Class of Ship.

and the concentration of his battleships for attacks upon the Red Admiral's communications."

It remains to give the results of the campaign as tabulated in the official "Summary of Red and Blue losses," and then, to quote the comments of the Admiralty. The comparative losses of the two sides are given in the following table :

These figures speak for themselves. The official comments also speak for themselves; the only remark to be made on them is that the destruction of commerce in the face of a hostile command of the sea would probably be found in actual war to be a much more difficult business than the manoeuvres made it appear. If that is so, it would seem that the risks involved are not likely to be greater than could be covered by insurance, if only owners and underwriters can be induced to keep their heads.

ADMIRALTY REMARKS

The manœuvres were deprived of much of their value owing to the small proportion of merchant vessels which accepted the Admiralty terms for taking part.

The percentage of loss of merchant vessels was high (55 per cent.), and would appear alarming were it not for the fact that this success of Blue was only achieved at the

COMMENTS OF THE ADMIRALTY

329

expense of the complete disorganisation of his fighting forces, and that, as stated by the chief umpire, had hostilities continued, "it is practically certain that the commencement of the third week of the war would have seen all commerce-destroying ships either captured or blockaded in their defended ports."

It is probable also that the percentage of loss would have been very considerably lower had it been possible for all the merchant ships traversing the manoeuvre area, to the number of upwards of four hundred, to take a part in the proceedings. As it was, the attack of the twentyseven battleships and cruisers and thirty destroyers of the Blue Fleet was concentrated upon the inadequate number of sixty merchant steamers and thirty-four gunboats and destroyers representing merchant steamers; in consequence, the actual percentage of loss is misleading, and affords little or no basis for calculation of the risks of shipping in time of war. It should also be noted that considerations of expense and the fact that the attacking fleet was on the seaward flank of the trade routes prevented wide detours being made for the purpose of avoiding capture.

The summary of Red and Blue losses will show the cost of a guerre de course against a superior naval power, and proves that, although a temporary commercial crisis might possibly be caused in London by this form of attack, the complete defeat of the aggressor could not be long delayed, with the result that public confidence would be quickly re-established and the security of British trade assured.

To make an enemy's trade the main object of attack, while endeavouring to elude his fighting ships, is generally recognized as being strategically incorrect from the purely naval point of view, and this procedure could only be justified if there were reason to suppose the hostile Government could by such action be coerced into a misdirection of their strategy or premature negotiations for conclusion of hostilities.

As it was considered desirable, however, that the risks to British shipping should be examined, under the most unfavourable conditions conceivable, the Blue Commander-in-Chief was directed to carry out a plan of campaign which is generally allowed to be strategically unsound, and there is no doubt that, fettered as he was by these

limitations, he achieved his mission with great ability, though it is open to question whether he might not have achieved a greater measure of success by the employment of his cruisers only for the guerre de course and the concentration of his battleships for attacks upon the line of the Red Admiral's communications.

THE HIGHER POLICY OF DEFENCE1

I

MUST begin my lecture with an acknowledgment and an apology-an acknowledgment of the high honour done me by your commandant and your professor of military history in inviting me to address so wellinformed and, I hope, so critical a professional audience as yourselves on a subject connected with your profession; and an apology for my audacity in accepting their invitation. I am neither a sailor nor a soldier; I am an outsider to both those noble professions, though I have devoted some time and thought to the study of their higher functions and relations. You will bear with me if I say many things which you know as well as I do, and some things which may provoke your dissent. I have no dogmas to propound. My sole object is to offer you some food for reflection and, perhaps, some material for profitable discussion among yourselves. If I can attain that object I shall not regret my audacity, and I am sure you will forgive it.

The subject of my lecture is what has been called "The Higher Policy of Defence." By this I understand the due co-ordination of all the agencies of warfare, naval and military, offensive and defensive, and their intelligent adaptation to the conditions historical, geographical, political, and economical, of the countries, states, or Powers supposed to be engaged in war. It will be seen at once that the problem of defence so conceived cannot be studied in the abstract. We cannot disengage it from

1 A lecture delivered by request at the Royal Staff College, Camberley, on December 9, 1902, and printed in the National Review, January, 1903.

its circumstances and conditions. For instance, the problem of defence for a country like Switzerland, which has no seaboard, must differ fundamentally from the problem of defence for a Power like the British Empire, which is essentially a maritime Power, having no land frontiers except such as are in the last resort defensible only through the agency of sea power. These two cases are perhaps the extreme limits within which the problem of defence varies for different countries. On the one hand we have a country which has no direct interest in the sea at all, which has nothing but land frontiers to defend and nothing but land forces to defend them withal; on the other, we have a country with vital interests in every quarter and on all the seas of the earth, which can neither defend itself nor attack its enemies without crossing the sea. I say it cannot defend itself without crossing the sea because that is a very poor conception of national, to say nothing of Imperial defence, which regards its primary object as the defence of our own shores. That might be, and, indeed, would be, our ultimate object if all else were lost. But before that object could even come into view our Empire would be at an end. The British Empire, it has been well said, is the gift of sea power. By sea power it has been won, by sea power it must be defended. This is not to say that it must or can be defended by naval force alone. On the contrary, that would be as fatal a mistake as to say that the problem of defence for England is concerned primarily with the defence of these shores. A few years ago we had to defend ourselves in South Africa. We should never have effected our purpose if we had relied on naval force alone. On the other hand, we should never even have begun to effect it if the seas had not been open to us. Sea power and naval force are not convertible terms. Naval force is that particular agency of warfare which takes the sea for its field of operations; military force is that particular agency of warfare which takes the land for its field of operations. Both are essential elements