poor and all but hopeless exile,—and he had taken what steps he could to comfort and strengthen the oppressed Church in republican, and as yet infidel, France. But the First Consul desired to reconstruct social order. He saw at once the necessity of procuring for the State the support of the Church, and of imposing on the Church the control of the State-and he proposed to the Pope a concordat. The difficulty of his Holiness' situation was great. On the one hand he felt the importance of re-christianizing France; on the other, the long-oppressed Church and the extruded Bourbons were his fellow-sufferers and his clients. What may have been his' internal struggles we know not; he signed a concordat by which a new distribution of sees was carved out, and all bishops were displaced-if they did not accept the invitation to resign. Moreover, their legitimate sovereign was virtually deposed, and their oath of allegiance dispensed with by the injunction to take the oath to the Republic and its rulers, whom the Pope, with pardonable hypocrisy, affected to believe to be Catholics; though little could be known of Buonaparte's religion, except that he had recently declared himself a Turk.

In thus reviving the despotism of the Pope, the First Consul probably did not look beyond the purposes of the hour. The union of papal bulls and consular bayonets must, he knew, cut off from the disaffected both the means of resistance and the hopes of martyrdom-and he was satisfied. Yet the statesmen employed to construct the concordat and the articles organiques,' embodied in them those provisions of the ancient ecclesiastical law of France which had been framed to prevent the encroachments of papal power-a piece of foresight for which they are deservedly eulogised by M. Dupin, and which may be advantageously contrasted with the indolence and self-deception of English legislators when employed on a similar subject. Buonaparte's acts continued to favour the growth of papal influence. In 1804 the Pope was dragged across the Alps in winter, from Rome to Paris, to crown the usurper. Such at least is the version we chose to give of the matter in England. The Pope himself, in an allocution to the cardinals, professes to go with joyand assuredly the transaction admits of a construction as favourable to papal authority as the coronation of Charlemagne by Leo.* In

* Mr. Seymour's critics are angry with him for asserting that the Pope crowned the Emperor, because it is notorious the emperor put the crown on his own head.' This is a mere quibble. The crafty usurper sent for the Pope to give his coronation the sanction of unction and consecration, in order to secure the allegiance of those who would respect such sanction; while to gratify others, whose religious and political unbelief would be offended at this retrograde mummery,' he took the crown from the

Pope's

In the zenith of his triumph, however, the new Emperor was destined to discover that he had contributed to restore a power which he could not control. In 1809 the Pope, a prisoner at Fontainebleau and alone, on being urged with menace to renew some concessions he had revoked, excommunicated his gaoler, the conqueror of the continent, and the most despotic of monarchs. To the arrogance of a Pope he added the firmness of a martyr, and, notwithstanding the mischief of the precedent, the sympathies of Europe flowed freely in favour of the oppressed Church and its persecuted Head.

Immediately on the downfall of Napoleon, the Pope availed himself of these favourable dispositions, and of the general confusion, to restore the Jesuits and to re-establish the Inquisition. Even now we look back with wonder at this proof how far he had actually advanced in reasserting the full-blown pretensions of Rome amidst the cold and scoffing nineteenth century. In the meantime it was not clearly perceived that the legalization of the Romish worship in this country had given importance to a variety of political questions-questions, indeed, which we have not yet seen fairly stated, much less solved. What are the necessary limits of toleration to a religion which itself enjoins intolerance? How is the just subordination to the State to be enforced on a body which in certain matters professes obedience to a foreign Head? What are the due limits of these matters? Can a Protestant Government safely neglect those precautions and restrictions with which, as long experience proves, a Roman Catholic Government cannot dispense ? Is the duty of the Protestant Government to its Roman Catholic subjects fulfilled by merely enacting laws to punish their disobedience? Can it safely or justly abandon the laity of this creed to the encroachments of the clergy, and both to the ultramontane pretensions of the See of Rome?' Unfortunately, at the moment when these points might have been most safely discussed, the necessity of entertaining them was superseded by the apathy, or rather debility, which paralyzed the church of Rome in its head and its members. Moreover, at first the Roman Catholic body seemed aware of the relation which ought to subsist between them and the Government. In 1793, being anxious to supply the want of places of education for their clergy-(a want occasioned by the recent destruction of religious houses in France) - the Irish Roman Catholic bishops addressed a memorial to the Crown, petitioning for leave to found a college, and holding out the

Pope's hand and placed i on his own head; but it has never occurred before to Protestant or Catholic to doubt that Buonaparte was crowned by Pius VII. in Notre Dame.

advantage

advantage of securing to the government a due control over the priesthood, as the sure result of compliance.* The prayer was more than granted. Maynooth was founded and endowed. The professions of gratitude were unbounded a statue was votedneed we add, it was never raised? In 1799 the Irish bishops were still influenced by the same sentiments; they met and declared their willingness to allow the Government a veto on their appointments in return for emancipation. By them, however, the advantages of agitation were soon preferred-and the concession was revoked. The English Catholics in 1810 met and declared their willingness to give reasonable securities, in return for political privileges. A reference to Rome being proposed, their agent, Dr. Poynter, repaired thither to meet Dr. Milner, the agent of the Irish party. In the absence of the captive Pope, the Propaganda decided for the veto, but did not convince the Irish, who admire passive obedience only as a reason for taking up arms. On the return of the Pope the matter was again referred. Pius VII. feared to irritate his Irish subjects. It is not easy to persuade guerilla troops to submit to the routine of regular discipline; but he had learnt moderation from adversity, and he decided in favour of a qualified veto. During the long struggle that intervened between the Toleration Act and the Relief Bill, it need not have been difficult to repair past errors:-but on the one hand, our liberal statesmen assumed that the spirit of the Papacy still was and ever would remain what they wished it to be, or they persisted in believing so on the evidence of interested parties whom it was the height of simplicity to credit or even to examine on such a subject ;† on the other hand, the aversion entertained by Protestants to all direct communication with the Pope, made it difficult, perhaps, impossible, to propose the only method by which any adequate securities for the future could be obtained. In the ears of good Protestants the word 'concordat' suggested, and it still suggests, the ideas of compromise, surrender, subserviency. We beg leave to say, that when in a recent article we used the word, we meant none of these. We meant restrictions and regulations for the exercise of the Romish worship, imposed with the consent of the Head of the Romish Church; a consent which, after more or less of struggle, he has always given in Catholic as well as in Protestant States, and which he must always give, except where the folly of Go*This document is particularly well worth the reader's attention. It is quoted in a pamphlet entitled 'Case of Maynooth College considered.' Dublin, 1836.

We could wish our statesmen would turn to some of the pamphlets and speeches then put forth on the question. The perusal might inculcate a lesson of humility, and so far of wisdom.

vernment

No

vernment betrays that more is to be gained by withholding it. Let it be proved to us that regulations can be devised by hostile legislation, so as to attain the end proposed, and we will gladly wait Lord Derby's two years to give him time to produce them. But where are such laws to find their sanction? Who will enforce their penalties, if severe? If light, how many will be found to court them! How fine to be persecuted when persecution means only notoriety, applause, letters in the Times, and, perhaps, subscriptions and preferment! How pleasant to wear the crown of martyrdom when it is turned to a chaplet of bays! On the other hand, when we are determined to discontinue the war, where is the 'compromise' in making a convention with the only party who can ensure us peace? agreement can be binding on the Roman Catholic body, unless sanctioned by their Head; and to insist that the terms shall be settled without his intervention is more absurd than to propose terms to marauding soldiers to the exclusion of their general-inchief. The argument against compromise' has lost all its meaning since the days of so-called persecution. To treat with the Pope acknowledges no more than the fact of his claimswhich no one denies-and gives no sanction to their validity. All toleration is a compromise-but it is one which we have deliberately resolved to make, and which no one wishes to revoke. As long as we attempted to dam up the torrent, principle, at least, was preserved; but having-wisely or unwisely-broken down the dam, where is the compromise of principle in cutting a channel for the passage of waters, rather than leaving them to flood the country in their overflow?

If it was a want of foresight to admit Romanists to toleration, without taking proper steps to secure the tranquillity of the State, it was madness to admit them to political privileges. That at the time of the Relief Bill terms satisfactory to the reasonable of both parties might have been obtained, is undoubted. That none can be proposed now in the height of the present conflict, and that none probably would be accepted, is equally true. But it is profitable to dwell on what might and ought to have been done then, because it suggests the only possible termination more or less remote, after more or less of suffering and blundering, which we can anticipate for our difficulties. The Relief Act, bad as it was, was not altogether unaccompanied by restrictive clauses. All these have been openly and shamelessly set at nought. The consent of the country was with difficulty extorted to that measure by the assurance that the Roman Catholic Church could never be more aggressive than it then appeared. That assurance was believed to have all the force of a compact. The Romanists

certainly

certainly did all they could by the most vociferous expressions, not merely of acquiescence, but of eternal gratitude, peace, and good-will, to persuade us that they considered it a compact of most sacred obligation. Another statue was voted-but as before no steps were taken to erect it. We might forgive their versatility, however ungrateful; but what words can express our scorn in hearing the resolution-makers of the Rotunda assert that a compact made with them at the time of the Relief Act has been violated on the side of the State by the recent enactment?

Since the year 1829, the Pope has steadily increased his authority over the Romish clergy in these kingdoms; and they, on their part, have obtained fresh power over the laity and the legislature. Fashion and taste have combined to make attractive a subserviency which our predecessors would have thought degrading and ridiculous; and the priests, by their influence in elections, are enabled to domineer over those who, to secure a seat in Parliament, are willing to give up the independence which alone can make a seat desirable. It is needless again to point out how far the fatal policy of our present ministers has contributed to papal aggrandizement and encouraged papal aggression. But to complete our sketch of the resurrection of papal power, we must note the impulse that has been given to ultramontane doctrines of late years, and more especially since the convulsions of 1848. The discussion is profitable if not agreeable. Let us not again be led astray from undervaluing our adver

sary.

The position of the papacy at the present crisis presents some striking contrasts of strength and weakness, which call to mind its anomalous condition in the middle ages. The temporal power of Rome is shaken to its foundation. In her own strongholds, it is said, she is undermined by the disciples of the Reformation. In Florence, at this moment, a religious ferment exists, of which it is impossible to ascertain the extent, or to foresee the effects. On the other hand, never were ultramontane principles received with so much favour on this side the Alps. Austria, willing to avail herself of every support to prop the falling fabric of social order, has thrown herself into the arms of the repentant Pope, and has deprived herself of those safeguards against ecclesiastical encroachment which long experience had obtained.* In France, on the restoration of the Bourbons, the Roman Catholic had been declared the religion of the State. In 1830, as a concession (perhaps unavoidable) to the republican

Mr. Bowyer infers that the royal exequatur' cannot be necessary, because Austria has resigned it. That is begging the whole question. Austria has but begun her experiment.

and