WITH the present number commences a second volume of the American Review. We embrace the occasion, to speak briefly of our position and prospects. If it is not due to any character which the Magazine has acquired for itself, it is at least due to the cordial interest of those who have aided it in reaching the point it occupies. It is, moreover, necessary that it be at once fully understood, and beyond the possibility of mistake, what were at first, and what must be, with any hope of success, the aims and efforts proposed in its establishment.

The great practical object of this work has always been, that it should be, in the fullest sense, NATIONAL. It was very clearly seen from the beginning, that on no narrower platform, could it be of the greatest effectual and abiding benefit to the country. And this was to be a nationality, not of mere numerical force, of extended, equal, and permanent circulation, but of universal acceptability and influence. It was not only to go into every part of the Union, but to be received in every part, as a reliable expositor-in politics, in literature, in morals, in social science of all the great and true interests of the commonwealth, the organ, for the nation, of a just conservative PROGRESS. It was evident, indeed, that the former of these great results could not be effected without the latter; the Review could never attain both an extended and permanent circulation, without rendering itself universally acceptable and influen

tial. It is from a want of attention to this plain necessity in the case, that every journal of importance, ever started in this country, has fallen in the way—failing, of course, to be generally received, equally as it failed of adapting itself for such reception. So simple a matter of history was not to be disregarded-even if the national influence of the work were not the main consideration, but merly an extended patronage.

This important object being distinctly. before us, several particular positions were evidently to be avoided.

In the first place, wherever located and conducted, the work must be kept very free from all sectional doctrines, and sectional prejudices, that could not be reasonably entertained in other portions of the country. Every one interested in its establishment felt the necessity of this; the point was fully discussed with, and by experienced and influential men from different parts of the Union, and distinguished persons, representing all sections in the national councils, united their names on the original prospectus, partly for the express purpose of guaranteeing to the community the maintenance of such a course. This course, accordingly, has been kept steadily in view, and is never to be lost sight of.

A second position, as plainly to be avoided, was that of a sectarian bias. Every one perceives at once the strong necessity, in this country, of keeping such an organ well aloof from such a position. The other great interests—of

THE framers of our National Constitution, and the people who adopted it, undoubtedly felt that the unavoidable imperfections of language might give rise to doubts respecting the true meaning of certain portions, and they therefore established, as part of the Constitution itself, an appropriate tribunal for its interpretation. This tribunal was designed as the national representative, as much so as the legislature or the executive; so that according to the true theory of our government, its decisions once made are ipso facto the decisions of the nation, pronounced in the only legal and constitutional way. They are to be regarded as the supreme law, until, if found inconvenient, they shall be remedied in the only method pointed out in the constitution for its own amendment. This tribunal, it is true might err-for it was a human institution-but in such a case, the nation, whose agent it is for this specific purrose, is supposed, by the fundamental compact, to which all in theory assent, to endorse its errors, and to make them part of the supreme law, until remedied in the method to which allusion has been made. Such was the original scheme of our constitution, and such the plan designed for its successful action. It was a scheme founded not only upon the soundest principles of political science, but also upon a healthy and unsophisticated common sense. It was the only possible resource against continual anarchy and revolution. When viewed in this light, we had some reason to boast of having a written frame of government, and to regard ourselves as superior, in this respect, to those comparatively free States whose constitutions were founded upon a long series of unwritten precedents and decisions. We would ask, however, whether experience has not shown that we have not such grounds for triumph in this respect as we fondly imagined? Has it not proved that the written, not through any intrinsic obscurity, but by the depravity and blindness of those upon whom it is to operate, may possess as much uncertainty and instability as the unwritten?

The constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, should, according to a sound theory, become the national mind -the same to the State that the indivi

dual soul is to the body. It should be that through which the nation thinks and wills, whilst no other public sentiment or public will is to be regarded as of any validity or entitled to any respect. Its justice, at least so far as interpretation is concerned, should be the national justice—its principles the national conscience. But paper and parchment never can effect this. Time alone is the great agent in the accomplishment of such a result. With us, however, the difficulty is, that this time cannot be allowed. Every man's private judgment, not only of what the Constitution actually does mean, but also of what it ought to be, is to be set off against the voice of the whole nation as expressed through its judiciary. In Eng-land, the fundamental law arose out of chaos, and in the course of centuries has grown to something like regular form and consistency. Our's, on the other hand, commenced in what we boasted of as certainty, and yet has every year been drifting farther and farther away into the tohu and bohu of unsettled interpretation, of private judgment, and individual responsibility. We will not give it time to strike its roots into the earth. We have acted like the foolish child in the fable, who pulled up his bean plant every morning, to see whether it had grown any during the night, until he finally so far destroyed all vitality as to prevent its ever becoming fixed in the soil.

The first serious injury inflicted upon the growth and expansion of this tender plant, consisted in departing from the only true mode of interpretation, namely, the plain grammatical meaning of language, and substituting certain arbitrary rules in its stead. Hence the doctrine of strict construction in reference to those objects to which the makers of this rule see fit to apply it, and of liberal construction in regard to others. next blow was the encouraging, on the part of some of our highest functionaries, of a mean, malignant, and demagogue spirit towards the tribunal which the Constitution had intrusted with its own interpretation. As a natural consequence, this was followed by the extravagant claim which was carried to its height during the disastrous administration of Andrew Jackson, namely, that the chief executive,

The

and by parity of reasoning every subordinate executive and legislative officer (for they too had consciences and had taken oaths) must support the constitution, as he in his individual wisdom might understand it. All this, we say, was for conscience sake. These most conscientious souls might, forsooth, be led into error by following the opinions of such men as Marshall and others, whose lives had been devoted to the study of constitution al law, and who were as far as possible removed from the heat of party strife. It was far better, they thought, to trust the cool and unbiassed judgment of a president or a secretary, daily engaged in the hottest and most unhallowed contentions of political warfare.

It has, however, been reserved for abolitionists, and especially their chief, James G. Birney, to discover and act upon a method of interpretation which throws this doctrine of General Jackson utterly into the shade. It opens an entirely new chapter in political and moral philosophy. General Jackson was willing to execute the Constitution as he understood it; yet still it was the Constitution, whole and entire, according to such understanding. James Birney also is willing to assume this solemn obligation. He is ready to take the oath without reserve or qualification, and yet assures us, in his letter to Mr. Shapter, that he should not execute certain parts of the Constitution, because he deems them repugnant to national justice. He does not mean to maintain that instrument, and laws made in pursuance thereof, as it really is, or as it may be interpreted by the national judiciary, or even as he himself may understand its provisions as now existing. What then does he intend to do? He swears to support the Constitution as it is, and yet means to execute it, not as it is, but as he thinks it ought to be.

Truly this may be called by way of distinction the conscientious age. Here is a deadly blow at the very roots of all moral obligation, an utter contempt of all the sanctions of an oath, and yet this is all on the score of conscience. There was nothing so unblushing in any of the iniquities of that abominable school whose enormities were exposed by Pascal. They vehemently denied the imputation in which Mr. Birney so openly glories. We may regard slavery to be as great an evil as we can well imagine,

stilleven in the most frightful picture of the most exaggerating abolitionist, it is not to be placed in the scale with the demoralizing effects of such a sentiment as this. Cruelty and oppression carry with them their own moral antidotes, but who ever assails or trifles with the sanctions of the oath, attacks the foundations of all truth and all morality. The soundest political writers and historians, whether of ancient or modern times, have eve regarded a low estimate of the solemnr obligations of the oath as one of the surest signs of a corrupt and degenerate age. The stern historian Livy most strikingly presents it as the great contrasting distinction between the religious integrity of the ancient and the atheistic licentiousness of the later Rome. There had not yet come, (he says,) that negligence of religious obligation, nor did each individual man, by interpreting oaths and laws according to his own wishes, force them into an accommodation with himself, but rather accommodated his own manners and habits to the law and the oath. Nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum et leges aptas faciebat, sed suos potius mores ad leges et jusjurandum accommodabat.*

For the better understanding of some of the points connected with this serious charge against Mr. Birney and his conscientious followers, it should be borne in mind, that there are in this country two distinct kinds of abolitionists. The one class may be styled, for distinction's sake, the Garrison, or Boston abolitionists, the other the followers of Birney, Smith, and Stewart, or as they style themselves,the Liberty Party. Without dwelling upon the trifling causes which produced the separation, it may be said that the Garrison portion at that time was generally regarded as the most fanatical, and the most dangerous. We believe, however, that the opposite of this is the truth. From a careful study of both societies and all their extravagances, we are satisfied that there is far more of moral principle in the eastern than in the western branch of these misguided fanatics. Setting out from those premises which they both hold in common, the former, with a rigid consistency, which, in itself, and aside from all other considerations is entitled to our admiration, have gone on, step by step, without flinching at the conclusions to which they saw themselves inevitably advancing, until they have finally arrived at theories