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what higher; and the extent to which such operating rules are given practical effect through periodical examinations on them, by surprise tests, and by disciplinary action was also set forth. Emphasis was laid on the fact that these rules require the fireman, when practicable, to assist the engineer in watching the road and observing signal indications, and to communicate to the engineer the name and indication of all signals affecting the movement of their train. It was said that, with the increased use of the automatic stokers on their heavy power, the firemen are better able to observe such roadside signals.

The Burlington does not operate its trains at excessive speed, and speed recorders are maintained on locomotives handling the principal passenger trains, so that there is a convenient check upon the speed thereof.

Evidence was adduced respecting State and Federal highways and crossings in automatic train-stop territory, and whether at grade, under grade, or overhead. In addition to these State and Federal highways, there are 61 other road crossings at grade in the same territory, and such condition is fairly representative of highway developments and improvements on the Burlington system since the installation of the automatic train-stop device.

An exhibit shows the construction of paved and other surfaced highways, which is assigned as one of the principal causes for lesser train movements and train density. It is claimed that these crossings are a source of substantial expense to the railroad, and that their existence, when at grade, creates a potential source of accidents because of the increased density of highway traffic and the high speed permissible thereon. During the period 1922 to August 31, 1932, 26 persons were killed in highway-crossing accidents on the Burlington system for every person killed in train collisions.

In addition to the automatic train-stop device, the Burlington, within the past 38 months, has installed other safety devices on its line between Creston and Lincoln, as follows: (a) centralized traffic control between Red Oak and Balfour, Iowa, 25.31 miles; between Pacific Junction, Iowa, and Plattsmouth, Nebr., 4.95 miles; and between Greenwood and Waverly, Nebr., 5.44 miles, at a cost of $207,367; (b) a manually controlled interlocking power plant at Lincoln, known as Baird Tower, at a cost of $122,639.

The automatic block-signal system in this territory, the automatic train-stop, the centralized traffic control and the interlocking plants are operated independently of each other.

An exhibit was introduced showing the total investment in all types of signal apparatus, together with the amount expended since

July 1, 1922, on apparatus other than the train-stop device. The total expenditures as of January 1, 1932, amounted to $11,012,829.15. Of this amount the Burlington had expended since July 1, 1922, $5,536,564.63, exclusive of the automatic train-stop device. As stated before, approximately $330,000 of this sum has been expended for additional protection in automatic train-stop territory within the past three years. The result of all these expenditures, it is claimed, has substantially lessened any need for the automatic train-stop device.

Considerable testimony was given by the signal engineer of the Burlington, who described with some detail the signal apparatus and the safety devices which will remain in operation in what is now automatic train-stop territory if this petition is granted. In his judgment the signal installation in this territory is as modern and efficient as any installed elsewhere and train operation without the automatic train-stop device will be as safe as at present. It is his opinion that any money available for the maintenance of signal work could more advantageously be expended for highway-crossing protection and extension of the centralized traffic control than for the automatic train-stop device. The witness explained that the centralized traffic control and interlocking plants enable traffic to be handled safely, efficiently, and economically, particularly peak loads, and that they would have been installed regardless of an automatic train stop. With a centralized traffic-control system the entire control of traffic for certain territory is under one man; and all train movements are shown on the centralized traffic-control machine in the one office. One great advantage in centralized traffic control is elimination of stops of heavy-tonnage trains when heading in or out of switches, which largely eliminates the pulling of drawbars; but the principal advantage of centralized traffic control is that it not only increases traffic capacity but also enables the traffic to be handled safely. In another respect centralized traffic control has an advantage over the automatic train stop, in that it enables the one man in charge of same to observe the extent, if any, to which enginemen disobey signal indications; for under the automatic train-stop system, a disregard of wayside signals is only known to the officials as a result of surprise tests or when enginemen report their own negligence, or in case of an accident. With this knowledge before them, centralized traffic control should result in making enginemen more alert than when operating under the automatic train-stop.

In consideration of the many changes on the Burlington since our orders were issued, to wit: (a) The lower traffic density in auto

matic train-stop territory; (b) the freedom from accidents which the automatic train stop was designed to prevent; (c) the additional safety devices installed between Creston and Lincoln; (d) the general increase in the ability of the line between Creston and Lincoln to handle traffic safely and efficiently; (e) the indirect expense through interference with the efficient use of locomotives on long runs; (f) the large decrease in its operating revenue; and (g) the urgent need for the elimination of causes of accidents at other points, we find that at the present time operating conditions between Creston and Lincoln do not require the continued maintenance and operation of automatic train-stop devices, and therefore our orders of June 13, 1922, and January 14, 1924, as amended, in so far as those orders apply to petitioner, are suspended until our further order.

An appropriate order will be entered.

COMMISSIONERS AITCHISON and EASTMAN dissent.

190 I. C. C.

No. 21025

DANN-GEROW COMPANY, INCORPORATED, ET AL. v. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.

Decided December 5, 1932

Former findings and order in original report, 161 I. C. C. 673, modified so as to permit the use of grouping approved in Brick and Clay Products in the South, 88 I. C. C. 543, 155 I. C. C. 730.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON FURTHER CONSIDERATION

MCMANAMY, Commissioner:

In the former report, 161 I. C. C. 673, division 3 found the rates on common brick, hollow building tile, and brick other than common, in carloads, from points within the territory on and east of the Mississippi River and south of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers to Clearwater and St. Petersburg, Fla., unreasonable for the future to the extent that they exceeded or might exceed rates determined by the application of the distance scale prescribed in Brick and Clay Products in the South, 88 I. C. C. 543, 155 I. C. C. 730.

Upon defendants' petition requesting that the former report and order be modified so as to permit the use of the grouping approved by us in Brick and Clay Products in the South, supra, we have reopened the case for further consideration. As pointed out in the petition, the rates prescribed in the cited case and the grouping there approved were for application in practically all of the territory east of the Mississippi and south of the Ohio and Potomac, except the Florida peninsula. The proposed grouping if authorized will not materially affect the level of the rates prescribed in the former report. Complainants have voiced no objection to the proposed grouping.

There is no apparent reason why rates to and from the Florida peninsula should not be grouped to the same extent as rates to and from other points within southern territory. The former report should be and is hereby modified so as to permit the same grouping as was approved in Brick and Clay Products in the South, 88 I. C. C. 543, 155 I. C. C. 730.

190 I. C. C.

No. 24747

N. C. BLANCHARD COMPANY v. NASHVILLE, CHATTANOOGA & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY

Submitted September 10, 1932. Decided December 12, 1932

Rates on hickory billets, in carloads, from New Market, Stevenson, and Bass, Ala., and McMinnville, Manchester, and Summitville, Tenn., to Chattanooga, Tenn., over interstate routes, found not unreasonable. Complaint dismissed.

John S. Fletcher and E. DeL. Wood for complainant.

Charles P. Reynolds for defendant.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 3, COMMISSIONERS MCMANAMY, BRAINERD, AND LEE BY DIVISION 3:

Exceptions were filed by complainant to the report proposed by the examiner and defendant replied.

Complainant, a corporation manufacturing golf shafts at Boyce, Tenn., alleges by complaint filed September 24, 1931, that the interstate rates on hickory billets, in carloads, from New Market, Stevenson, and Bass, Ala., and McMinnville, Manchester, and Summitville, Tenn., to Chattanooga, Tenn., were and are unreasonable and in violation of the long-and-short-haul and the aggregate-of-intermediates provisions of section 4 of the interstate commerce act. It seeks lawful rates for the future and reparation on shipments moving within the statutory period, including those moving during the pendency of this proceeding. Rates will be stated in cents per 100 pounds, and do not include the present emergency charges.

A motion filed in advance of hearing by defendant to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the issues herein were adjudicated in Blanchard Co. v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 174 I. C. C. 655, was sustained except as to two additional points of origin, Manchester and Summitville, and except as to the allegation under section 4 of the act. As will appear hereinafter, this action, together with the status of the pleadings and the limitations of the evidence, confines the issues primarily to the movement from Manchester and Summitville.

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