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sounds discovered a certain number of vowels, distinguished others of a different power, called consonants, some of which were mutes, and others liquids, and to the whole combination of elements he gave the form and name of an alphabet.
P. 20. The good, which constitutes happiness, must be in itself sufficient and perfect, the aim and end of all human creatures.
A life of mere pleasure considered by itself, which, (if pleasure only be that good) must need no mixture nor addition.
If we had no memory nor reflection, we could have no enjoyment of past pleasure, nor hope of future, and scarcely any perception of the present, which would be much like the life of an oyster: on the other hand, a life of thought and reflection, without any sense of pleasure or of pain, seems no desirable state. Neither contemplation, therefore, nor pleasure, are the good we seek after, but probably a life composed of both.
P. 22. Whether the happiness of this mixed state is the result of pleasure, or rather of wisdom, and which contributes most to it?
P. 23. Division of all existence into the infinite, the limited, the mixed, which is composed of the two former, and the supreme cause of all.
πριν αν εν αυτή τας διαφορας ειδη πασας όποσαι περ εν ειδεσι κεινται· τας δε αυ παντοδαπας ανομοιοτητας, όταν εν πληθεσιν οφθωσι, μη δυνατον είναι δυσωπούμενον παυεσθαι, πριν αν συμπαντα οικεία εντος μιας ὁμοιοτητος ερξας, γενοῦς τινος ουσιᾳ περιβαλη.
1 Or rather, that which limits and gives bounds (тO TEрas) such as figure, which gives bounds to extension; as time, which limits duration, &c.
Example of the first; all that admits of increase or decrease, greater or less, hotter or colder, &c. i.e. all undetermined quantity.
Of the second; all that determines quantity, as equality, duplicity, and whatever relation number bears to number, and measure to measure.
Of the third, or mixed; all created things, in which the infinity of matter is, by number and measure, reduced to proportion.
P. 27. Pleasure and pain, having no bounds1 in themselves, are of the nature of the infinite.
P. 28. The supreme power and wisdom of the Deity asserted.
But a small portion of the several elements is visible in our frame. Our soul is a small portion of the spirit of the universe, or fourth kind mentioned above.
P. 31. Pain is a consequence of a 2 dissolution of that symmetry and harmony in our fabrick, which is the cause of health, strength, &c. as pleasure results
1 Happiness and misery, says Mr. Locke, are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; but of some degrees of them we have very lively ideas. (Chapt. of Power, 1. 41.)
2 This is an idea of Timæus, the Locrian: 'Okoσαι μEV WV (TWV Κινασεων) εξιστάντι ταν φυσιν, αλγειναι εντι ὁκοσαι δε αποκαθιστ τάντι ες αυταν, άδοναι ονομαινονται. And Mr. Locke makes much the same observation. Excess of cold (says he) as well as heat, pains us; because it is equally destructive of that temper, which is necessary to the preservation, and the exercise of the several functions of the body, and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth, or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds. Essay on H. U. Ch. 7. §. 4.
from the return and restoration of the parts to their just proportions.
Thus hunger and thirst are uneasinesses proceeding from emptiness; eating and drinking produce pleasure by restoring a proper degree of repletion. Excess of cold is attended with a sensation of pain, and warmth brings with it an equal pleasure.
Pleasures and pains of the soul alone arise from the1 expectation of pleasure or pain of the body: these are hopes and fears, and depend upon the memory.
A state of indifference is without pleasure or pain, which is consistent with a life of thought and contemplation.
P. 33. Sensation is conveyed to the soul through the organs of the body; the body 2 may receive many motions and alterations unperceived by the mind.
Memory is the preserver of our sensations.
Recollection, an act of the mind alone, restores to us ideas imprinted in the memory, after an intermission. Desire, in the mind alone, by which it supplies the wants of the body: it depends on memory.
In the appetites, pleasure and pain go together, a
1 66 Hope is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him. Fear is an uneasiness upon the thought of future evil, likely to befall us." Locke H.U. Ch. 20. Φοβος ἡ προ λυπης ελπις θαῤῥος δε, ἡ προ του εναντιου. L. 1. Legum. p. 644.
2 This is also from Timæus. Κινασιων δε των απο των εκτός τας μεν αναδιδομένας εις τον φρονεοντα τοπον, αισθησιας ειμεν, τας δε ὑπ ̓ αντιλαψιν μη πιπτοισας, ανεπαισθητως, η τω τα πασχοντα σωματα γεωδεστερα ειμεν, η τω τας κινασιας αμενηνοτερας γιγνεσθαι. De Animâ Mundi. p. 100.
proportionable satisfaction succeeding as the uneasiness abates.
Memory of a past pleasing sensation inspires hope of a future one, and thereby abates an uneasiness actually present; as the absence of hope doubles a present pain.
Whether truth and falsehood belong to pleasures and pains?
They do as these are founded on our opinions 2 of things preconceived, which may, undoubtedly, be either true or false.
Our opinions are founded on our sensations, and the memory of them. Thus we see a figure at a distance beyond a certain rock, or under a certain tree, and we say to ourselves, it is a man; but on advancing up to it, we find a rude image of wood carved by the shepherd.
The senses, the memory, and the passions, which attend on them, write on our souls, or rather delineate, a variety of conceptions and representations of which, when justly drawn, we form true opinions and propositions; but when falsely, we form false ones.
On these our hopes and fears are built, and consequently are capable of truth and falsehood, as well as the opinions on which they are founded.
1 What Plato calls by the name of Μνημη, and Αναμνησις, are by Locke distinguished under the names of contemplation and memory, L. 1. Ch. 10. being the different powers of retention. (See De Legib. L. 5. p. 732.)
2 All this head is finely explained by Locke. (Ch. of Power, § 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, &c.) which is the best comment on this part of Plato.
P. 40. The good abound in just and true hopes, fears, and desires; the bad in false and delusive ones.
P. 41. As pleasures 1 and pains are infinite, we can only measure them by comparison, one with the other.
Our hopes and fears are no less liable to be deceived by the prospect of distant objects, than our eyes. As we are always comparing those, which are far off, with others less remote or very near, it is no wonder that we are often mistaken; especially as a pleasure, when set next a pain, does naturally appear greater than its true magnitude, and a pain less.
So much then of our pains and pleasures as exceeds or falls short of its archetype, is false.
A state of indolence, or of apathy, is supposed by the school of Heraclitus to be impossible, on account of the perpetual motion of all things.
Motions and alterations 2 proved to happen continually in our body, of which the soul has no perception.
P. 43. Therefore, (though we should allow the perpetual motion of things,) there are times when the soul feels neither pleasure nor pain; so that this is a possible state.
Pleasure, and its contrary, are not the consequences of any changes in our constituent parts, but of such changes as are considerable and violent.
1 "If we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison." (Locke, C. of Power. § 42.)
2 Whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind,-whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within,—there is no perception, Locke, Ch. 9.