sidered in determining the amount in controversy. There is a contrary decision, but it is radically erroneous. § 91. In certain suits in equity, the matter in dispute is the value of the right in controversy.-While, perhaps, in all actions at law, and most suits in equity, the amount in controversy is measured by the specific recovery sought by the plaintiff, without regard to the collateral consequences of the judgment, there are many suits in equity where a different rule prevails. "Where a bill in equity is filed to abate a nuisance, or to set aside a deed, or for a decree giving other mandatory or preventive relief, it is the value of the property of which the defendant may be deprived by the decree sought which is the test of jurisdiction, and not the claim of the The facts and the holding of the Court in that case are well stated in the head-note thereto: "Three suits were brought in a State court by the same plaintiffs, citizens of one State, against the same defendant, a citizen of another State, on three promissory notes of the latter, all given for parts of the same consideration, and each for less than five hundred dollars, and the same defense existed to and was pleaded against all of the notes. that the collateral effect of a judgment may be considered in determining the amount in controversy for the purpose of an appeal or writ of error. The decisions in Troy v. Evans, 97 U. S. 1, 24 L. 941, Stinson v. Dousman, 20 How. 461, 15 L. 966, are cited as authority for this supposition. The Supreme Court in the cases cited in note 3, has decided that the collateral effect of a "Held, that a verdict and judg-judgment may not be considered ment in one of the suits would to determine whether it is appealconstitute an estoppel, and be de-able, and said that it was not incisive of the others, and that, therefore, the matter in dispute, in each one of said suits, exceeded the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and that any one or all of said suits might be removed to the Federal Court under the act of March 3, 1875." Anderson v. Gerding, 1 Fed. Cas. 840, 3 Woods 487. The decision in Anderson v. Gerding, supra, is based upon the theory that the amount in controversy for the purpose of removal or for appeal is determined by the same general rules, and the supposition tended to decide in Troy v. Evans, or Stinson v. Dousman, supra, that such collateral effect may be considered. The later cases, therefore, completely overthrow Anderson v. Gerding, supra, which is built wholly upon an erroneous construction of Troy v. Evans, supra, and Stinson v. Dousman, supra. Compare Thecker v. Milburn, 23 Fed. Cas. 908, Hayw. & H. 271. $91. 1 Ante § 90. "2 complainant. The amount in dispute in certain injunction suits is the value of the object to be gained by the plaintiff by such suit. Where the defendant is about to destroy the 2 Baltimore v. Postal Tel. Cable | ant of the right to maintain the Co., 62 Fed. 500, 502, awning, and not the damage to the plaintiff, determined the right of citing Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. removal. The value of the right Ward, 2 Black 485, 17 L. 311; Washington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 25 L. 782; was above, and the amount of damage was below, the jurisdictional limit and jurisdiction was Estes v. Gunter, 121 U. S. 183, 7 asserted upon removal. If the Sup. Ct. 854, 30 L. 884. In Mississippi & Missouri R. Co. v. Ward, supra, the appellee charged the appellant with having created a nuisance by erecting a bridge across the Mississippi River at Rock Island and prayed that the nuisance might be abated. He did not seek damages by his bill, but only an abatement of the nuisance as a preventive remedy against future injury and delay to navigation. It was objected to the jurisdiction of the United States Court that the bill did not allege the amount of damage individually sustained by the appellee, and hence did not show the amount in controversy to be sufficient to authorize the Court to take jurisdiction. "But," says the Supreme Court, "the want of a sufficient amount of damage having been sustained to give the Federal Courts jurisdiction, will not defeat the remedy, as the removal of the obstruction is the matter of controversy, and the value of the object must govern." This case is followed in Whitman v. Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81. Suit was there brought to restrain the maintenance by defendant of an awning over a part of a street adjoining plaintiff's premises. It was held that the value to defend damage to plaintiff had been above the jurisdictional limit, and the right to maintain the awning worthless to defendant, jurisdiction could have been asserted on the ground that the damage to plaintiff was sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Rainey v. Herbert, 3 U. S. App. 592, 5 C. C. A. 183, 55 Fed. 443, affirming Herbert v. Rainey, 54 Fed. 248; Clapp v. Spokane, 53 Fed. 515. Contra: A recent decision which seems to the author to be in direct conflict with Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, supra, and cases following it, is Hagge v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 104 Fed. 391. 3 In a suit by a railroad company to enjoin a shipper from prosecuting in the State courts, a multiplicity of suits for alleged overcharges in freight, the Circuit Court of Appeals said: "In a suit for an injunction the amount in dispute is the value of the object to be gained by the bill. Fost. Fed. Prac. § 16. An injunction may be of much greater value to the complainant than the amount in controversy in cases of dispute which have already arisen. Symonds v. Greene, 28 Fed. 834; Whitman v. Hubbell, 30 Fed. 81. The business or the property of the plaintiff, and a suit for injunction is brought by him to prevent such destruction, the value of the plaintiff's business or property is the value in dispute. If the acts sought to be enjoined will injure the plaintiff's business, but not totally destroy it, the amount of such injury to plaintiff is the value to him of the injunction against defendant. In a suit for a mandatory injunction, the amount between the annual rate contended for by the defendants and that to which the complainant asserts a right." * In an action by a South Carolina liquor dealer to enjoin the officers of that State from seizing his goods, thereby interfering with and destroying his business of im maintenance of its rates is the real subject of dispute, and the object of the bill, and the value of this object must be considered. Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Co. v. Ward, 2 Black 485, 17 L. 311. This value not being liquidated or fixed by law, the alleged value, especially on demurrer to the bill, must govern." Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Kute-porting liquors, "the value of the man, 13 U. S. App. 99, 4 C. C. A. right of importation of ales, wines, 503, 54 Fed. 547, quoted with ap- and other liquors, products of other proval in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. States and countries" having been Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65, 73. conceded to be in excess of $2,000, Other cases in which jurisdic- it was held that "the pecuniary tion was maintained upon an as- value of plaintiff's rights in consertion of this principle are troversy exceeded the value of Hennessy v. Herrmann, 89 Fed. $2,000," and that it was not essential to jurisdiction that plainArkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal tiff's goods of the value of $2,000 Co., 96 Fed. 353. 669; The Supreme Court has denied the applicability of this rule in suits to enjoin the collection of taxes. Post 96, note 4. The decision of the jurisdictional question in Lanning v. Osborne, 79 Fed. 657, is well stated in the syllabus, as follows: "In a suit brought by the receiver of a water company to establish his alleged right to fix the rates at which he should furnish to consumers water for irrigation, it is the value of that right which constitutes the amount in controversy, and not the mere difference be seized. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 17 Sup. Ct. 262, 41 L. 648. Case of threatened destruction of property. Maffet v. Quine, 95 Fed. 199. 5 In deciding injunction suits brought by railroad companies to prevent fraudulent practices by ticket brokers who were defendants, Judge Clark said: "In my opinion these are in no just sense suits upon the contracts, nor for specific performance, but are suits to protect the business of the complainants against the irreparable mischief being suffered by reason of the fraudulent use and abuse of these ticket contracts; and in controversy is the value of the plaintiff's alleged right which is denied by defendant. In a suit to restrain the use of property, the amount in controversy is the value of such use, and not the value of the property.7 § 92. Different matters in dispute between the same parties of which a United States Circuit Court may take jurisdiction may be united in one suit to make the amount in controversy exceed $2,000.-Different causes of action the amount or value of the matter | before the filing of the bill, it gives in controversy is not the damage rise to the necessary implication that might be specifically recovered in a suit upon any one or more of these contracts, but is the protection furnished to the plaintiffs, and the loss prevented by the fraudulent use of any and all of these void papers. It is the value of the whole object of the suit to the complainant which determines the amount in controversy." Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65, 72-73. that the subsequent permanent injury, unless enjoined, will exceed in pecuniary amount that already suffered, because the past damages only covered a period between the demand and the filing of the bill." Butchers' & Drovers' Stock-Yards Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 31 U. S. App. 252, 14 C. C. A. 290, 67 Fed. 35, 40. Compare Von Schrader v. Brittan, 93 Fed. 9. 7 Oleson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 44 Fed. 1. It is held in Smith v. Bivens, 56 Fed. 352, that under the circumstances of that case, the value of the land there used for pasturage was the amount in dispute, for such land was of no value for any other purpose. Compare 6"The amount in controversy in the action is the value of complainant's alleged right to have a siding built, and to have live stock in car-load lots received and delivered by the railroad company at its stock yards. The averment of the bill is that the injury and damage done to its business by the refusal of the railroad company to afford to it such transportation and shipping facilities is irreparable, and largely exceeds the amount of the sum of $2,000. The damage done by the refusal is to be estimated by the value of the right denied, and therefore the allegation that the damage largely exceeds $2,000 is inferentially a statement that the value of the right denied is largely in excess of $2,000. Even if this averment refers, as claimed by counsel, to damages sustained by complainant U. S. 533, 13 Sup. Ct. 184, 36 L, Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Cunningham, 103 Fed. 708. An action by the United States to compel the abatement of a fence surrounding public land does not involve the title to the land so as to make the value of the land the test of jurisdiction;—the value of "the possession, use, and occupation of such enclosure" is the test. Cameron v. United States, 146 in favor of a sole plaintiff, or of all plaintiffs jointly where there are more than one, against a sole defendant, or more than one defendant, when they are all liable for the whole debt or damages for which suit is brought, may be united to make the suit embrace a matter in dispute in excess of $2,000.1 The joinder of two counts in a declaration, filed in a State court, each praying for the recovery of $2,000 and costs, shows prima facie that the amount in dispute is $4,000, and entitles the defendant to a removal, so far as the amount in controversy is concerned, where it does not affirmatively appear that both counts are for the same cause of action.2 If it should affirmatively appear that both counts are for the same cause of action, the amount of the actual cause of action would be controlling.3 A United States Circuit Court may have jurisdiction of a suit upon the principal of a bond and overdue interest coupons thereon, though neither separately amounts to $2,000, if all taken together aggregate more than that sum. A suit may be brought upon several interest coupons, without a bond, if they aggregate the jurisdictional amount. Several claims against the same defendant or defendants, each less than $2,000, may be assigned to one person, and joined in one suit by him, if they all aggregate more than $2,000 of principal, the suit being otherwise within Fed 1077; s. c., 148 U. S. 301, 13 Sup. Court (Blodgett, Judge), assuming Ct. 595, 37 L. 459. jurisdiction, said: § 92. 1 Stanley v. Albany County, 15 Fed. 483, 21 Blatchf. 249, and other cases cited in succeeding notes. Armstrong v. Ettlesohn, 36 Fed. 209, was a suit commenced in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. . The defendant filed a demurrer to the declaration for want of jurisdiction. The declaration contained three counts. The first was upon a promissory note of $875, one was for $875 due for money had and received, and the other for $875 due for work and labor done. The "Upon the face of this declaration, which we can only look at under this demurrer, there appear to be three causes of action, which, when aggregated, make more than the amount required to give jurisdiction." 2 Platt v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 37 Fed. 730. 8 Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337, 17 L. 557. 4 Edwards v. Bates County, 163 U. S. 269, 16 Sup. Ct. 967, 41 L. 155. 5 Judson v. Macon County, 14 Fed. Cas. 16, 2 Dill. 213. |