The Augusta and Summerville Railroad Company vs. Dorsey. jury in weighing testimony, yet it would not hesitate to set aside a verdict in a case involving vindictive damages, where there was reason to suspect that the same was the result of bias in favor of one class of suitors, or prejudice against another class. 18. The last ground of error complained of is an extract from the closing argument of Mr. Black to the jury, in which, with great eloquence and power, he described the agony, the suffering and the torture endured by the plaintiff; and for which, as well as for every sigh, every groan, and every pain that he had suffered, he should have compensation equivalent to his agony. These were to be put in one side of the scales, and in the other side money, money, until they "in even balance hung," and the jurors felt that he had been fully and adequately remunerated. The complaint is, not that this appeal was illegal, but that its effect was electrical, and produced a verdict founded not upon law and fact, but upon sympathy and sorrow. We cannot recognize this as a good ground for a a new trial. Impassioned appeal, and persuasive eloquence are but the lawful weapons of forensic conflict, and undoubtedly have been employed from the time in Greece when Mars himself was tried for murder by a jury of twelve men and acquitted by an equality of votes, in the first trial mentioned in history by a jury of that number. 3d Modern Rep., preface, page 9. On the whole, therefore, we think that there should be a new trial in this case. Judgment reversed. Moses, trustee, vs. The Eagle and Phenix Manufacturing Company. MOSES, trustee, vs. THE EAGLE AND PHENIX MANUFACTURING COMPANY. [Crawford, Justice, did not preside in this case.] Where distinct parcels of property are levied on under one levy, and and all claimed by the same claimant, the whole tried under one issue, and a verdict rendered finding certain particular parcels of the property subject, the legal intendment of such a verdict would be that the balance was not subject. (a.) While it might have been more regular to have required the jury to have found explicitly as to all the lots before receiving the verdict, yet where the verdict has been returned and a judgment rendered ordering the fi. fa. to proceed against the parcels found subject, the judgment could subsequently be amended by declaring the true intendment of the verdict and adjudging accordingly. (b.) That a judgment has been before the supreme court for review, and has been affirmed, will not prevent a subsequent amendment so as to more certainly declare the effect of the verdict. Prac Judgments. Amendments. Verdict. Claims. tice in Superior Court. Before Judge WILLIS. Muscogee Superior Court. November Adjourned Term, 1880. Reported in the decision. R. J. MOSES, for plaintiff in error. PEABODY & BRANNON, for defendant. SPEER, Justice. An execution in favor of Van Leonard, trustee, against the Water Lot Company, of the city of Columbus, issued on the 18th of September, 1867, from the superior court of Muscogee county, was levied upon certain property known as water lots numbers 4, 5, 9, 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, all lying and being in the city of Columbus, Moses, trustee, vs. The Eagle and Phenix Manufacturing Company. each lot containing 72 feet front north and south on Bay street, and being between Franklin and Crawford streets, also the dam across the Chattahoochee river nearly opposite lot I aforesaid survey, and the canal and raceway in front of said lots, and all the water power and right to control the water in front of the city of Columbus, subject to the rights of the owners of lots 1, 3, 11, 13 and 15, each to one-nineteenth part of the water controlled. Dam and canal under divers deeds from the Water Lot Company, etc., Levy made 5th of March, 1877. To this the Eagle & Phenix Manufacturing Company interposed their claim to the property levied on, and on their giving bond the same was returned to the court for trial, on issue joined on said levy and claim, a trial was had and the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the jury, find the water lots numbers 20 to 37 inclusive subject to plaintiff's execution." [Signed] A. A. BOYD, Foreman. Whereupon the following judgment was entered on said verdict: "The jury in this claim case having found lots 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, levied on by plaintiff to be subject to plaintiff's execution, and the claimant having interposed a claim to all of said lots known as water lots 20 to 37 levied on, except lots 23, 24, 25, it is considered and adjudged that plaintiff's fi. fa. proceed for the use of J. J. Bradford, trustee, against the aforesaid water lots from 20 to 37, including 20 and 37, and he recover from claimant his costs in this proceeding. June 4, 1877. R. J. MOSES, BLANDFORD & GARRARD, Attorneys for plaintiff in fi. fa." It further appears that, on notice to R. J. Moses, trus tee, on motion of attorneys for claimant, at the November adjourned term, 1880, of Muscogee superior court, the court entered the following judgment nunc pro tunc in said cause: Moses, trustee, vs. The Eagle and Phenix Manufacturing Company. "Van Leonard, trustee Howard Manufacturing Company, plaintiff in fi. fa., vs. The Water Lot Company of the city Fi. fa. levy and claim in Muscogee superior court. "It appearing to the court that the above stated fi. fa. was levied by the sheriff of this county, on the 5th of March, 1877, upon the following lots known as water lots: Numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. 34, 35, 36, 37, all lying and being in the city of Columbus, each lot containing 72 feet front, north and south, on Bay street, between Franklin and Crawford streets, according to a survey made by John Bethune, on the 6th of December, 1841, also the dam across the Chattahoochee river, nearly opposite lot of said survey, and the canal, or race-way, in front of said lots, and all the water power and right to control the water in front of the city of Columbus, and state of Georgia, as fully as the same is owned or controlled by the Water Lot company of the city of Columbus, subject to the rights of the owners of lots 1, 3, 11, 13 and 15, each to one-nineteenth part of the water controlled by said dam and canal, under divers deeds from the Water Lot Company of the city of Columbus, the whole levied on as the property of said defendants in fi. fa.; and the said claimant having filed his claim to lots 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, also the dam across the Chattahoochee river and the canal, or race-way, in front of said lots, and all the water power in front of said lots, or belonging or appertaining thereto, in front of the city of Columbus, which had been so levied on. And at the May term, 1877, an issue was joined between the plaintiff in fi. fa. and claimant as to the said property so claimed being subject to said fi. fa., and upon said issue a jury came, and after hearing evidence, returned the following verdict, to-wit: "We, the jury, find the water lots numbers 20 to 37, inclusive, subject to the plaintiff 's execution," upon which verdict the said plaintiff, at the said term of said court, entered up the foltowing judgment, to-wit: "The jury in the claim case having found lots 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, levied on by plaintiff's fi. fa., to be subject to plaintiff 's execution, and the claimant having interposed a claim to all of said water lots known as water lots 20 to 37 inclusive, levied on, except lots 23, 24, 25, it is considered and adjudged that plaintiff 's fi. fa. proceed for the use of J. J. Bradford, trustee, against the aforesaid water lots, from 20 to 37, including 20 and 37, and that he recover from claimants his costs in this proceeding." Moses, trustee, vs. The Eagle and Phenix Manufacturing Company. And whereas the true meaning and effect of said verdict was, that all the property so levied upon and claimed as aforesaid, except lots numbers 20 to 37, inclusive, except lots 23, 24 and 25, were, by the said jury, found not subject to said fi. fa., and no other judgment having been rendered or entered up on said verdict except the before recited judgment; now, upon motion of claimant, it is considered and adjudged by the court that all of said property so levied upon and claimed, except lots 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, lot number 9 not having been claimed, is not subject to plaintiff's fi. fa., and that the said levy be dismissed as to all the remainder of said property so levied on and claimed as aforesaid. This judgment to be entered up as of said May term, 1877. [Signed] J. T. WILLIS, J. S. C. C. C." To the allowing and entering said judgment on the min utes upon said verdict nunc pro tunc plaintiff in fi. fa. ex. cepted, and assigned the same as error. The real question lying at the foundation of this case is, whether the judgment nunc pro tunc, rendered by the court below and excepted to, is in harmony with and by legal intendment can be sustained by the verdict made by the jury. If a verdict is found, and a defective or insuffi. cient judgment entered thereon, no one can question the right of the court to aid it by amendment. The Code declares: "A judgment may be amended, by order of the court, in conformity with the verdict upon which it is predicated, even after an execution issues." Code, $3494. The only question then is, did the court below, in conformity with the verdict returned, amend this judgment. We recognize the rule insisted upon by counsel for plaintiff in error, that the court could not amend a verdict after the jury had been discharged from the case, as was held in 8 Ga., 20; 17 Ib., 362; and other authorities cited; but that is not the question here. If it became necessary to amend this verdict in order to sustain the judgment complained of, we admit the position of plaintiff in error would be right. But the defendant in error sought no such interference, but to let the verdict stand as returned and amend the judgment rendered, so as to let the judgment |