239 U. S. Opinion of the Court. ject any charge that it was enforced to the extent of risk of the life of anybody or to the injury of anybody. Plaintiff in error was charged with certain acts of omission, the jury found that he was guilty as charged, and the finding was sustained by the trial and supreme courts. We may say without particular review that they were plain violations of duty required by the statute. There was an especially significant fact: the fire was detected by one of the employés of the hotel about 1:30 A. M., and later a guest called the attention of the clerk to the smell of smoke. The clerk was moved by this warning to look into a cuspidor, and no further; and this was two hours before defendant in error awoke to find the halls filled with smoke. The neglect cannot be magnified by comment. If the action of a clerk under such circumstances would be a discharge of duty to one guest it would be a discharge of duty to many guests; if to men, then to women and children, and the tragedy which might result appalls the imagination. But to one or many the duty to investigate when the existence of a fire is indicated or suspected is clear. It is to be remembered that in the case at bar there were indications of fire at 1:30 A. M., and that at 3:30 defendant in error awoke to find the halls filled with smoke. He could get no response to his calls by telephone; he sought the elevator, but it was not running, and, not knowing the location of the stairway, he returned to his room and attempted to escape by means of a rope fire escape. These facts and others referred to by the court justified the jury in concluding that plaintiff in error did not do all in his power to save defendant in error. It is entirely aside from the questions in the case and the requirements of the statute to consider the dismays and perils of an extreme situation, and what then might be expected of courage or excused to timidity. It was one of the purposes of the statute to preclude such extremity. VOL. CCXXXIX-28 Opinion of the Court. 239 U.S. It requires careful inspection of conditions especially through the night to detect the existence of fire and prompt action if it is detected. Had these requirements been observed in the present case, defendant in error would not have been permitted to sleep in a burning hotel for two hours until means of escape were cut off by the density of the smoke and the absence of the employés of the hotel from their posts-except by a rope, which proved too weak to sustain his weight. Plaintiff in error contends further that the statute "is lacking in due process of law" because "it fails to prescribe any fixed rule of conduct." The argument is that the requirement “to do all in one's power" fails to inform a man of ordinary intelligence what he must or must not do under given circumstances. Rules of conduct must necessarily be expressed in general terms and depend for their application upon circumstances, and circumstances vary. It may be true, as counsel says, that "men are differently constituted," some being “abject cowards, and few only are real heroes;" that the brains of some people work "rapidly and normally in the face of danger while other people lose all control over their actions." It is manifest that rules could not be prescribed to meet these varying qualities. Yet all must be brought to judgment. And what better test could be devised than the doing of "all in one's power" as determined by the circumstances? The case falls, therefore, under the rule of Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, and not under the rule of International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199. It is objected that as the statute is directed to keepers of hotels having more than fifty rooms and does not apply to keepers of hotels having less, it therefore discriminates against the former and deprives them of the equal protection of the laws. The contention is untenable. McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539; Williams v. Arkansas, 239 U. S. Argument for Respondent. 217 U. S. 79; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59; Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Booth v. Indiana, 237 U. S. 391. Judgment affirmed. EX PARTE UPPERCU, PETITIONER. PETITION FOR MANDAMUS. No. 14, Original. Argued December 6, 1915.-Decided December 20, 1915. The right of a litigant to have material evidence from an existing object does not depend upon having an interest in it, or upon the right or want of right of the public to examine that object. Although it may be perfectly proper for a judge to order evidence and documents in a litigation to be sealed, his order should be modified so as to admit any of the sealed matter to be produced as evidence at the instance of any litigant in whose behalf it is material. The application of a litigant to have a document, which is material evidence in his cause, produced should not be rejected because the court in whose custody it is had made an order in a suit to which he was not a party that the testimony including the desired document be sealed subject to inspection only of the parties to that action. Where a judge of a Federal court refuses to allow documents which are included in evidence in a case in that court which has been ordered to be sealed to be produced for evidence, mandamus from this court is the proper remedy to require him to make an order for the production of such document. THE facts, which involve the right of an interested party to have documents in the custody of the court produced as evidence, notwithstanding a previous order placing them under seal, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Alvin Cushing Cass for petitioner. Mr. Frank W. Knowlton, with whom Mr. Charles F. Argument for Respondent. 239 U.S. Choate, Jr., and Mr. James Garfield were on the brief, for respondent: Mandamus is not the proper remedy. A writ of mandamus will never be granted where there is another adequate legal remedy open to the petitioner. It cannot be used to perform the functions of an appeal or a writ of error. Ex parte Roe, 234 U. S. 70; Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363; In re Pollitz, 206 U. S. 323; Chandler v. Circuit Judge, 97 Michigan, 621. In this case the petitioner had another adequate legal remedy in the form of an appeal or a writ of error from the denial of his motion. Sloan Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 Fed. Rep. 504, distinguished. A writ of mandamus can never be used to control the judicial discretion of a subordinate court. Ex parte Roe (supra); In re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 468. Though mandamus may be used under appropriate circumstances, to compel a court to decide an issue, it cannot be used to dictate how such issue shall be decided. Consequently, it cannot compel the reviewing or vacating of a judgment, decree or order already made, on the ground that the issue was wrongly decided. Ex parte Morgan, 114 U. S. 174; Ex parte Schwab, 8 Otto, 240; Ex parte Loring, 4 Otto, 418; Chiera v. Circuit Judge, 97 Michigan, 638. The act of a court suppressing or refusing to suppress a deposition, being judicial, will not be controlled by mandamus. 26 Cyc. 205; Ex parte Elson, 25 Alabama, 72. The making of the order ensealing the depositions in the case of United States v. Dwight was an act within the discretion of the court. A writ of mandamus will never be granted unless the petitioner has a clear and specific right to be enforced by it. In re Key, 189 U. S. 84; Ex parte Cutting, 4 Otto, 14. Petitioner has no absolute or clear right to examine the depositions as he was not a party to the original suit, nor to the agreement for ensealing them. 239 U. S. Argument for Respondent. His interest in the subject-matter of the original suit was confined to his claim against the United States for a contingent remuneration if the suit was successful. Having received such remuneration he ceased to have any interest whatever in the subject-matter of the original suit. Any right which petitioner may have had to examine the records in question, short of an absolute right, was suspended by the ensealing order. Depositions differ from other public documents which are required to be open to the inspection of all. A deposition is no part of the record, but is a separate statement by a person not a party to the cause. Wigmore on Evidence, § 2111 (3); Myers v. Roberts, 35 Florida, 255; Rev. Stat., § 865; Re McLean, Fed. Cas. No. 2719. The custody of depositions is given to the clerk, not because they are part of the record of the case, but simply to insure the safeguarding of the documents and to preserve their integrity until offered as evidence in the case. Where a deposition is opened out of court contrary to this provision, it becomes inadmissible as evidence. Beale v. Thompson, 8 Cranch, 70. A deposition, if suppressed or excluded, loses all evidential value. Its existence as an instrument of evidence is conditional upon its being admitted in evidence. Gross v. Coffey, 111 Alabama, 468, 474; House v. Camp, 32 Alabama, 541, 549; Moore v. McCullough, 6 Missouri, 444; Weeks, Law of Depositions, § 365. The public has no absolute right to inspect a deposition which has been filed in court, whether it has been opened or not. Depositions, within the limits of their statutory existence, are entirely within the control of the court. A court has power and discretion to suppress depositions for irregularities in the taking or return, as in Dunkle v. Worcester, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4162; or containing scandalous matter, as in In re Caswell, 29 Atl. Rep. 259. |