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of them were either the praises of some divinity, or moral precepts, or reflections on life, or gay exhortations to mirth, to wine, or to love. There were some Scolia of great antiquity; the most esteemed were those of Alcæus, of Praxilla, and of Anacreon.
P. 451. What Plato alludes to here runs in this manner: Υγιαινειν μεν αριστον ανδρι θνητῳ, δευτερον δε, καλοφυᾶ γενεσθαι, το τρίτον δε, πλουτειν αδόλως, και το τεταρτον, συνηβᾶν μετα των φιλων. On this subject, see Athenæus, L. 15. p. 694, where he alludes to this passage of Plato; Aristophan. Vesp: v. 1221, et Nubes, v. 1367, and Burette on Plutarch, de Musicâ and Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscript. vol. 15. p. 315.
P. 453. The first definition of rhetorick by Gorgias: Ότι Πειθοῦς δημιουργος εστι.
P. 454. His second and fuller definition is, 'Orɩ δημιουργος εστι της πειθούς της εν τοις δικαστηρίοις, και εν τοις άλλοις οχλοις, και περι τουτων & εστι δικαια τε και αδικα.
P. 455. Пept Iaтpov άipeσews.] There were publick physicians elected in most of the Greek cities, who received a salary from the commonwealth, and seem to have taken no fees of particular people. Those physicians who exercised this office, were said Snμoolevel. See Aristophan. in Avibus, v. 585, and Acharnens. v. 1029. Plutus, v. 508; but this custom seems to have been laid aside before Ol. 97. 4, in Athens: Aristophan. Plutus, v. 407. Gorgias, p. 514, and the Politicus, p. 259.
Ib. The third definition of rhetorick, to which Socrates reduces Gorgias, is this; 'ОT TEOUS EσTL δημιουργος πιστευτικής, αλλ' ου διδασκαλικής.
Ρ. 455. Περι του δια μέσου τείχους.] The Μακρα Texŋ, which joined Athens to the Piraeus were begun on the motion of Pericles, Ol. 80. 3. (Vid. Thucyd. L. 1. s. 107.) Socrates at that time was about twelve years old. See Plutarch in the lives of Pericles and Cimon. Harpocration tells us, that of the two walls which extended from the city to the Piraeus, the southern only, or the innermost, was called To dia peσov, as lying between the outermost, To Bopetov, and the To Paλnpikov, which was a third wall, drawn from Athens to the port Phalerus; and he cites this very passage.
P. 563. Socrates's own ludicrous definitions of eloquence to mortify the professors of it, as an art, are these: Εμπειρια τις χαριτος και ἡδονης απεργασιας· επιτήδευμα τι, τεχνικον μεν ου, ψυχης δε στοχαστικής, και ανδρειας, και φυσει δεινης προσομιλειν τοις ανθρωποις. Πολιτικής μοριου είδωλον, το κεφαλαιον δε αυτού, κολακεια αντιστροφον οψοποιΐας εν ψυχῃ, ὡς εκείνο μεν εν σωματι. There is much good sense in this part of the dialogue; he distinguishes the arts, which form and improve the body, into the gymnastick, which regulates its motions and maintains its proper habit, and the medical, which corrects its ill habits and cures its distempers those of the 1 soul, which answer to the former, are the legislative, which prescribes rules for its conduct
1 Η Νομοθετικη, και ἡ Δικαστικη, for we should so read it, as Ficinus and H. Stephanus seem to have found it in some MSS. though Quintilian, and Aristides also, in Orat. 1. contra Platonem pro Rhetoricâ, p. 7. edit. Jebb. Vol. 2. doubtless followed the common reading, Δικαιοσυνη ; the sense is the same, but the former reading seems more elegant. Plato comprehends both these arts under the general name, ἡ Πολιτικη.
and preserves its uprightness, and the judicative, which amends and redresses its deviation from those rules. Flattery, ever applying herself to the passions of men, without regarding any principle or proposing any rational end, has watched her opportunity, and assuming the form of these several arts, has introduced four counterfeits 1 in their room, viz. 1. Cookery, which, while it tickles the palate, pretends to maintain the body in health and vigour; 2. Cosmeticks, which conceal our defects and diseases under a borrowed beauty; 3. Sophistry, which, by the false lights it throws upon every thing, misleads our reason and palliates our vices; and 4. Rhetorick, which saves us from the chastisement we deserve and eludes the salutary rigour of justice.
As Quintilian has given the sense of this in Latin, and has also hit the true scope of the dialogue better than any one, I shall transcribe the whole passage, L. 2. § 15. "Plerique 2 autem, dum pauca ex Gorgiâ Platonis a prioribus imperitè excerpta legere contenti, neque hoc totum, neque alia ejus volumina evolvunt, in maximum errorem inciderunt; creduntque eum in hâc esse opinione, ut rhetoricen non artem, sed peritiam quandam gratiæ ac voluptatis, existimet, et alio loco,
1 Η Οψοποιητικη, ἡ Κομμωτικη, ἡ Σοφιστικη, και ἡ Ρητορικη : these deserve not the name of arts (Texva); for art (he says) eXEL λογον τινα, ὦ προσφερει ὁ προσφέρει, όποια αττα την φυσιν εστιν· ώστε την αιτίαν έκαστου εχειν ειπειν : whereas these are only Εμπειριαι, τριβαι, επιτηδεύσεις (i.e. knacks, practices, businesses) άι του ἡδεος στοχαζονται ανευ του βελτιστου. See Gorgias, p. 501.
2 Cicero himself seems to fall under this censure, L. 1. de Oratore, where he mistakes the great end and aim of this dialogue.
civilitatis particulæ simulachrum, et quartam partem adulationis: quod duas partes civilitatis corpori assignet, medicinam, et quam interpretantur, exercitatricem ; duas animo, legalem atque justitiam. Adulationem
autem medicinæ vocet coquorum artificium et exercitatricis mangonum, qui colorem fuco et verum robur inani saginâ mentiantur, legalis, cavillatricem, justitiæ, rhetoricen. Quæ omnia sunt quidem scripta in hoc libro, dictaque a Socrate, cujus personâ videtur Plato significare, quid sentiat. Sed alii sunt ejus sermones, ad coarguendos qui contra disputant, compositi, quos ελεγκτικούς vocant; alii ad præcipiendum qui δογματικοι appellantur. Socrates autem, seu Plato, eam quidem, quæ tum exercebatur, rhetoricen talem putavit, nam et dicit his verbis, τουτον τον τροπον ὃν ὑμεῖς πολιτευεσθε ; non autem vera et honesta intelligit. Itaque disputationem illam contra Gorgiam ita claudit, ουκουν αναγκη τον ῥητορικον δικαιον ειναι, τονδε δικαιον βουλεσθαι δικαια και πραττειν. Ad quod ille quidem conticescit, sed sermonem suscipit Polus juvenili calore inconsideratior, contra quem illa de simulachro et adulatione dicuntur. Tum Callicles adhuc concitatior, qui tamen ad hanc ducitur clausulam, τον μελλοντα ορθως ῥητορικον εσεσθαι δικαιον αρα δειν είναι, και επιστημονα των δικαιων: ut appareat Platoni non rhetoricen videri malum, sed eam veram nisi justo et bono non contingere," &c.
Ρ. 465. Λειοτητι και αισθησει.] Read Εσθητι, as in Aristides, Orat. 1. cont. Plat. Ed. Jebb. Vol. 2. p. 8.
Ib. Το του Αναξαγόρου.] An allusion to the first words of Anaxagoras's philosophy, Паvτа xρημata nv
ὁμου, ειτα Νούς ελθων αυτα διεκοσμησε. Diog. Laert. L. 2. Sect. 6.
Ρ. 467. Ω λῶστε Πῶλε, ἵνα προσειπω σε κατα σε.] Α jingle of sounds, such as Polus had prescribed in his Art of Rhetorick. So in the Symposium: Παυσανίου δε παυσαμένου (διδασκοῦσι με γαρ ισα λεγειν δι Σοφοι) p. 185. and in the Hipparchus, p. 225. Και χωρα και ώρα, &c.
Ib. Ου τουτο βουλεται ὁ αλλ' εκεινο οὗ ενεκα πραττει.] He is here proving that fundamental 1 principle of his doctrine, namely, that the wicked man is doing he knows not what, and sins only through ignorance and that the end of his actions, like that of all other men, is good, but he mistakes the nature of it, and uses wrong means to attain it.
Ρ. 468. Το αγαθον αρα διωκοντες.] See Locke on Hum. Und. B. 2. Ch. 21. sect. 41, 42. on Power.
Ρ. 470. Εχθες και πρωην.] As the time of this dialogue plainly appears (from that passage in p. 473. και περυσι βουλευων λαχων, &c. which is taken notice of by Athenæus, L. 5. p. 217.) to be Ol. 93. 4. the year after the sea-fight at Arginusæ, these words must be taken in a larger sense, as we say of a thing long since past, "It happened but the other day," when we would
1 Vid. Protagoram, p. 357. et sequent. et Epist. ad Dionis Famil. p. 336. Meno, p. 77, 78. Philebus, p. 22. Sophist. p. 228. This was a real maxim of Socrates; Ουδένα γαρ ὑπελαμβανε πραττειν παρα το βελτιστον, αλλα δι' αγνοιαν. Aristot. Ethic. ad Nicom. L. 7. c. 2. Ουδείς γαρ αν έκων εθελοι πείθεσθαι πραττειν τουτο, ότω μη το χαιρειν του λυπεισθαι μαλλον έπεται· σκοτοδινιᾶν δε το ποῤῥωθεν δρωμενον πᾶσιν, ὡς επος ειπειν, παρεχει. Plato de Legibus. L. 2. p. 663.