of the distance from which it comes or to which it is bound, before or after crossing such state line-in other words, if it be commerce to send goods from Cincinnati, in Ohio, to Lexington, in Kentucky, it is equally such to send goods or to travel in person from Cincinnati to Covington; and while the reasons which influenced this court to hold in the Wabash case that Illinois could not fix rates between Peoria and New York may not impress the mind so strongly when applied to fixing the rates of toll upon a bridge or ferry, the principle is identically the same, and, at least in the absence of mutua! or reciprocal legislation between the two states, it is impossible for either to fix a tariff of charges. | terstate ferries and bridges, and perhaps in some instances have been recognized as having the authority to do so by the courts of the several states. But we are not aware of any case in this court where such right has been recognized. Of recent years it has been the cus tom to obtain the consent of *Congress [220 for the construction of bridges over navigable waters, and by the seventh section of the Act of September 19, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 426, 454), it is made unlawful to begin the construction of any bridge over navigable waters, until the location and plan of such bridge have been approved by the Secretary of War, who has also been in frequent instances authorized to reg ulate the tolls upon such bridges, where they With reference to the second question, an connected two states. So, too, in Wiggins attempt is made to distinguish a bridge from Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365 [27: a ferry boat, and to argue that while the latter 419], it was held that a state had the power to is an ins rument of interstate commerce, the impose a license fee, either directly or through former is not. Both are, however, vehicles of one of its municipal corporations, upon ferry such commerce, and the fact that one is mov keepers living in the state, for boats which they able and the other is a fixture makes no differ-owned and used in conveying from a landing ence in the application of the rule. Commerce in the state passengers and goods across a was defined in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. 9 navigable river to another state. It was said Wheat. 1, 189 [6: 23 68], to be "intercourse," that "the levying of a tax upon vessels or and the thousands of people who daily pass other watercraft, or the exaction of a license and repass over this bridge may be as truly said fee by the state within which the property 219]to be engaged in commerce as if they were subject to the exaction has its situs, is not a shipping cargoes of merchandise from New regulation of commerce within the meaning of York to Liverpool. While the bridge com- the Constitution of the United States." Obvipany is not itself a common carrier, it affords ously the case does not touch the question here a highway for such carriage, and a toll upon involved. Upon the other hand, however, it such bridge is as much a tax upon commerce was held in Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. as a toll upon a turnpike is a tax upon the 69 [18: 653], that a municipal ordinance of New traffic of such turnpike, or the charges upon a Orleans imposing a license tax upon persons ferry a tax upon the commerce across a river. owning and ruuning tow boats to and from A tax laid upon those who do the business of the Gulf of Mexico was void as a regulation of common carriers upon a certain bridge is as commerce. much a tax upon the commerce of that bridge as if the owner of the bridge were himself a common carrier. | It is clear that the state of Kentucky, by the statute in question, attempts to reach out and secure for itself a right to prescribe a rate of Let us examine some of the cases which are toll applicable not only to persons crossing supposed to countenance the doctrine that fer- from Kentucky to Obio, but from Ohio to ries and bridges connecting two states are not Kentucky, a right which practically nullifies instruments of commerce between such states the corresponding right of Ohio to fix tolls in such sense as to exempt them from state from her own state. It is obvious that the control. In Conway v. Taylor, 66 U. S. 1 bridge could not have been built without the Black, 603 [17:191], a ferry franchise on the consent of Ohio, since the north end of the Ohio was held to be grantable under the laws bridge and its abutments rest upon Ohio soil; of Kentucky to a citizen of that state who was and without authority from that state to exera riparian owner on the Kentucky side. It cise the right of eminent domain, no land was said not to be necessary to the validity of could have been acquired for that purpose. the grant that the grantee should have the right It follows that, if the state of Kentucky has of landing on the other side or beyond the the right to regulate the travel upon such jurisdiction of the state. The opinion, how bridge and fix the tolls, the state of Ohio has ever, did not pass upon the question of the the same right, and so long as their action is barright of one state to regulate the charge for monious there may be no room for friction beferriage, nor does it follow that because a state tween the states; but it would scarcely be [22 1 may authorize a ferry or bridge from its own consonant with good sense to say that separate territory to that of another state, it may reg-regulations and separate tariffs may be adopted ulate the charges upon such bridge or ferry. by each state (if the subject be one for state A state may undoubtedly create corporations regulation), and made applicable to that porfor the purpose of building and running steamships to foreign ports, but it would hardly | be claimed that an attempt to fix a scale of charges for the transportation of persons or property to and from such foreign ports would not be a regulation of commerce and beyond the constitutional power of the state. It is true the states have assumed the right in a Dumber of instances, since the adoption of the Constitution, to fix the rates or tolls upon iu tion of the bridge within its own territory. So far as the matter of construction is concerned, each state may proceed separately by authorizing the company to condemn land within its own territory, but in the operation of the bridge their action must be joint cr great confusion is likely to result. It may be for the interest of Kentucky to add to its own population by encouraging residents of Cin cinnati to purchase homes in Covington, and whether, in the absence of legislation by Congress, the states may by reciprocal action fix upon a tariff which shall be operative upon both sides of the river. We do hold, however, that the statute of the commonwealth of Kentucky in this case is an attempted regulation of commerce which it is not within the power of the state to make. As was said by Mr. Justice Miller in the Wabash case: "It is impossible to see any distinction in its effect upon commerce of either class between a statute which regulates the charges for trans tax for the benefit of the state upon the same transportation." The judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky is, therefore, reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceed. iugs in conformity with this opinion. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment of reversal, for the following reasons: to do this by fixing the tolls at such a rate as to induce citizens of Ohio to reside within her borders. It might be equally for the interest of Ohio to prescribe a higher rate of toll to induce her citizens to remain and fix their homes within their own state, and as persons living in one state and doing business in another would necessarily have to cross the bridge at least twice a day, the rates of toll might become a serious question to them. Congress, and Congress alone, possesses the requisite power to harmonize such differences, and to enact a uniform scale of charges which will be opera-portation and a statute which levies a[223 tive in both directions. The authority of the state, so frequently recognized by this court, to fix tolls for the use of wharves, piers, elevators, and improved channels of navigation, has always been limited to such as were exclusively within the territory of a single state, thus affecting interstate commerce but incidentally, and cannot be extended to structures connecting two states without involving a liability of controversies of a serious nature. For instance, suppose the agent of the Bridge Company in Cincinnati should refuse to recog nize tickets sold upon the Kentucky side, en abling the person holding the ticket to pass from Ohio to Kentucky, it would be a mere bintum fulmen to attempt to punish such agent under the laws of Kentucky, Or, suppose the state of Ohio should authorize such agent to refuse a passage to persons coming from Ken tucky, who had not paid the toll required by the Ohio statute; or that Kentucky should enact that all persons crossing from Kentucky 222]to Ohio should be entitled to a *free passage, and thus attempt to throw the whole burden upon persons crossing in the opposite direction. It might be an advantage to one state to make the charge for foot passengers very low and the charge for merchandise very high, and for the other side to adopt a converse system. One scale of charges might be advantageous to Kentucky in this instance, where the larger city is upon the north side of the river, while a wholly different system might be to her advantage at Louisville, where the larger city is upon the south side. The several states have the power to establish and regulate ferries and bridges, and the rates of toll thereon, whether within one state, or between two adjoining states, subject to the paramount authority of Congress over interstate commerce. By the concurrent acts of the legislature of Kentucky in 1846, and of the legislature of Ohio in 1849, this bridge company was made a corporation of each state, and authorized to fix rates of toll. Congress, by the Act of February 17, 1865, chap. 39, declared this bridge "to be, when completed, in accordance with the laws of the states of Ohio and Kentucky, a lawful structure:" but made no provision as to tolls; and thereby manifested the intention of Congress that the rates of toll should be established by the two states. 13 Stat. at L. 431. The original acts of incorporation constituted a contract between the corporation and both states, which could not be altered by one state without the consent of the other. COVINGTON & CINCINNATI ELE [224 v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 224.) State law fixing tolls on interstate bridge. The Kentucky law of 1890 fixing the tolls and fare over the bridge connecting that state and Ohio and spanning the Ohio river at Cincinnati, is in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. We do not wish to be understood as saying that, in the absence of Congressional legislation or mutual legislation of the two states, the company has the right to fix tolls at its own discretion. There is always an implied understanding with reference to these structures that charges shall be reasonable, and the question of reasonableness must be settled as other ques tions of a judicial nature are settled, by the evidence in the particular case. As was said in Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 217 [29: 158, 166], 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 382: "freedom from such imposition does not of course imply exemption from reasonable charges, as compensation for the carriage of persons, in the way of tolls or fares, or from the ordinary taxation to which other property is subjected, any more than like freedom of Argued Jan. 26, 29, 30, 1894. Reargued transportation on land implies such exemp April 25, 1894. Decided May 26, 1894. tion. Reasonable charges for the use of prop erty, either on water or land, are not an inter-State of Kentucky, affirming the judgment ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the ference with the freedom of transportation between the states secured under the commerNOTE.-A8 to interstate commerce; regulation of: cial power of Congress." Nor are we to be power of Congress, how far exclusive, see note to understood as passing upon the question | Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 29: 158. [No. 1043.] of the criminal court of Kenton county, in | 3. re Messrs. Wm. H. Jackson and W. II. Wadsworth for plaintiff in error, on both ar guments. If the government, charged with the duty of disposing of a tract of public land within a state, chooses to proceed under the provisions of a particular statute of that state, the same legal effect should be given to its proceeding as in case of an individual proprietor. 4. The United States possess no jurisdiction to Messrs. Wm. Goebel and Wm. J. Hendrick, Atty. Gen. of Kentucky, for defendant | Argued March 29, 30, 1894. Decided May 25, in error, on both arguments. Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court: 1894. APPEAL from the decree of the Circust Court of the United States for the North This case differs from the last only in the ern District of Illinois, sustaining a demurrer fact that the plaintiff in error was not incor- to and dismissing an information or bill in equity in which the United States were comporated until 1886, and subsequently to a general law of the state declaring that all char-lainants, and the Illinois Central Railway ters and grants of or to corporations shall be Company et al.,defendants, the object of which subject to amendment or repeal at the will of was to prevent the continuance of encroachthe legislature. Conceding that these wordsments in the future upon certain property in became a part of its charter, and hence that Chicago, and to preserve it open to the public no contract was impaired by the legislation of uses for which it was dedicated by the United States. Affirmed. 1890, such legislation is still open to the ob jection found to exist in the former case, that it is in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. The judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky is, therefore, reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceed ings. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Justice Gray and Mr. Justice White concurred in the judgment of reversal, for the like reasons as in the case of Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, ante, p. 962. COM See same case below, 33 Fed. Rep. 730. Mr. Lawrence Maxwell, Jr., Solicitor One who dedicates property to public uses is entitled in a court of equity to enforce the trusts declared by the dedication, whether he accompanied the dedication with a tran-fer of the fee to the municipality or retained the fee in himself. Warren v. Lyons City, 22 Iowa, 351; Barclay v. Howell, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 498 (8: 477); Hardy v. Memphis, 10 Heisk. 127. The demurrer admits the allegation of the bill that the fee of the public ground is in the United States, and that allegation must be taken as true. If, however, the court may consider the effect of a conveyance of the lots marked on the plat with reference to the plat and assume that the government had not expressly reserved title in itself to the streets and public grounds, the government would clearly still be the owner in fee of the east half of the land-ground bordering the lake. 1. After the United States has laid out a piece of 2. public land in Chicago, into streets and lots, and to restrain the diversion of such public ground NOTE. As to dedication of lands for public pur- Co. 24: 743. Banks v. Ogden, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 57 (17:818); Harris v. Elliott, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 25 (9: 333). The government has only this remedy to protect itself against the threatened invasion of its reversionary interest, and it is obliged to act promptly to prevent the claim of title by adverse use or estoppel being set up. Wiliams v. First Presbyterian Soc. 1 Ohio St. 478. The United States have in this respect the rights of a private person who has made a dedication. United States v. Chicago, 48, U. S. 7 How. 185 (12: 660). Messrs. Benjamin F. Ayer and John S. Miller, for appellees: The plat in this case has all the force of an express grant. It operates by way of estoppel, and concludes the former owner and all claiming under him from asserting title. Matthiessen & H. Zinc Co. v. La Salle, 117 Ill. 411; Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Ill. 348; Gebhardt v Recres, 75 Ill. 301; Hunter v. Middle ton, 13 Ill. 50; Illinois & M. Canal Trust es v. Harens, 11 Ill. 551; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 3S7 (36: 1918). The title of the United States has been completely devested. The sale of the lots as delineated on the plat and with reference to it, was in law an effectual dedication of the streets and public grounds for municipal uses. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 3 How. 212 (11: 565). The tract ceased to be a part of the national domain, and the title to so much of it as had been dedicated to public use became vested in the state, unless by force of the state statute the fee passed to the city, or unless, upon common law principles, the conveyance of the lots carried the fee to the purchasers. entitles the United States to the relief prayed or show any right of interference on their part, either in law or in equity, respecting the matters referred to, or allege any violation, contemplated or threatened, of any right, legal or equitable, of the United States. Upon the hearing of the several cases known and spoken of together as the "Lake Front Case," before the circuit court of the United States at Chicago on the 23d of February, 1888, this demurrer was argued, and was sustained, "except as to that part of the information which alleges, in substance, that the Illinois Central Railroad Company claims the absolute ownership of, and threatens to take possession of, use and occupy the outer harbor of Chicago,” the opinion of the court *being "that the[234 general government, upon the showing made by it, has no title to any of the streets or grounds described in said information, and has no standing in court, except so far as it seeks to protect the said harbor against obstructions that would impair the public right of navigation, or interfere with any plan devised by the United States for the development or improvement of the outer harbor." Mlinois v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 33 Fed. Rep. 730. Afterwards, on the 231 of August, 1890, the attorney of the United States was granted leave to amend the information by striking out whatever related to the outer harbor and the encroachments alleged to have been made, or threatened in the navigable waters of the lake; and, at the same time, an order was entered by the district judge sustaining the demurrer to the information as amendel, and directing that it be dismissed, “without prejudice to the United States, however, to hereafter institute any appropriate action or proceedings for the purpose of enforcing any rights they may have in the navigable waters of the lake or outer harbor of Chicago;" and thereupon an appeal was prayed and alRep.lowed to the supreme court." Banks v. Ogden, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 57 (17: 818; Hamilton v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 124 Ill. 235; Lissell v. New York Cent. R. Co. 23 N. Y. 61; New Orleans v. United States, 35 U. S 10 Pet. 662 (9: 573); Goodtitle v. Kibbe, 50 U. S. 9 How. 471 (13: 220); Hallett v. Beebe, 54 U. S. 13 How. 25 (14: 35); Mumford v. Ward well, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 423 (18: 756); Weber v. State Harbor Comrs. 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 57 (21: 798); Van Brocklin v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 151 (29: 845). When the ground was dedicated to public use, all the littoral rights appurtenant to it were dedicated with it. The incidents necessarily followed and were subject to the nature and condition of the principal estate. Potomac S. B. Co. v. Upper Potomac 8. B. Co. 109 U. S. 672 (27: 1070); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (24; 224); New Orleans v. United States, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 662 (9: 573); Barclay v. Howell, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 498 (8: 477); Cincin nati v. White, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 431 (8: 452); Godfrey v. Alton, 12 Ill. 30, 52 Am. Dec. 476; Brooklyn v. Smith, 104 Ill. 429, 44 Am. 90; Cook v. Burlington, 30 Iowa, 94, 6 Am. Rep. 649; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 634. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal on the part of the United States from a decree of the circuit court sustaining a demurrer to an information or bill in equity, in which they were complainants and the Illinois Central and other railroad com panies were defendants. The information charges that encroachments are made or threa tened upon property of the United States, and the object of the information, so far as contended on the present appeal, is to prevent their continuance in the future, as to one particular parcel of property and to preserve it open to the uses for which it was dedicated by the United States. That property consists of land situated on the shore of Lake Michigan, being part of fractional section ten in Chicago, lying between Lake Michigan on the east and block twelve of the plat of Fort Dearborn addition to Chicago on the west. From the decree of the circuit court in the Lake Front case, rendered in February, 1888, appeals were taken to the Supreme Court of the United States by the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the city of Chicago, and they were argued and decided at its October term, 1892. Illinois Cent. R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 [36:1018]. The United States did not appear and participate in the argument on the appeal. As they were never a party to those suits in the court below and never appealed from the decree, they were dropped as a party in the designation of the title of the case. The questions involving the title and right of the pirties embraced in the cases, considered under the general designa tion of the Ilinois Central Railroad Compatny v. State of Illinois, to the navigable waters of the harbor of Chicag and in the Lake Front property, and the encroachments on the har bor by the railroad company, and the validity of the Act of April 16 1869, granting submerged lands in the harbor, were fully consid ered and settled as between the state and the city of Chicago on the one part, and [235 the Illinois Central Railroad Company on the other. The 8 veral parties named as defendants appeared to the information, and the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Michigan Central Railroad Company demurred to it on The appeal now before the court is the one the ground that it does not state such a case as taken by the United States from the decree of the military occupation of the government, but eventually, in 1845 or soon afterwards, all of them were sold and conveyed by the United States to divers persons "by and according to said plat and with reference to the same. the circuit court rendered on the 23d of August, 1890, sustaining the demurrer to the information. The amendment allowed to the information consisted in striking out that part to which the demurrer was not sustained, and was made in order that the demurrer might go The statute of Illinois of February 27, 1833, to the entire information. The only conten- then in force for the making and recording of tion now urged by the Solicitor General, on town plats (Ill. Rev. Stat. 833, p. 599) probehalf of the appellants, is that the informa-vided that every donation or grant to the pubtion is good to the extent that it seeks to relic, marked or noted as such on the plat, strain the appellees from diverting the public ground designated as such, on the plat of the Fort Dearborn addition to the city of Chi cago, from the supposed public easement to which it was dedicated. The Solicitor Gencral states that on this branch of the case the information proceeds upon the theory that the United States, being the owners of the land in question, and having dedicated it to a public purpose, are entitled to enjoin its diversion from that public purpose to private uses. It will, therefore, be unnecessary for the disposi-intended. Matthiessen & II. Zinc Co. v. LaSalle, tion of the appeal to consider any other position originally taken by the United States in the information. should be deemed in law a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee simple title, and that “the land intended to be for streets, alleys, ways, commons, or other public uses, in any town or city, or addition thereto, shall be held in the corporate name thereof in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth and expressed or intended." The plat in such cases had all the force of an express grant and operated to convey all the title and interest of the United States in the property for the uses and purposes Il. 411, 414, 415; Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 II, 117, 348; Gebhardt v. * Ricces, 75 Ill. 301; Il [237 nois & M. Canal Trustees v. Havens, 11 I. 554. It is stated in the information that the United States never parted with the title to the streets, alleys, and public grounds designated and marked on the plat, and that they still own the same in fee simple "with the rights and privileges, riparian and otherwise, pertaining to such ownership, subject to the use and enjoyment of the same by the public. But we do not think this position is tenable. A title to some of the streets may have continued in the government so long as the title to any of the adjoining lots remained with it, but not afterwards without disregard of the statutory regulations of the state and its provisions for the transfer of the title. When a resort is made by individuals or the govern ment to the mode provided by the statute of a state where real property is situated, for the transfer of its title, the effect and conditions prescribed by the statute will apply, and such ance as is there designated. The language of the statute is clear, that the land intended for streets, alleys, ways, commons, or other public uses in any town or city or addition thereto shall be held in the corporate name thereof, in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth and expressed or intended. As early as 1804 a military post was estab lished by the United States south of Chicago river, upon the southwest fractional quarter of section ten, and was subsequently occupied by troops until its sale many years afterwards. In 1819, Congress passed an Act authorizing the sale by the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, of such military sites belonging to the United States as may have been found or had become useless for military purposes. And the Secretary of War was authorized, on the payment of the consideration agreed upon into the Treasury of the United States, to execute and deliver all needful instruments conveying the same in fee. And the Act declared that the jurisdic tion which had been specially ceded to the United States for military purposes, by a state, over such site or sites should thereafter cease. 3 Stat. at L. 520. Subsequently, in 1824, upon the request of the Secretary of War, the south-operation given to the instrument of convey236] west *quarter of this fractional section ten, containing about fifty-seven acres, and on which Fort Dearborn was situated, was reserved from sale for military purposes by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The land thus reserved continued to be used for military purposes until 1837. In that year, under the direction of the Secretary of War, it was laid off by his authority into blocks, lots, streets, alleys and public ground, as an addition to the municipality of Chicago, and called the " Fort Dearborn addition to Chicago," and in June, 1839, a plat thereof was made and acknowledged by his agent and at torney and recorded in the recorder's office of the county of Cook. On that plat a part of the ground situated between Lake Michigan on the east and block twelve on the west is In 1854, the validity of the survey and plat designated as "public ground forever to re-made of Fort Dearborn reservation was recog main vacant of buildings." It bears also a further declaration in these words, viz: "The public ground between Randolph and Madison | streets and fronting upon Lake Michigan is not to be occupied with buildings of any description." Subsequently, and for some years, several lots designated and shown on the plat were reserved from sale and remained in The interest in and control of the United States over the streets, alleys, and commons ceased with the record of the plat and the sale of the adjoining lets. Their proprietary interest passed, in the lots sold, to the respective vendees, subject to the jurisdiction of the local government, and the control over the streets, alleys, and grounds passed by express desig. nation of the state law to the corporate authorities of the city. nized in Congress in an Act for the relief of one John Baptiste Beaubien (10 Stat. at L. 81, chap. 172), by which the Commissioner of the General Land Office was authorized to issue a patent or patents to Beaubien for certain lots designated and numbered on the survey and plat of the Fort Dearborn addition to Chicago, *made under the order of the Secretary [238 |