The Philosophical Works of David Hume ...A. Black and W. Tait, 1826 - Philosophy |
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actions advantage Æneid agreeable animal appear argument arise Atheists attended beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character circumstances Cleanthes common concerning connexion consider contrary degree Deity Demea derived direct passions distinct double relation effect emotion entirely esteem evil excite execution of justice experience farther feel force give human nature hypothesis imagination immediately impressions infer influence interest ject judgment justice and injustice kind love and hatred love or hatred mankind manner matter ment mind moral motive neral never notion object obligation observe operate original ourselves pain particular person Philo philosophers philosophical scepticism pleasure possession present pride and humility principles proceed produce qualities quire racter reason regard relation of ideas religion render resemblance rience rules scepticism SECT sensation sense sensible sentiments sion society sophism species supposed sympathy thing thought tion tis evident tis impossible transition tural twill uneasiness vice and virtue virtue and vice
Popular passages
Page 234 - I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is, however of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not...
Page 167 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Page 504 - Dire was the tossing, deep the groans : Despair Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch ; And over them triumphant Death his dart Shook, but delay'd to strike, though oft invoked With vows, as their chief good, and final hope.
Page 219 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Page 157 - ... or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas: the refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape ; the action of the executioner ; the separation of the head and body ; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions ; but the mind feels no difference...
Page 168 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Page 250 - In another sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue ; so no virtue is more natural than justice.
Page 497 - Being, according to this pretended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matter; and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five.
Page 233 - Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: and this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; tho', like that too, it has little or no influence on practice.
Page 523 - Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organised, sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness!