missioners had understood Northwestern geography better, to say nothing of the then unknown resources of Lake Superior, they would have stated the argument with even greater strength.

To close the war that began on Lexington Green, April 19, 1775, three separate treaties were necessary. France and the United States conducted simultaneous negotiations with different English commissioners, the understanding being that the preliminaries should be signed the same day. On November 29th Dr. Franklin wrote to M. de Vergennes that the American articles were already agreed upon, and that he hoped to lay a copy of them before his Excellency the next day. Except a single secret article, they were duly communicated; but, to the astonishment and mortification of the Count, they were already signed, and therefore binding, as far as the commissioners could make them so. The game for despoiling the young Republic of one-half her territorial heritage was effectually blocked. Vergennes bitterly reproached Franklin for the course that he and his associates had followed, and Franklin replied, making such defence as he could, admitting no more than that a point of bienséance had been neglected. The American Congress and Secretary for Foreign Affairs at first were also disposed to blame the commissioners; but so anxious was the country for peace and so much more favorable were the terms obtained than had been expected, that murmurs of dissatisfaction soon gave place to acclaims of gratification and delight. The preamble to the treaty contained the saving clause that it should not go into effect until France and England came to an understanding, a fact that the astute Franklin did not fail to press upon the attention of the irate Vergennes. However, that condition was soon fulfilled, and a general peace assured.

The definitive treaty of peace between the United States and England, which is merely the preliminary treaty over again, with the exception of the secret article to be noticed in the note at the end of this chapter, was signed September 3,

1783. His Britannic Majesty acknowledged the United States to be free, sovereign, and independent States, and relinquished for himself, his heirs, and successors "all claim to the government, propriety, and territorial right of the same and every part thereof;" assigning them boundaries that have proved to be more satisfactory than those proposed by Congress in 1779 could have been. It was a treaty of partition of the British Empire, and of the English-speaking world. At the time, British statesmen generally dreaded its effect on the Mother Country, but time has proved it a godsend to her as well as to America.

The happy issue of this negotiation was very largely due to William, Earl of Shelburne, afterward first Marquis of Lansdowne. Both as Secretary for the Colonies in the Rockingham Cabinet, and as Prime Minister, he was governed by the sentiment that he thus expressed: "Reconciliation with America on the noblest terms by the noblest means." Had the negotiation remained open at the downfall of his ministry, which was largely the result of the liberal terms that he gave the Americans, and so passed into the hands of the Fox-North coalition, no one can tell what the fate of the West would have been.

It is impossible nicely to divide among Dr. Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jay, the honor of saving the West to their country. On that issue, Mr. Adams was unquestionably firm. A tradition has floated down the stream of diplomacy to the effect that Dr. Franklin was indifferent, or at least disposed to yield; but we have Mr. Jay's express testimony to the contrary,' to say nothing of the improbability of the Doctor's taking such a course, in view of his Western record as set forth in a previous chapter. However, the man who goes through the original documents, including the discussions at Madrid as well as those at Paris, will be pretty certain to conclude that the old Northwest has greater reason for gratitude to John Jay than to either of his colleagues.

1 Sparks: Works of Franklin, X., 8.

It is not easy to tell what were the decisive arguments in this Western controversy. It is often said, and particularly by Western writers, that the issue turned mainly on the George Rogers Clark conquest. This view rests on tradition rather than on historical evidence, and I venture the opinion that it is largely erroneous. No man, at least, can read the reports on the national boundaries submitted to Congress without seeing that far more reliance was laid, by the committees that prepared them, on the colonial charters than on Clark's great achievement. The report of August 16, 1782, urges the argument: "The very country in question hath been conquered through the means of the common labors of the United States; ""for a considerable distance beyond the Alleghany Mountains, and particularly on the Ohio, American citizens are actually settled at this day"—" fencible men," not "behind any of their fellow-citizens in the struggle for liberty," who will be thrown back within the power of Great Britain if the Western territory is surrendered to her; but the same report contains page after page of arguments based on the charters and on colonial history. It was indeed most fortunate that the Virginia troops were in possession of the Illinois and the Wabash at the close of the war, but there is no reason to think that the Clark conquest, separate and apart from the colonial titles, ever would have given the United States the Great West. Writing to Secretary Livingston, the American Commissioners give color to the idea that the decision turned on the charters and not on the conquest. They say the Court of Great Britain "claimed not only all the lands in the Western country and on the Mississippi, which were not expressly included in our charters and governments, but also all such lands within them as remained ungranted by the King of Great Britain." "It would be endless," they add, "to enumerate all the discussions and arguments on the subject." It is highly probable that the British ministry, see

2

1 Diplomatic Correspondence, X., 117.