seems now settled that if the warrant or order mentioned by the statute of 7 Geo. 2. c. 22. do not purport on the face of it, or be shown by proper averment, to be made by one having authority to command the payment of the money, or direct the delivery of the goods, and to be compulsory on the person having possession of the subject matter of it: but only purport to be a request to advance the money or supply the goods on the credit of the party applying, which the other may comply with or not, as he sees proper, is not a warrant or order within the statute. (2 E. P. C. 936.) It hath been decided, that an order drawn in the name Mary Mitchell's of an overseer of the poor, by a person who was or pretend- case, Foster's ed to be entitled to parochial relief, on the tradesman who C. L. 119. generally furnished the parish with goods, in the following form: "Mr. Jefferies, I desire you to let this woman have six yards of ordinary stuff, a pair of stockings, a shift, &c. and I will see it all paid for," is not an order for the delivery of goods within the statute 7 Geo. 2. c. 22; for the words "warrant or order," as they stand in the statute, are synonimous and expressive of one and the same idea, and in common parlance import that the person giving such warrant or order hath, or at least claimeth, an interest in the money or goods which are the subject matter of that warrant or order; that he hath, or at least assumeth, a disposing power over such money or goods, and taketh on him to transfer the property, or custody of them at least, to the person in whose favour such warrant or order is made; for though the present case may come within the mischiefs intended to be prevented, yet in the construction of acts so penal as this, the old rule of adhering strictly to the letter must not be departed from. Case of G. Wil + So also, to forge an order on a tradesman, in the name liams, before the of one of his customers, in the following form: "Please twelve judges, "to let the bearer, Captain George Williams, have twelve barrels "of tar, and in so doing you will oblige, yours, &c. W. R." is not an order for the delivery of goods within the meaning of the Cases C. L. 108. Elor's case, Cases C. L. 266. The case of John Clinch, statute. And upon the authority of the foregoing cases it has been held, that an order in the following form, "Please to "send ten pounds by the bearer, as I am so ill I cannot wait on you," is not an order for the payment of money; for the statute means such an order as, if genuine, the party giving it had a right to make, but this is a mere letter, rather requesting the loan of money than ordering the payment of it. So also, an order forged by a servant in the name of the son and apprentice of a tradesman, in the following form, Cases C. L. 457. Please to send by the bearer eight pounds of the silk unmark"ed," and carried to a dyer who had silk belonging to the trader to die, is not an order for the delivery of goods; for, in the first place, it is not directed to the person who had possession of the (a) See Jones's goods (a); and, in the next, the son and apprentice had no interest, claim of interest in, or a disposing power over the goods, nor any authority whatever to make such an order. case, Cases C. L. 51. John Jones's case, Cases C. L. 51. Order for delivery of goods. Lockitt's case, Order. But where a silversmith had sent two silver cups to Goldsmiths'-hall to be stamped, and his servant forged an order on the officer of the goldsmiths' company, in the name of his master, for the re-delivery of them, it was held, that this would have been an order for the delivery of goods within the statute: but as the order was not directed to any person, he was pardoned on condition of transportation. † And where a person went to the shop of a trader, lookCases C. L. 89. ed out goods, and paid for them by a draft on a banker, in this form, "Messrs. Fordyce and Co. Pay to Mr. W. H. or "bearer, sixteen pounds ten shillings, R. V." out of which he received six pounds ten shillings, it was decided, by the unanimous opinion of the twelve judges, to be an order for the payment of money within the statute 7 Geo. 2. c. 22. although neither the drawer of it, nor any person of his name, ever kept cash at Fordyce's banking shop; for the nature of the order assumes, that there was cash there in the name of the drawer, which he hath taken upon him to transfer to the person in whose favour the order was made. Bills of exchange may be laid as warrants or orders for the payment of money, as in Lockett's case (supra), when the judges held that every bill of exchange was an order for the payment of money, though not vice versa. See also Willoughby's Case, 2 E. P. C. 945. James McIntosh was convicted of forging and uttering an order for the payment of money in the words and figures following: Petersfield, 6th Aug. 1779. Sir, Please to pay on demand to Mr. Hugh Young, or order, all all my proportion of prize money due to me for my services on board his majesty's ship Leander, for which this shall be your authority. Witness my hand, This was laid in the indictment both ways, as a bill of exchange and as an order for the payment of money. It was objected that this was not a bill of exchange, nor an order for payment of money, under the stat 7 Geo. 2. c. 22. because no sum of money was mentioned; and secondly, that the instrument was void, under the st. 32 Geo. 2. c. 34. s. 2. as wanting the formalities requisite to an order for payment of prize money. The judges held the conviction proper. Several cases have decided, that the forgery need not be in the name of an existing person; thus, 116. + It has been decided, that a forged deed, purporting to be The case of a power of attorney from A. B. administratrix of her father Ann Lewis, C. D. a mariner, late belonging to such a ship, empowering E. F. Foster, C. L. to receive from the navy-office the wages due to the deceased, is within the letter and meaning of the statute 2 Geo. 2. c. 25. although it appear that C. D. died childless and unmarried, and of course that there could be no such person in rerum naturâ as A. B. the daughter of C. D. Sess. 1772. Cases C. L. 78. + So also, where one Bolland, the holder of a note of hand, Bolland's case, had indorsed it in his own name, but finding that the bad- O. B. Feb. ness of his credit prevented him from getting it discounted, erased all the letters except the initial of his name, and added the letters "anks," making the name Banks, whom he represented to be a wine-merchant living in Rathbone-place, but in fact no such person ever existed, it was decided to be a forgery within the statute 7 Geo. 2. c. 22. 159. + So also, where a person found a real bill of exchange, and, Tuft's case, in order to procure the cash for it, indorsed it in a fictitious Cases C. L. name, it was held to be a forgery, although no such person as the name forged was known to exist, and although the fictitious sig- Taylor's case, nature was not necessary to his obtaining the money. + So also it is said, that if a bill of exchange payable to A. or order, get into the hands of another person of the same name with the payee, and such person, knowing that he is not the person in whose favour it was drawn, indorse it, he is guilty of a forgery. Cases C. L. 191. Per LORD Mead v. Young, + But it hath been determined, that a person, who hath Rex v. Aickles, been long known by a name which was not his own, and Cases C. L. 345. who afterwards, for the purposes of concealment, assumes his own name, and in that name draws a bill of exchange, is not Sterling's case, Cogan's case, Cases C. L. 356. guilty of forgery, although the bill was drawn with an intention to defraud; for, in order to constitute this offence, the deed or instrument forged must, by the forgery, be made a false instru ment. It has also been decided, that a forged writing, purCases C. L. 95. porting to be the last will and testament of a person who is not dead, is a forgery within the above statute; for although there can be no such instrument as a last will and testament, in contemplation of law, until after the decease of the testator, it is sufficient if the forged instrument appears upon the face of it to be good, whether the supposed testator be alive or dead. Fitzgerald's case, Cases C. L. 20. Birch and Mar tin's case, Cases C. L. 74. Mary Dunn's Powell's case, Cases C. L. 193. notis. Lavell's So also it is said, that a forged will is within the statute, although the christian name of the supposed testator is wrong mentioned in the body of the will. + It is decided, that, in an indictment for forging a will, a certain paper writing, purporting to be the last will and "testament of," &c. is a sufficient description of the instrument forged. It has been decided, that if a person apply to a prize agent with a probate, purporting to be a probate of the will of her husband, in which she is named executrix, and obtain money from him due to the supposed testator, a receipt given by her as the wife and executrix of such testator is a forgery, if it appear that she is a different person, and not entitled to either of these characters; for although, if a person give a note entirely as his own, his subscribing it by a fictitious name will not make it a forgery, the credit in such case being given to the person subscribing it, yet if he give a receipt as the receipt of another, and by that means obtain credit, it is strictly and properly a false instrument. In an indictment for forgery, it is sufficient to aver a Cases C. L. 72. general intent to defraud, without setting out the particular manner by which the fraud was to be effected; for it is no answer to the charge of forgery, to say that there was no special intent Cases C.L. 213. to defraud any particular person: and if a particular person be named, a description of him to a common intent is all that is required: as if it charge the intention to defraud Messrs. "Drummond and Co. Charing-cross;" or to defraud “A. B. C. D. &c. the stewards of the feast of the sons of the clergy." Jones and Palmer's case, Cases C. L. 295. Bills of Exchange of Foreign States and Corporations. By the 43 Geo. 3. c. 139. it is enacted, "That if any person, "from and after the passing of this act, shall within any part of "the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, falsely "make, forge, or counterfeit, or cause or procure to be falsely "made, forged, or counterfeited, or knowingly aid or assist in "the false making, forging, or counterfeiting, any bill of exchange, or any promissory note, undertaking, or order for the payment of money, purporting to be the bill of exchange, promissory note, undertaking, or order for the payment of money, 66 of |