case upon so-called bills of exception, the whole record is certified and the case is considered, as the opinion shows upon the facts and the law applicable thereto. Thus the proceeding in the Supreme Court is practically an appeal. In the opinion and judgment in that court it is styled an appeal. The right to review the judgment in this court is, as we have said, controlled by the Federal Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 691, and is in the same manner, i. e., by appeal or writ of error, and with the same procedure, so far as applicable, as is applied to final judgments and decrees of the Circuit Courts of the United States. From what has been said, it is apparent that such review from the orders of the Circuit Courts of the United States was uniformly by appeal, and not by writ of error. Nor is the different method of review a mere difference in form and procedure only. Upon appeal, as the statutes already referred to and the decisions of this court show, it was intended to take before the reviewing court the questions of law and fact involved, upon all competent evidence taken and heard before the Board of General Appraisers and before the Circuit Court. Such was the uniform method and purpose of review, under all the statutes and procedure, which, so far as applicable, are to be read into the Philippine Act, and such is still the policy of the Federal Statutes in permitting review of the decisions of the Boards of General Appraisers in the United States by appeal to the Court of Customs Appeal. By writ of error the review is limited to questions of law, a method of procedure inapplicable to customs cases where the facts must be considered in order to determine the proper classification of the merchandise and the duty to which it is subject.

We reach the conclusion that the writ of error, by which it is sought to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in this case, should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and it is so ordered.

Dismissed.

239 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v.
CAMPBELL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

No. 53. Argued November 4, 1915. Decided November 15, 1915.

Where the only questions are whether the carrier's rule was applicable to the case and was properly applied, this court is not concerned with the reasonableness of the rule.

Whether a rule of the carrier in regard to forfeiture of mileage books

is reasonable is a question for the Interstate Commerce Commission. Where the carrier's own rule provides that the mileage book can be forfeited if presented for passage by anyone other than the original purchaser the carrier cannot forfeit the book because the original purchaser presents it for transportation of someone other than himself.

The state court does not deny a Federal right to a railroad company by simply holding it strictly to its own terms in connection with mileage books.

94 So. Car. 95, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the right of a railroad company to forfeit a mileage book, and the construction of the rules under which such a book was issued in this case, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. John K. Graves, with whom Mr. L. E. Jeffries was on the brief for plaintiff in error:

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina no reference is made to the schedules, applicable in this case, governing the sale and issuance of mileage books and mileage exchange tickets, in force in pursuance of the Act to Regulate Commerce. The effect of this act on the ordinary rules of common law apparently was not considered.

Counsel for Defendant in Error.

239 U.S.

It is not entirely clear on what ground or grounds the South Carolina court rested its opinion. It seems to hold that the book and the ticket should not have been forfeited because the husband, the original purchaser of the mileage book, in presenting them for his wife without fraud, was not violating the provision as to forfeiture, since the book and ticket were presented by the original purchaser.

The court also seems to hold that the acts of the various agents in exchanging the coupons for the exchange tickets were such acts as to waive the provision as to forfeiture. The provision of the tariff was clearly applicable in this case, and the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in violation of its terms was clearly erro

neous.

In support of the contentions of plaintiff in error, see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; B. & O. R. R. v. Hamburger, 155 Fed. Rep. 849; B. & O. S. W. R. R. v. Evans, 82 N. E. Rep. 773; Bitterman v. Louis. & Nash. R. R., 207 U. S. 205; B. & M. R. R. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97; Chi. & Alton R. R. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 156; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 441; Kans. City R. R. v. Albers, 223 U. S. 573; Kans. City S. R. R. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Marche v. Central R. R., 21 I. C. C. 195; M., K. & T. R. R. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; Newton Gum Co. v. C., B. & Q. R. R., 162 C. C. A. 341; N. Y. Cent. R. R. v. United States, 212 U. S. 500; Penna. R. R. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Burckett, 229 U. S. 603; Southern Ry. v. Harrison, 119 Alabama, 539; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Tex. & Pac. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Co., 204 U. S. 426; United States v. Miller, 223 U. S. 599.

Mr. John G. Capers, with whom Mr. William G. Sirrine was on the brief for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by Samuel J. Campbell against the Southern Railway Company to recover damages for the wrongful forfeiture of the plaintiff's mileage book. The Company sought to justify the forfeiture under its tariff regulations which had been duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The defense was overruled by the state court. 94 So. Car. 95.

The admitted facts are these: On November 20, 1910, Mr. Campbell, being the owner of a thousand-mile coupon book, or mileage book, purchased another mileage book of the same sort from the agent of the Southern Railway Company at Greensboro, North Carolina, and thereupon presented both books to the agent of the Company and obtained, in exchange for coupons, two 'mileage exchange tickets' to Greenville, South Carolina. With these tickets he and his wife traveled to Greenville, the tickets being accepted by one of the Company's collectors. A few days later he presented his mileage books to the agent of the Company at Greenville and obtained, for the proper number of coupons, two exchange tickets to Greensboro. When he presented these tickets for the transportation of himself and his wife, the ticket collector asked if he had mileage books and required him to produce them. Upon looking at the books the ticket collector returned one of them to Mr. Campbell but forfeited the other, which contained unused coupons for six hundred miles. The exchange ticket, which had been issued for the coupons taken from the book, was also forfeited, and the ticket collector demanded and received payment in cash of the fare for the plaintiff's wife.

The tariff regulations and conditions which related to mileage books, or mileage tickets, and were filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission were as follows:

"Exchange Requirement.-Mileage coupons (except as

noted below) will not be honored for passage on trains or steamers or in checking baggage (except from non-agency stations and agency stations not open for the sale of tickets) but must be presented at ticket office and there exchanged for continuous passage ticket, which continuous passage ticket will be honored in checking baggage and for passage when presented in connection with the mileage ticket.

"Non-Transferable. If a mileage ticket or ticket issued in exchange for coupons therefrom be presented to an agent or conductor by any other than the original purchaser, it will not be honored but will be forfeited, and any agent or conductor of any line over which it reads shall have the right to take up and cancel such ticket or tickets."

A jury was waived, and the case was submitted to the trial judge upon a stipulation that if judgment went for the plaintiff he should recover the value of the mileage book (twelve dollars) and twenty-five dollars damages. Judgment was entered accordingly.

We are not concerned with the reasonableness of the rule; that, if challenged, would be a question for the Interstate Commerce Commission. The question now is as to the application of the rule. Nor need we consider the right of the ticket collector to demand payment for the transportation of the plaintiff's wife. The case, as the state court said, turns upon the right to forfeit the mileage book with its unused coupons.

The condition expressed in the rule is that the mileage book, or mileage ticket, as it is termed, shall be presented by the original purchaser. The plaintiff was the original purchaser and presented it. The Company seeks to construe the rule as if it read that the mileage book should be forfeited if presented by the original purchaser for the transportation of a person other than himself. The rule does not so read. It was not made a ground of forfeiture