that the legal intendment was, that B. entered under the title of the heirs
of A., and that the statute of limitations could not begin to run, till after
the possession of the defendant was held adversely to the heirs of A.
An entry adverse to the lawful possessor is not to be presumed, but must be
proved. Jackson, ex dem. Gansevoort v. Parker, 124-2.

II. Entry into part of a Tract.

2. A tract of land was granted, by letters patent, to A. in 1735, which was
surveyed and laid out into lots. In 1736, B. executed leases for several
lots to different persons, for lives, reserving rent, in which he asserted his
claim to the whole tract; and exercised various acts of ownership, until
his death, in 1752, and his heirs also gave leases of some of the lots, in
1767, and his title and that of his heirs, continued to be acknowledged by
the tenants, and remained undisputed, until after the year 1783. In an
action of ejectment brought by the heirs of B. against C., who had been
in possession since 1772, it was held that a grant from the original paten-
tees to B. was to be presumed; that entry, by him, into part, with a claim
to the whole, was to be considered as an entry into the whole; and that
the entry of C. was in subordination to the title of B.

Jackson, ex dem. Gansevoort v. Lunn, 109.

EQUITY.

See CHANCERY.

ERROR.

Plaintiff, administrator, recovered in the common pleas of Ulster, a verdict
under $25, and that court refused to give judgment in his favor for the
costs. Motion for a mandamus denied; a writ of error is the proper rem.
edy. Jansen v. Davison, 480. See vol. 2, p. 72, 73, n. (a), 217, n. (b.)

In an action against a sheriff for an escape, if it be averred, or found on the
record, that the sheriff permitted the prisoner to escape, it is equivalent to
a finding of a voluntary escape.

The prohibition in the 10th section of the first article of the constitution of
the United States, does not extend to the municipal regulations of the pres-
ent states, which modify the process and proceedings relative to the recov-
ery of debts, as establishing jail liberties, &c.

The act, (sess. 24, c. 91,) as to jail liberties, is imperative on the sheriff, who
is bound to grant the liberties to the prisoner on his tendering a sufficient
bond; but as this bond is intended only for the sheriff's indemnity, he may

waive it, and grant the liberties, without taking the bond; and he will not

1. A foreign sentence of an admiralty court is conclusive between the assurer
and the assured.-(Reversed in error, in a like case.

Ludlows v. Dale, 426. See vol. 1, p. 16.

See Goix v. Knox, vol. 1, p. 337, 16, n. (a), and 341, n. (c.)

II. By Deed or will.

2. By the common law, a conveyance of land by a person against whom
there is an adverse possession at the time, to a third person, is void; but
the title of the grantor is not thereby extinguished or divested; nor will
such conveyance enure, by way of estoppel, for the benefit of the defend-
ant in possession.

No person can be technically estopped by a conveyance under the statute of
uses. Jackson, ex dem. Jones v. Brinckerhoff, 101.

3. A. by his last will and testament, among other things, devised as follows:
"And whereas I have conveyed to my son C., my lands at C., and to my
son D. my lands at F. I give and devise all my remaining lands and tene-
ments, and real estate whatsoever, to my sons C. and D. and my daugh-
ter," &c.

It was held that the recital in the will was evidence of a conveyance of the
farm in F. to D. and that C. as heir of the testator, was estopped by the
recital, to deny that the farm was conveyed to D. and that the necessary
intendment from the language of the clause in the will, was, that it was a
conveyance in fee to D. Denn, ex dem. Colden v. Cornell, 174.
Cases and authorities, 178, 178-5.

4. Cases and authorities upon estoppel by recital, 178, n. (b.)

5. A stranger or third person

writing or matter in pais.

III. In pais.

cannot avail himself of an estoppel by a mere
Jackson, ex dem. Jones v. Brinckerhoff, 101.

Authorities upon the doctrine of estoppel in pais, 103, n. (a.) See Faugier

I. Admission.

EVIDENCE.

II. Admiralty survey.

III. Adultery.

IV. Ancient Deed.

V. Attainder.

VI. Bills of Exchange, &c.

VII. Bond.

VIII. Breach of Promise.

IX. Debt.

X. Declarations.

XI. Deed.

XII. Demurrer to.

XIII. Deposition de bene esse.

XIV. Ejectment.

XV. Forgery.

XVI. Judgments, Decrees and Sentences.

XVII. Pardon.

XVIII. Parol Evidence to vary terms of written paper.

XIX. Presumption.

1. Corroborating circumstances.

2. Of Indebtedness.

3. Of Grant.

4. Of Disabilities.

XX. Private Acts.

XXI. Receipt.

XXII. Record.

1. Attestation of from another State.

2. Of Will.

XXIII. Resulting trust.

XXIV. Statute.

XXV. Witness.

1. Attachment against.

2. Competency.

a. General rule as to incompetency, arising from in-

terest.

b. Of Witness, or wife of Witness, to devise.

c. Owner for master, in Master v. Shipper.

d. Grantor for Grantee, at the suit of third person in

Trespass.

4

e. Tenant of Devisee in ejectment, by Heir v. De-

visee.

f. Party to negotiable paper to impeach the same.

g. Effect of pardon with proviso.

3. Subscribing.

XXVI. Written Contract-Parol Evidence to vary-

Ambiguitas latens.

I. Admission.

1. A deliberate acknowledgment of a note being due ought to conclude the
party, unless strong evidence be offered to show a mistake.

II. Admiralty survey.

Bazen v. Roget, 536.

2. Admiralty surveys as to seaworthiness of vessels, are not evidence of the

facts stated in them.

son v. The Same, 39.

Abbott v. Sebor.

Same v. United Ins. Co. Robin-

III. Adultery.

3. Feigned issued from chancery to try the fact of adultery. Confessions of
the wife connected with other proof, and not fraudulently made, admitted
Doe v. Roe, 424. See vol. 1, p. 25.

IV. Ancient Deed.

4. A will executed in 1723, and which had been proved by the witnesses in 1733
and 1744, and recorded, but not in a manner authorized by law, was al-
lowed to be read in evidence, on the trial of an action of ejectment, in
1801, as an ancient deed; though actual possession did not follow and ac-
company the will, that being explained by the peculiar situation of the
property in question; and other circumstances shown, to raise a presump-
tion of the existence and genuineness of the will.

The general rule in reference to proof of ancient deeds is that a deed appear-
ing to be of the age of thirty years, may be given in evidence, without
proof of its execution, if the possession be shown to have accompanied it,
or where no possession has accompanied it, if such account be given of the
deed, as may be reasonably expected under all the circumstances of the
case, and will afford the presumption that it is genuine. Per Radcliff, J.
Livingston and Thompson, J., concurring. Kent, J., diss.

Jackson, cx dem. Lewis v. Laroway, 283.

Cases and authorities, 292, n. (a) and (b.)

V. Attainder.

5. A conviction and attainder in pursuance of the act of the 22d October,
1779, considered as a statute attainder.

The rule in such cases is, that an incomplete description may be aided by
proof, but a false or repugnant description cannot.

Jackson, ex dem. St. Croix v. Sands, 491. See vol. 2, p. 267.

VI. Bills of Exchange, &c.

See BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES AND
CHECKS, XIII. 4. See Infra, XXV., Witness.

VII. Bond.

See Infra, XXV., Witness.

VIII. Breach of Promise.

6. On a promise of marriage the licentious conduct of the female plaintiff
admitted to be shown without any restriction as to the time of the promise
or the intended marriage, with a view to the question of damages. Ch. J.
Lansing, contra. Johnson v. Caulkins, 437.

See vol. 1, p. 116, 118, n. (a.)

IX. Debt.

7. In debt on a judgment in a neighboring state, nil debet is a denial of the
whole declaration, and the judgment must be proved.

Rush v. Cobbett, 500. See vol. 2, p. 256, 257, n. (a.)

X. Declarations of Party.

See Supra, I., Admission.

XI. Deed.

See Infra.

XII. Demurrer to.

See DEMURRER TO Evidence.

XIII. Deposition de bene esse.

8. A deposition admitted to be read, which was taken de bene esse, on the
same day on which an order for that purpose was obtained, and notice