of an exemption from future taxation. The fact that the property taxed may be of greater value than $2,000 will not authorize a United States Circuit Court to take jurisdiction. of a suit to enjoin a tax, if the amount of the tax be less than that sum.5 While different taxpayers may, for con

Jewett v. Leavenworth County, mem. 13 Fed. Cas. 612, according to

Adams v. Douglas County, 1 Fed. Cas. 106, 108, McCahon 235, 1 Kan. (2 Ed.) 627,

American Fertilizer Co. v. Board the suit was dismissed because

venience, in some cases, unite in a suit to enjoin a tax where the cause of complaint is common to all the plaintiffs, not the whole tax to be collected by the municipality, nor yet the total amount to be collected from the plaintiffs, but the separate amount of the tax of each plaintiff, is the sum in dispute to determine the jurisdiction." Where a part of a tax is admitted to be legal, and a part is claimed to be illegal, the sum of that claimed to be illegal determines the question of jurisdiction. In a suit by a taxpayer (or shall we say by a corporation that ought to be a taxpayer?) against the treasurers of several counties, cities, or other municipal corporations, to enjoin the collection of taxes, the several amounts which the different defendants are seeking to collect cannot be aggregated to make the sum in dispute exceed $2,000, as required by law. The disputed tax which each different treasurer is trying to collect, is, as to him, the ju

it did not appear that, in a proceed-lection of municipal assessments, ing to enjoin the treasurer, the com- in plainant's tax exceeded five hundred dollars," which was then the jurisdictional sum.

"Schulenberg-Boeckeler Lumber Co. v. Hayward, 20 Fed. 422;

Sioux Falls Nat. Bank v. Swenson, 48 Fed. 621.

Wheless v. St. Louis, 96 Fed. 865. A contrary rule would enable non-resident property owners to seriously interfere with local municipal affairs by vexatious suits in the United States Courts.

The principles of equity which

This is suggested rather than de-authorize the bringing of one suit cided as to original jurisdiction in Woodman v. Latimer, 2 Fed. 842; King v. Wilson, 14 Fed. Cas. 563, 1 Dill. 555, 13 Int. Rev. Rec. 36, 3 Chi. Leg. News 137, 5 Am. Law Rev. 562.

As to appellate jurisdiction, where the same rule applies as to original jurisdiction, the text is fully supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in

Russell v. Stansell, 105 U. S. 303, 26 L. 989, approved and quoted in Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 1066, 30 L. 1083.

See, also, ante § 93.

The rule stated in the text was applied to a suit to enjoin the col

by several taxpayers or by one in behalf of all, to determine the legality of a tax against all the property owners of a corporation are clearly stated in

Knopf v. First Nat. Bank, 173 Ill. 331, 50 N. E. 660.

Consult also, ante § 93, note 8. 7 Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370, 13 Sup. Ct. 348, 37 L. 206;

Woodman v. Ely, 2 Fed. 839; United States Exp, Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 475;

Western U. Tel. Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 449, 454, quoted in note 9 to this section.

risdictional sum.8 This rule has been successfully evaded in some cases by beginning suits against the taxing officers of the State to enjoin them from certifying the assessments of the plaintiff corporations to the taxing officers of the different counties. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by joining the State officers in a suit after the assessments have been certified to the county officers, where the county officers are required to make the collections.10 Where an officer of the State is required to collect the taxes levied against a railroad corporation, for all the counties and other municipal corporations within the State, the total amount of such taxes, and not the several amounts owing to each municipality, is the jurisdictional criterion in a suit by the railroad company to enjoin their collection.11

8 Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., | ported by adding together the 147 U. S. 370, 13 Sup. Ct. 348, 37 L, 206;

Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Walker, 148 U. S. 391, 13 Sup. Ct. 650, 37 L. 494;

Fishback v. Western U. Tel. Co., 161 U. S. 96, 16 Sup. Ct. 506, 40 L. 630;

Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U. S. 319, 17 Sup. Ct. 89, 41 L. 451; And see ante § 95.

There is no right to maintain a joint suit in such a case though the amount each defendant were seeking to collect exceeded $2,000.

Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., supra, quoted ante § 95 head-note. Contra (overruled by the case just cited):

Union Pac. R. Co. v. McShane, 24 Fed. Cas. 640, 3 Dill. 303.

amounts due in each county. If my conclusion is correct, that this action will lie against the board of appraisers, there is nothing whatever in this objection, because the amount involved in controversy in the suit is the whole amount to be certified by the board under the law, less the aggregate amount which the complainant must pay in the various counties of Ohio, under such laws as are in force if the Nicholls law is not valid. That difference admittedly exceeds $2,000. For this reason, I am of the opinion that the bill does present a case for equitable relief in a Federal Court." Western U. Tel. Co. v. Poe, 61 Fed. 449, 454, followed in Western U. Tel. Co. v. Norman, 77 Fed. 13.

10 Fishback v. Western U. Tel. Co., 161 U. S. 96, 16 Sup. Ct. 506, 40 L. 630.

9"Again, it is urged that the affidavits filed show conclusively that in no single county will the assessment against the complain- 11 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams, ant amount to $2,000; wherefore 180 U. S. 28, 21 Sup. Ct. 251, 45 the argument is that the jurisdic- L. tion of this Court cannot be sup-|

§ 97. Interest and costs are excluded in determining the amount necessary to give jurisdiction.-In determining the question of the amount in controversy, the sum is computed, by the letter of the statute, "exclusive of interest and costs."1 Interest is excluded under the present act, whether it accrue before or after suit.2 Interest is defined as "premium paid for the use of money." The term interest, in this statute, however, is construed in a more restricted sense by the Supreme Court. It is limited to an accessory or incidental demand. Interest on a note or bond that is evidenced by an ordinary interest coupon or coupons is treated as principal and not as interest in determining the jurisdictional amount.5 In an action upon the covenants of warranty in a deed for damages for an eviction, the matter $97.

1 Ante §§ 6, 7;

Greene County v. Kortrecht, 52 U.S. App. 250, 26 C. C. A. 381, 81 Fed. 241;

Keiser v. Cox, 116 Ill. 26, 4 N. E.

Lazensky v. Knights of Honor, U. S. 269, 16 Sup. Ct. 967, 41 L. 155;

32 Fed. 417;

Brown v. Webster, 156 U. S. 328, 15 Sup. Ct. 377, 39 L. 440.

An action cannot be maintained by the payee of a claim to recover interest after the principal has been paid and accepted, if there is no

Bergman v. Inman, 91 Fed. 293. 2 Moore v. Edgefield, 32 Fed. 498. The same construction was given to the identical language of an Indiana statute, in Wagner v. Kastner, 79 Ind. 162, express contract to pay interest. "When the principal subject of

163;

Galbraith v. Trump, 83 Ind. 381, a claim is extinguished by the act

382;

Murphy v. Patterson, 83 Ind. 599. Under the act of 1875, interest accruing before suit was included, in determining the amount in controversy, and that accruing after suit was excluded, in determining such amount.

Carrick v. Landman, 20 Fed. 209. Contra, holding that interest to time of removal is included,

McGinnity v. White, 16 Fed. Cas. 116, 3 Dill. 350, 1 Cent. Law J. 241. An Illinois decision, construing a statute of that State, is in harmony with the first of these cases.

in dispute is the sum sought to be recovered, although the measure of damages is the purchase money and interest on

In the Bates County case, the Supreme Court quotes with approval from

The conclusion of the Supreme Court, upon the question of jurisdiction, in Edwards v. Bates County,

Aurora v. West, 7 Wall. 82, 105, supra, is thus stated: 19 L. 42, 50:

"Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a definite sum of money, on a given day, and being drawn and executed in a form and mode for the very purpose that they may be separated from the bonds, it is held that they are negotiable, and that a suit may be maintained on them without the necessity of producing the bonds to which they were attached."

For other purposes, as well as to determine jurisdiction, coupons are treated as independent con

tracts.

"Not only may a suit be maintained upon an unpaid coupon in advance of the maturity of the principal debt, but the holder of a coupon is entitled to recover interest thereon from its maturity. Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470, 473, 25 L. 228, 230. The logical effect of these rulings is that when the interest evidenced by a coupon has become due and payable the demand based upon the promise contained in such coupon is no longer a mere incident of the principal indebtedness represented by the bond, but becomes really a princi

Butterfield v. Ontario, 44 Fed. pal obligation. Clearly, such

171.

would be the nature of the claim of one who, as owner of the coupons and not of the bonds, brought his action to enforce payment of

The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Bates County, supra, quotes further from Nesbit v. Riverside, 144 U. S. 610, the indebtedness evidenced by the 12 Sup. Ct. 746, 36 L. 562:

coupons. So, also, before maturity of the bonds, their holder could still have sued upon the matured coupons as an independent indebtedness, and not as a mere accessory to a demand for a recovery of the face of the bonds.

"Each matured coupon is a separable promise, and gives rise to a separate cause of action. It may be detached from the bond and sold by itself. Indeed, the title to several matured coupons of the same bond may be in as many dif- "The claim made by the plaintiff ferent persons, and upon each a on the coupons was in no just distinct and separate action be sense accessory to any other demaintained. So, while the prom-mand, but was in itself principal ises of the bond and of the coupons and primary. In ascertaining, in the first instance are upon the therefore, the jurisdictional sum same paper, and the coupons are in dispute, the sum of the coupons for interest due upon the bond, yet should have been treated as an inthe promise to pay the coupon is dependent, principal demand and as distinct from that to pay the not as interest; and in holding bond, as though the two promises otherwise the lower Court erred to were placed in different instru- the prejudice of the plaintiff in ments, upon different paper." error."