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terpreted. I must therefore hold that the discovery of the mineral character of land in sections 16 and 36, subsequent to survey, does not defeat the title of the State to the same as school land. The case of Sherman vs. Buick (45 Cal., 656) is cited by counsel. In this case, the court held that "the title to each sixteenth and thirty-sixth section, upon its being surveyed, vests absolutely in the State." This decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court at the present term.

After a careful examination of the case, however, I do not think that the question of the title of the State to mineral lands is involved, or that the decision in any way affects that question.

It is not intended to assert that the title to the lands in said sections passes to the State upon the survey under the provisions of the acts of July 26, 1866, and July 9, 1870, said lands at the date of survey being recognized and regarded as mineral.

The views expressed by Secretary Delano, before referred to, will continue to control the Department in the disposal of lands thus designated.

There are other questions presented in the case under consideration; but if the views above expressed are correct, their consideration is not called for.

Your decision is reversed, and the papers transmitted with your letter of September 10, 1875, are herewith returned.

Very respectfully,

To the COMMISSIONER OF the GENERAL LAND OFFICE.

C. SCHURZ, Secretary.

School sections in Colorado do not pass to the State if they are known to contain valuable deposits of coal.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE, Washington, D. C., March 30, 1877. GENTLEMEN: With your letter of the 19th instant you transmitted the application of Michael B. Fox and Thomas M. Patterson to enter the southeast quarter of section 16, township 1 south, rauge 70 west, as coal land.

You refused this application, for the reason that the tract applied for is in a school section.

The question is presented whether lands which fall within sections 16 and 36 pass to the State of Colorado under the act of Congress approved March 3, 1875, (18 Stat., 474,) entitled "An act to enable the people of Colorado to form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of the said State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States," where the same contain valuable deposits of coal.

The 7th section of said act provides "that sections numbered 16 and 36 in every township, and where such sections have been sold or otherwise disposed of by any act of Congress, other land equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not more than one quarter section, and as contiguous as may be, are hereby granted to said State for the support of common schools."

Section 15 of said act provides "that all mineral lands shall be excepted from the operation and grants of this act."

The words "mineral land," as they occur in the several acts regulating the disposal of the public domain, are used in contradistinction to the words "agricultural land." That lands containing valuable deposits of coal have been considered and treated as mineral lands is evident from the text of the act of July 1, 1864, (13 Stat., 343,) entitled "An act for the disposal of coal lauds and of town property in the public domain," viz, "That where any tracts embracing coal beds or coal fields, constituting portions of the public domain, and which as 'mines' are excluded from the pre-emption act of 1841, and which, under past legislation, are not liable to ordinary private entry," &c. The Revised Statutes of the United States provide for the sale of coal lands under the general term "mineral lands and mining resources." (Vide title 32, chapter 6, Revised Statutes.)

The Hon. Secretary of the Interior, on the 7th of May, 1875, affirmed the decision of this office in case of James P. Hogden et al. vs. The State of California, and held that mineral lands did not pass to the State of California under the act of 3d of March, 1853, entitled "An act to provide for the survey of the public lands in California, the granting of pre-emption rights therein, and for other purposes," (10 Stat., 244,) and that coal lands are mineral lands.

It is therefore held that sections 16 and 36 in the several townships do not pass to the State of Colorado under the act of 3d March, 1875, if the same contain valuable deposits of coal.

You will therefore allow said applicant to file upon and enter said tract upon full compliance with the law and instructions, should no appeal be taken from this decision within sixty days from the date of your notification to all parties in interest.

Very respectfully,

Denver, Colorado.

REGISTER and RECEIVER,

J. A. WILLIAMSON, Commissioner.

School sections in Nevada which are mineral in character do not pass to the State.

Supreme Court of the United States.-October term, 1876.

SOLOMON HEydenfeldt, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, vs. THE DANEY GOLD AND SILVER Mining Company.

In error to the supreme court of the State of Nevada.

Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment to recover a specific portion of the west half of the sonthwest quarter of section 16, township 16, range 21 east, in Lyon County, Nevada. The land in controversy is rich in minerals, and was not surveyed by the United States until the year 1867. Prior to the date of the survey, or the approval of it, the defendant's grantors and predecessors in interest had for mining purposes entered upon the land, and claimed and occupied it according to the mining laws and the custom of miners in the locality. This possession and claim of ownership have been continuous and uninterrupted, and the defendant has expended over eighty thousand dollars in the construction of improvements for carrying on the business of mining on the land. The plaintiff claims title from the state by patent. It is dated the 14th day of July, 1868, and was issued on the assumption that sections sixteen and thirty-six, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, and whether containing minerals or not, were granted to the State for the support of common schools by the seventh section of the Nevada enabling act, approved March 21, 1864, (13 Stat., 32.)

This interpretation of that act is denied by the General Government, and the defendant has a patent of the 2d of March, 1874, from the United States for the land in controversy, issued in conformity with the laws of Congress on the subject of mining. Which is the better title is the point for decision. It has been the settled policy of the government to promote the development of the mining resources of the country, and as mining is the chief industry in Nevada, the question presented for decision is of great interest to the people of that State.

The seventh section of that act is as follows: "That sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in every township, and where such sections have been sold or otherwise disposed of by any act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than one quarter-section, and as contiguous as may be, shall be and are hereby granted to said State for the support of common schools."

It is true that there are words of present grant in this law, but in construing it we are not to look at any single phrase in it, but to its whole scope, in order to arrive at the intention of the makers of it. "It is better always," says Sharswood, Judge, "to adhere to a plain common sense interpretation of the words of a statute than to apply to them refined and technical rules of grammatical construction." (Gyges's Estate, 65 Pa. State, 312.)

If a literal interpretation of any part of it would operate unjustly or lead to absurd results and be contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken as a whole, it will be rejected. And there is no better way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when there are expressions in it which are rendered ambiguous by their connection with other clauses, than by considering the necessity for it and the causes which induced the legislature to pass it. With these rules as our guide it is not difficult, we think, to give a true construction to the law in controversy.

Congress, at the time, was desirous that the people of the Territory of Nevada should form a state government and come into the Union. The terms on which this admission could be obtained were proposed, and, as was customary in the enabling acts for new States, the particular sections of the public lands to be donated to the State for the use of common schools were specified. These sections had not been surveyed, nor had Congress then made, or anthorized to be made, any disposition of the public lands within the Territory of Nevada.

But this condition of things did not stand in the way of Congress making proper provision on the subject. Some provision was necessary in order to place Nevada in this respect on equal footing with States recently admitted. But the people were not interested in getting the identical 16th and 36th sections in every township. Indeed, it could not be known until after survey where these sections would fall, and a grant of quantity put Nevada in as good a condition as other States which had received the benefit of this bounty. A grant operating at once and attaching prior to the surveys by the United States would deprive Congress of the power of disposing of any part of the public domain until there was a segregation by survey of the land granted. In the mean time further improvements would be arrested, and the persons who before the surveys were made had occupied and improved the country would lose their possessions and labor, in case it turned out that they had settled upon the granted lands. Con

gress was fully advised of the condition of a new community like Nevada, of the evil effects of such legislation upon its prosperity, and of all antecedent legislation upon the subject of the public lands within the bounds of the proposed new State. In the light of this information, and surrounded by these circumstances, Congress made the grant in question. That it is ambiguous is very clear, for the different parts of it cannot be reconciled, if the words used are to receive their usual meaning. Schulenberg vs. Harriman (21 Wallace, 44) establishes the rule that "unless there are other clauses in a statute restraining the operation of words of present grant, these must be taken in their natural sense." This is a correct rule, and we do not seek to depart from it, but there are words of qualification in this graut.

And these words restrict the operation of the words of present grant. If their literal meaning be taken, they refer to past transactions; but evidently they were not used in this sense, for there had been no lands in Nevada sold or disposed of by any act of Congress, and why indemnify the State against a loss that could not occur? There could be no loss, and there was no occasion of making provision for substituted lands if the grant took effect absolutely on the admission of the State into the Union, and the title to the lands then vested in the State. Congress cannot be supposed to have intended a vain thing, and yet it is quite certain that the language of the qualification was intended to protect the State against a loss that might happen through the action of Congress in selling or disposing of the public domain. It could not, as we have seen, apply to past sales or dispositions, and to have any effect at all, must be held to apply to the future.

This interpretation, although seemingly contrary to the letter of the statute, is within its reason and spirit. It accords with a wise public policy, gives to Nevada all she had any right to ask for, and acquits Congress of passing a law which in its effects would be unjust to the people of the territory. Besides, no other construction is consistent with the statute as a whole, and this alone answers the evident intention which the makers of it had in view, and this was to grant to the State in præsenti a quantity of land equal in amount to the 16th and 36th sections, the grant to take effect when the status of the lands was fixed by survey and they were capable of identification. Congress, however, reserved until this was done the power of disposition, and if in the exercise of this power the whole or any part of a 16th or 36th section had been disposed of, the State was to be compensated by other lands equal in quantity and as near as may be in quality. By this means the State was indemnified against loss, and the people ran no risk of losing the labor of years. While the State suffered no injury, Congress was left free to dispose of the public domain in any way it saw fit, to promote the interests of the people.

It is argued that, conceding the construction given this grant to be correct, this defense cannot be sustained, because the land in controversy was not actually sold by direction of Congress until after this survey. This position ignores a familiar rule in the construction of statutes, that they must be so construed as to admit all parts of them to stand if possible. (Bouvier's Institutes, p. 42, sec. 7.)

The language used is, "sold or otherwise disposed of by any act of Congress," and the point made by the plaintiff would reject a part of these words from the statute. To limit the qualification to the grant in this way would defeat one of the main purposes Congress had in view. Congress knew, as did the whole country, that Nevada was possessed of great mineral wealth, and that mineral lands should be disposed of differently from those which were fit only for agriculture. No me hod for doing this had then been provided, but Congress said to the people of the Territory, "You shall, if you decide to come into the Union, have for the use of schools a quantity of land equal to two sections in every township, and the identical sections themselves, if on survey no one else has any claim to them, but until this decision is made and the lands surveyed we reserve the right, either to sell them or dispose of them in any other way that commends itself to our judgment." This right of disposition is subject to no limitations, and the wisdom of not surrendering it is apparent. The whole country is interested in the development of its mineral wealth, and to accomplish this object adequate protection was required for those engaged in this business. This protection was furnished by the act of Congress of July 26, 1866, (14 U. S. Stats., p. 251,) which was passed before the land in controversy was surveyed. This act disposes of the mineral lands of the United States to actual occupants and claimants, and provides a method for the acquisition of title from the United States. And these defendants occupied the land prior to the survey and were entitled to purchase, and the patent subsequently obtained from the Government relates back to the time of the original location and entry, and perfects their title.

These views dispose of this case, but there is another ground equally conclusive. Congress, on the 4th of July, 1-66, (14 Stat., p. 85,) passed an act, concerning lands granted to the State of Nevada, and, among other things, reserved from sale all mineral lands in the State, and authorized the lines of surveys to be changed from rectangular, so as to exclude them. This was, doubtless, intended by Congress as a construction of the grant in this case; but whether that construction be correct or not, and

whatever may be the effect of the grant in its original shape, it was clearly competent for the grantee to accept it in its modified form and agree to any construction put upon it by the grantor. The State, through its legislature, (see act of February 13, 1867,) ratified the construction given to it by Congress, and accepted it with the conditions annexed.

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We agree with the supreme court of Nevada that this acceptance was a recognition by the legislature of the State of the validity of the claim made by the Government of the United States to the mineral lands."

It is objected that the constitution of Nevada inhibited such legislation, but the supreme court of the State, in the case we are reviewing, held that it did not, (10 Nevada Reports, p. 314,) and we think their reasoning on this subject is conclusive. We see no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.

Salt springs and land adjacent are reserved from sale.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GENERAL LAND OFFICE,

Washington, D. C., March 2, 1876. GENTLEMEN: I have carefully examined the papers and testimony transmitted with your letter of the 1st October, 1875, in case of C. L. Hall vs. A. T. Litchfield et al. The question presented is as to the true character of the following described tracts, viz: The southeast quarter of southeast quarter section 36, township 12 south, range 77 west; the east half of northeast quarter of section 1, township 13 south, range 77 west; and the south half of southwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of southwest quarter of southeast quarter of section 31, township 12 south, range 76 west, Colorado.

The testimony submitted in the case is very voluminous and quite contradictory. The northeast quarter of northeast quarter of section 1, township 13 south, range 77 west, was returned by the surveyor general as saline lands, and the evidence submitted fails to establish the incorrectness of this return.

The township plats of township 13 south, ranges 76 and 77 west, show that a salt spring is situated immediately to the east of the township line between said townships. By the evidence it appears that on the northwest quarter of section 6, township 13 south, range 76 west, there is situated said salt spring and flowing wells of salt water. It also appears from the evidence that several salt springs are found along a salt creek which flows through the northwest quarter of said section 6 and the south half of the southwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of southwest quarter of section 31, township 12 south, range 76 west.

It is shown by the testimony that said northeast quarter of northeast quarter, section 1, township 13 south, range 76 west, the south half of southwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of southwest quarter of section 31, township 12 south, range 76 west, are of little, if any, use for agricultural purposes, and being saline lands as hereinbefore stated, are not subject to homestead or pre-emption entry. (Vide secs. 2258 and 2289, Revised Statutes of the United States.)

The policy of the Government has been uniform since the inauguration of the land system to reserve from sale salt springs.

The act of May 18, 1796, (1 Stat., 466,) requires every surveyor to note in his fieldbook the true situation of all mines, salt licks and salt springs, and reserves for future disposition by the United States every salt spring which may be discovered, together with the section of one mile square which includes it.

The act of May 10, 1800, (2 Stat., 73,) continued these reservations and authorized sales to be made of the public lands by the register and receiver, excluding the sections reserved by the above mentioned fact.

The act of March 26, 1804, (2 Stat., 277,) providing for the disposal of the public lands in the Indiana Territory, declares that "the several salt springs in the said Territory, together with as many contiguous sections to each as shall be deemed necessary by the President of the United States, shall be reserved for the future disposal of the United States."

It has been the policy of the Government to reserve these salt springs and lands from sale, as is evidenced by the text of the different acts regulating the disposal of the public lands.

The act of April 30, 1802, (2 Stat., 173,) admitting the State of Ohio, granted to the State certain salt springs.

The act of April 18, 1818, (3 Stat., 429,) authorizing the admission of the State of Illinois, grants all the salt springs and the lands reserved for the use of the same to the State.

The act of March 6, 1820, (3 Stat., 545,) authorizing the people of Missouri to form a State government, and for the admission of the State, provides "that all salt springs not exceeding twelve in number, with six sections of land adjoining to each shall be granted to the said State for the use of said State. Provided that no salt

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spring, the right whereof now is or hereafter shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual or individuals, shall by this section be granted to the said State."

The same provision is made in the acts providing for the admission of the following named States, as was provided in case of Missouri, viz:

Arkansas, (5 Stat., 58;) Michigan, (5 Stat., 59 ;) Florida, (5 Stat., 789;) Iowa, (5 Stat., 789;) Wisconsin, (9 Stat., 58;) Minnesota, (11 Stat., 166;) Oregon, (11 Stat., 383;) Kansas, (11 Stat., 269;) Nebraska, (13 Stat., 47.)

The act approved March 3, 1875, (17 Stat., 474,) enabling the people of Colorado to form a State government, and for the admission of the State into the Union, has the same provisions in regard to salt springs as those contained in the Missouri act.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Morton vs. Nebraska, (21 Wall., 660,) construed the proviso in the grant to Nebraska of salt lands. This proviso reads the same in the Nebraska and Colorado acts, viz: "Provided that no salt spring or lands the right whereof is now vested in any individual or individuals, or which hereafter shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual or individuals, shall by this act be granted to said State."

The State of Nebraska is within the limits of the Louisiana purchase. That part of Colorado which embraces the salt springs in controversy lies within the boundaries of the territory ceded by Mexico to the United States. In said decision it was held that "the real purpose of the proviso is to be found in the situation of the country embraced in the Louisiana purchase. The treaty of Paris of April 30, 1803, by which the "province of Louisiana" was acquired, stipulated for the protection of private property.

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In this condition of things Congress thought proper in granting the salt springs to the State to say that no salt springs the right whereof now is or shall be confirmed or adjudged to any individual, shall pass under the grant to the State. Whether this legislation was necessary to save salt springs claimed under the French treaty it is not important to determine, but manifestly it had this purpose in view and nothing more. It could not refer to salt springs not thus claimed, because all entry upon them was unlawful on account of previous re-ervation. This proviso can have little significance in the enabling art of Nebraska, or indeed in many other enabling acts, but Congress doubtless thought proper to in roduce it out of the superabundance of caution; as there could be no certainty that in purchased or conquered territory, however remote from settlement, there might not be private claims protected by treaty. stipulation to which it would be applicable. It cannot be invoked, however, for the protection of these plaintiffs. When a vested right is spoken of in a statute, it means a right lawfully vested, and this excludes the locations in question, for they were made on lands reserved from sale or entry."

The court also held that "the purpose Congress had in view is to be found in the unbroken line of policy in reference to saline reservations from 1796 to the date of this act. To perpetuate this policy and apply it equally to all the lands of the three Territories, (Kausas, Nebraska, and New Mexico,) was the controlling consideration for the incorporation of the section, (4th section, July 22, 1854, 10 Stat., 308;) and although the words of the section are loose and general, their meaning is plain enough when taken in connection with the previous legislation on the subject of salines. It cannot be supposed without an express declaration to that effect, that Congress intended to permit the sale of salines in Territories soon to be organized into States, and thus subvert a long established policy, by which it had been governed in similar cases.

In the case under consideration it is not shown that any valuable deposit of salt is found upon the land in controversy, but said lands appear to be valuable only on account of said salt springs.

After a careful consideration of all the fact and the law in the case, I am clearly of the opinion that this office has no authority to dispose of said tracts, either as agricultural or mineral lands; but that said salt springs, “with six sections adjoining and as contiguous as may be to each" should be reserved, in order that the State of Colorado may be placed on an equal footing with other States in the matter of salt springs reserva ions.

The filing, therefore, made by C. L. Hall and A. T. Litchfield et al., are both rejected.

You will inform all parties in interest and acknowledge the receipt hereof, allowing sixty days for appeal.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

REGISTER and RECEIVER,

Fair Play, Col.

L. K. LIPPINCOTT,
Acting Commissioner.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, D. C., February 13, 1877.

SIR: I have considered the case of C. L. Hall vs. A. T. Litchfield et al., involving the right to enter the southeast quarter of southeast quarter section 36, township 12 south

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