eral, to that of an architect invited to undertake the reconstruction of a palace, ancient and splendid, but which, in consequence of the lapse of time and the changes of the mode of living, is found to be in a ruinous or uninhabitable condition. What would be the natural mode of proceeding adopted by an enlightened artist under these circumstances? He would, I think, make it his first care to draw an exact plan of the edifice in its present state, so as to form a clear notion of the extent, the defects, and the conveniences of the building as it stands; and not till then would he proceed to the demolition of the existing edifice. He would next prepare such instruments, tools, and mechanical aids, as would be likely to render the work of construction more rapid, certain, and economical. Thirdly, he would accumulate the necessary materials. Fourthly, he would provide the ladders. Lastly, he would begin to build but should the edifice be so vast that no human life would be long enough to terminate it, he would construct so much of it as would suffice to give his successors an idea of the general plan, style, and disposition of the parts, and leave it to be completed by future generations. It will easily, I think, be seen, how accurately the mode of proceeding in Bacon's great work corresponds with common sense and with the method followed by our imaginary architect. Bacon is the builder; the great temple of knowledge is the edifice, which the labors of our race have to terminate according to his plan. § 10. Let us now inquire what portion of this project Bacon was able to execute. The first portion, consisting of a general view of the state of science at his time, with an explanation of the causes of its sterility and unprogressiveness, was published in 1605, in an English treatise, bearing the title of The Proficience and Advancement of Learning : this was afterwards much altered and extended, and republished in Latin, in 1623, under the title De Augmentis Scientiarum. The Novum Organum, the most important portion of Bacon's work, is that in which the necessity and the principles of the Inductive Method are laid down and demonstrated. It is, in AA tween the method recommend- C D E F B C G In the first of these the point A may be conceived to represent some general principle upon which depend any number of detached facts or phenomena B, C, D, E, F. Now let it be supposed that we are seeking for the explanation of one or all of these phenomena; or, in other words, desirous of discovering the law upon which they depend. It is obvious that we may proceed as the arithmetician proceeds in the solution of a problem involving the search after an unknown quantity or number; that is, we may suppose the law of nature to be so and so, and applying this law to one or all of the phenomena within our observation, see if it corresponds with them or not. If it does, we conclude, so far as our examination has extended, that we have hit upon the true result of which we are in search: if not, we must repeat the process, as the arithmetician would do in a like case, till we obtain an answer that corresponds with all the conditions of the problem: and it is evident, that the greater the number of separate facts to which we successfully apply our theoretical explanation, the greater will be the probability of our having hit upon the true one. Now this application of a preëstablished theory to the particular facts or phenomena is precisely the signification of the word synthesis. It is obvious that the march of the mind in this mode of investigation is from the general to the particular - that is, in the direction of the arrow, or downwards — whence this mode of investigation is styled deduction, or a descent from the general law to the individual example. Similarly, the Aristotelian method has received the designation à priori, because in it the establishment of a theory, or, at all events, the provisional employment of a theory, is prior to its application in practice, just as in measuring an unknown space we previously establish a rule, as of a foot, yard, &c., which we afterwards apply to the space to be so determined. In the diagram all the elements are the same as in the preceding one, with the exception that here the process follows a precisely opposite direction that is, from a careful comparison of the different facts, the mind travels gradually upwards, with slow and cautious advances, from bare phenomena to more general consideration, till at last it reaches some point in which all the phenomena agree, and this point is the law of nature or general principle, of which we were in search. As synthesis signifies composition, so analysis signifies resolution; and it is by a continual and cautious process of resolution that the mind ascends - in the direction marked by the arrow from the particular to the general. This ascending process is clearly designated by the term induction, which signifies an ascent from particular instances to a general law; and the term à posteriori denotes that the theory, being evolved from the examination of the individual facts, is necessarily posterior or subsequent to the examination of those facts. All human inventions have their good and their bad sides, their advantages and their defects: and it is only by a comparison between the relative advantages and defects that we can establish the superiority of one system or mode of action over another. On contemplating the two methods of which I have just been giving a very rough and popular explanation, it will be at once obvious that the Deductive mode enables us, when the right theory has been hit upon, to arrive at absolute, or almost mathematical truth; while analysis, being dependent for its accuracy upon the number of phenomena which furnish the materials for our induction, can never arrive at absolute certainty; inasmuch as it is impossible to examine all the phenomena of a single class, and as while any phenomena remain unexamined we never can be certain that the discovery of some new fact will not completely overset our conclusions. The utmost that we can arrive at, therefore, by this route, is a very high degree of probability a degree which will be higher in proportion as it is founded upon a greater number of instances, and attained by a more careful process of sifting. But the nature of the human mind is such that it is practically incapable of distinguishing between a very high probability and an absolute certainty; at least the latter is able to produce upon the reason the same amount of conviction —in some cases, perhaps, even a greater amount — than even an absolute certainty. If we consider, therefore, the enormous number of chances against any given à priori deduction being the right one, - for, as in an arithmetical problem, there can be only one correct solution, while the number of possible incorrect solutions is infinite, and observe that till all the possible phenomena have been submitted to the synthetic test we never can be sure that we have the right theory, we shall easily agree that the possible certainty of a theory is dearly bought when compared with the far greater safety of the analytical method of reasoning, which, keeping fast hold of nature at each step of its progress, has the possibility, nay, even the certainty, of correcting its errors as they may arise. - The most important portion of the whole Instauratio is the Novum Organum, in which Bacon lays down the rules for the employment of Induction in the investigation of truth, and points out the origin and remedies of the errors which most commonly oppose us in our search. The earlier philosophers, and particularly Aristotle, assigning a great and almost unlimited efficacy in this research to the intellectual faculties alone, contented themselves with perfecting those logical formulas, among which the syllogism was the principal, by whose aid, as by the operation of some infallible instrument, they conceived that that result would assuredly be attained; and gave rules for the legitimate employment of their syllogism, pointing out the means of detecting and guarding against fallacies or irregularities in the expression of their reasoning. Bacon went far deeper than this, and showed that the most dangerous and universal sources of human error have their origin, not in the illegitimate employment of terms, but in the weaknesses, the prejudices, and the passions of mankind, exhibited either in the race or the individual. He classifies these sources of error, which in his vivid picturesque language he calls Idols or false appearances, in four categories; the Idols of the Tribe, of the Den, of the Market-place, of the Theatre. Under the first he warns us against those errors and prejudices which are common to the whole human race, the tribe to which we all belong; the idols of the Den are those which arise from the particular circumstances of the individual, as his country, his age, his religion, his profession, or his personal character; the errors of the Market-place are the result of the universal habit of using terms the meaning of which we have either not distinctly agreed on, or which we do not clearly understand. These terms are used in the interchange of thought, as money is passed from hand to hand in the market; and we accept and transfer to others coins whose real value we have not taken the trouble to test. The idols of the Theatre are the errors arising from false systems of philosophy, which dress up conceptions in unreal disguises, like comedians upon the stage. We may compare the precautions of the older logic to that of a physician who should direct his efforts to the getting rid of the external efflorescence of a disorder, and should think his duty performed when he had purified the skin, though perhaps at the cost of driving in the disease and rendering it doubly dangerous. Bacon, like the more enlightened practitioner, sought out the deep-seated constitutional source of the malady; it is to that that he addresses his treatment, certain that when the internal cause is removed, the symptoms will vanish of themselves. § 11. Of the Third Book Bacon has given only a specimen, intended to show the method to be adopted in collecting and classifying facts and experiments; for in a careful examination of facts and experiments consists the whole essence of his induction, and in it are concealed the future destinies of human knowledge and power. Bacon contributed to this portion of the work a History of the Winds, of Life and Death, written in Latin; and a collection of experiments in Physics, or, as he calls it, Natural History in English. This portion of the work is alone sufficient to show how small are Bacon's claims or pretensions to the character of a discoverer in any branch of natural science, and how completely he was under the influence of the errors of his day; but at the same time it proves the innate merit of his method, and the power of that mind which could legislate for the whole realm of knowledge, and for sciences yet unborn. To the English fragment he gives the title of Silva Silvarum, i. e. a collection of materials. The Fourth Book, Scala Intellectus, of which Bacon has given but a brief extract, was intended to show the gradual march to be followed by induction, in ascending from the fact perceptible to the senses to principles which were to become more and more general as we advance; and the author's object was to warn against the danger of leaping abruptly over the intermediate steps of the investigation. Of the Fifth Book he wrote only a preface, and the Sixth was never commenced. § 12. Of the soundness and the fertility of Bacon's method of investigation, the best proof will be a simple and practical one: we have only to compare the progress made by humanity in all the useful arts during the two centuries and a half since induction has been generally employed in all branches of science, with the progress made during the twenty centuries which elapsed between Aristotle and the age of Bacon. It is no exaggeration to say that in the shorter interval that progress has been ten times greater than in the longer. That this progress is in any degree attributable to any superiority of the human intellect in modern times is a supposition too extravagant to deserve a moment's attention. Never did humanity produce intellects more vast, more penetrating, and more active, I will not say than Aristotle himself, but than the series of great men who wasted their powers in abstract questions which never could be solved, or in the sterile subtleties of scholastic disputation. We may remark, too, as a strong confirmation of the truth of what we are saying, that in those sciences which are independent of experiment, and proceed by the efforts of reasoning and contemplation alone, - as theology, for instance, or pure geometry, the ancients were fully as far advanced as we are at this moment. The glory of Bacon is founded upon a union of speculative power with practical utility which were never so combined before. He neglected nothing as too small, despised nothing as too low, by which our happiness could be augmented; in him, above all, were combined boldness and prudence, the intensest enthusiasm, and the plainest common sense. He could foresee triumphs over nature far surpassing the wildest dreams of imagination, and at the same time warn posterity against the most trifling ill consequences that would proceed from a neglect of his rules. It is probable that Bacon generally wrote the first sketch of his works in English, but afterwards caused them to be translated into Latin, which was at that time the language of science, and even of diplomacy. He is reported to have employed the services of many young men of learning as secretaries and translators: amomg these the most remarkable is Hobbes, afterwards so celebrated as the author of the Leviathan. The style in which the Latin books of the Instauratio were given to the world, though certainly not a model of classical purity, is weighty, vigorous, and picturesque. § 13. Bacon's English writings are very numerous: among them unquestionably the most important is the little volume entitled Essays, the first edition of which he published in 1597, and which was several times reprinted, with additions, the last in 1625. These are short papers on an immense variety of subjects, from grave questions of morals and policy down to the arts of amusement and the most trifling accomplishments; and in them appears, in a manner more appreciable to ordinary intellects than in his elaborate philosophical works, the wonderful union of depth and variety which characterizes Bacon. The intellectual activity they display is literally portentous; the immense multiplicity and aptness of unexpected illustration is only equalled by the originality with which Bacon manages to treat the most worn-out and commonplace subject, such, for instance, as friendship or gardening. No author was ever so concise as Bacon; and in his mode of writing there is that remarkable quality which gives to the style of Shakspeare such a strongly-marked individuality; that is, a combination of the intellectual and imaginative, the closest reasoning in the boldest metaphor, the condensed brilliancy of an illustration identified with the development of thought. It is this that renders both the dramatist and the philosopher at once the richest and the most concise of writers. Many of Bacon's essays, as that inimitable one on Studies, are absolutely oppressive from the power of thought compressed into the smallest possible compass. Bacon wrote also an Essay on the Wis |
