directly to Winters by that company. “The ticket was a valid one, and the company was under the highest obligation to accept it.” The court further observed that the conduct of the selling company in repudiating the tickets wrongfully disposed of by its own incompetent or dishonest agent did not in any degree justifiy the Baltimore & Ohio Company in repudiating tickets unaffected by the action of the Cincinnati, Jackson & Mackinaw Company. “The tort in the wrongful ejection of Winters was the tort of the corporation itself. It can not justify what was done by the fact that its conductor was but obeying the instruction of the company. That instruction was absolutely unjustifiable, in law or morals, and was a breach of both the public and private duty of the plaintiff in error to one who was rightfully on its train with a ticket which neither on its face nor in fact was subject to any question.” The court below imposed exemplary damages, and this also was upheld by the circuit court of appeals.

POWER OF CONGRESS TO AUTHORIZE A FEDERAL COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTION OF AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER.

In United States v. Duell (172 U. S., 576) it was contended that Congress had no power to enact the law requiring the court of appeals of the District of Columbia to review the action of the Commissioner of Patents in interference cases. The procedure here drawn in question is similar in some essential respects to the amendment of section 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, which the Commission has recommended to Congress in former annual reports. The law provides for appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents to the court of appeals for the District of Columbia. Notice of the appeal must be given to the Commissioner, the party appealing must lay before the court certified copies of all the original papers and evidence in the case, and the Commissioner is required to furnish the court with the grounds of his decision, fully set forth in writing, touching all the points involved on the appeal. The court is directed to hear and determine such appeal, and revise the decision appealed from in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the Commissioner. The court is further directed to return to the Commissioner a certificate of its proceedings and decision, which must be entered of record in the Patent Office.

The court held that although the Commissioner of Patents is an executive officer, generally speaking, matters in the disposal of which he exercises functions judicial in their nature may properly be brought within the cognizance of the courts; that in deciding whether a patent shall issue or not “the Commissioner acts on evidence, finds the facts, applies the law, and decides questions affecting not only public but private interests,” and that in all this he exercises judicial functions. The case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson (154 U. S.,

447) was cited by the court as authority on the point that as the proceeding in the court of appeals on an appeal in an interference controversy presents all the features of a civil case, a plaintiff, a defendant, and a judge, and deals with a question judicial in its nature, in respect of which the judgment of the court is final so far as the particular action of the Patent Office is concerned, such judgment is none the less a judgment “because its effect may be to aid an administrative or executive body in the performance of duties legally imposed upon it by Congress in execution of a power granted by the Constitution.” The court said that it is of vital importance that the line of demarcation between the three great departments of government should be observed, and that each should be limited to the exercise of its appropriate powers, but that in the matter of this appeal it found no such encroachment of one department on the domain of another as to justify it in holding the act in question unconstitutional.

THE SOUTH DAKOTA AND NORTH DAKOTA MAXIMUM RATE CASEs.

The case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Tompkins and others, railroad commissioners of the State of South Dakota (90 Fed. Rep., 363), was brought to restrain the commissioners from putting in force a schedule of rates and fares made by them on August 26, 1897. The court held that it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that enforcement of the schedule would result in depriving individuals or corporations affected thereby of their property without due process of law or of the equal protection of the laws; that the power of a State to establish rates and fares for the carriage of freight and passengers within its jurisdiction can not be destroyed by the sum which a railroad company may be pleased to charge to the operating expenses of its road in the State or the amount of indebtedness it may have created on such road.

As a basis for computation of local earnings, the court held, under the rule announced by the Supreme Court in the Nebraska Maximum Rate Case (169 U. S., 546), in fixing its schedule of rates and fares, that a State can not charge against a railroad company its interstate earnings, and the only method of arriving at a true and just valuation upon which to figure local earnings is to ascertain what per cent the local earnings constitute of the gross earnings of the road in the State, and to take the same per cent of the total value of its property in the State as the capital which is invested to produce the local earnings. The evidence showed that the gross local earnings of the railroad for the four preceding years, under the schedule of rates and fares proposed to be put into effect by the State, would have been from 12 to 18 per cent upon the value of the property used to produce such earnings, varying in the different years, and the court decided that it could not say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such schedule was unconstitutional, as depriving the company of its property without due process of law. The case of Northern Pacific Railway Company and others against Keyes and others, railroad commissioners of the State of North Dakota (91 Fed. Rep., 47), was brought to restrain the railroad commissioners from putting in force a schedule of maximum rates after July 1, 1897. From the opinion of expert witnesses, and from the fact that local traffic in North Dakota consists mainly of merchandise, is light in volume, short in haul, and small in individual shipments, the court ruled that the cost of transportation was, in relation to revenue, at least twice as great for local business as for the entire business of the carriers. It also held that a “proportional” rate for North Dakota, found by dividing the terminal rates on traffic between St. Paul and Duluth and points in North Dakota on a ton mileage basis, in such proportion as the number of miles in North Dakota bears to the entire haul, was unreasonable, as it did not allow for the length of haul or for the large amount of terminal business. A table was introduced in evidence showing the operating expenses of two of the roads affected for four years, and it appeared that, if the schedule as proposed had been in operation at that time, the business of the roads would have been done at an actual loss and nothing left for a return on the value of the property. The court held that the rates of the Commission were unreasonably low, and the restraining orders prayed for were granted.

AUTOMATIC COUPLERS.

In Troxler v. Southern Railway Company (44 Law. Rep. Ann., 313) the court said:

This matter of requiring these great corporations to protect the traveling public, and their employees as well, by the adoption of all safety appliances which have come into general use, is so important that we have gone into the subject at this length. Ordinarily owned by great syndicates out of the State in which they operate, and their management, at all events, removed from any subjection to that sound public opinion which is so great a check upon the conduct of individuals and of government itself, the sole protection left to the traveler and the employee alike is the application of that law which is administered impartially, and which can lay its hand fearlessly upon the most powerful combination and protect with its care the humblest individual in the land. The subject is one of transcendent importance.

The court quotes from page 77 of the Twelfth Annual Report of this Commission statistics showing the number of persons killed and injured on railways in the year ending June 30, 1897, and notes that 1,693 railroad employees were killed and 27,667 were wounded, and that among them 214 were killed and 6,283 wounded in coupling and uncoupling cars. The court then goes on to say:

In our own State the report of the North Carolina Railroad Commission for 1898

(pp. 250, 251) shows that for the year ending June 30, 1898, the railroads reported 879 persons killed and wounded (of whom 99 were killed), and of these 23 of the killed and 599 of the wounded were employees; total, 622. As of the 9,000 employees reported in this State, 4,000 (according to the usual ratio) were employees engaged in the actual operation of the trains, it follows that in this State 1 such employee in every 6) was in that year injured or killed. In view of such mortality, rivaling that of the bloodiest wars, this court can not reverse its declaration heretofore, which is sustained by every sentiment of justice and humanity, that where a life and limb saving appliance, like automatic car couplers, has come into general use, and its partial adoption has in four years, notwithstanding the increase in railroad mileage and employees, decreased the injuries and deaths from coupling cars one-half, the failure to adopt and use it is negligence per se.

NATIONAL CONVENTION OF RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS.

The Eleventh Annual Convention of Railroad Commissioners was held on August 10 and 11, 1899, at Denver, Colo. Twenty-one State Railroad Commissions and the Interstate Commerce Commission were represented. Delegates from the Association of American Railway Accounting Officers were also present. The convention was opened by its chairman, Hon. Cicero J. Lindly, of Illinois, who addressed the convention. In response to invitation from the committee on programme, addresses were also delivered by Judge Walter Clark, of the North Carolina supreme court, and Martin A. Knapp and Judson C. Clements, of the Interstate Commerce Commission. These addresses are included in the printed report of the proceedings, a copy of which has been sent to each Senator and Member of Congress. w Reports on the following subjects were submitted by committees appointed at the last convention: (1) Classification of construction expenses of steam railways; (2) classification of construction and operating expenses of electric railways; (3) railroad statistics; (4) legislation; (5) uniform classification; (6) safety appliances. The convention voted unanimously to recommend the immediate passage by Congress of such laws as will effectually suppress the transportation evils and abuses described in the various reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to this end particular attention was called to the recommendations contained in the Tenth Annual Report of this Commission. The convention also adopted a resolution recommending Congress to pass an act requiring the Interstate Commerce Commission to make and promulgate a uniform classification of freight articles, and urging the State Railway Commissions and the Interstate Commerce Commission to send strong memorials to Congress supporting the enactment of such a measure. Instructive reports concerning the powers, duties, and work of the various commissions were read and discussed. Committees to report to the next convention were appointed on the following subjects: Uniform classification; railroad statistics; powers, duties, and work of railroad commissions; classification of construction expenses of electric railways; legislation; delays attendant upon enforcing orders of railroad commissions; safety appliances; grade crossings; plans for ascertaining the fair valuation of railroad properties. The next convention will be held at Milwaukee, Wis., May 8, 1900.

The foregoing comprises a review of the work of the Commission during the last year, and contains such further information upon kindred subjects as is deemed of sufficient importance to require particular mention. All of which is respectfully submitted. MARTIN A. KNAPP. JUDSON C. CLEMENTs. JAMES D. YEOMANs. CHARLEs A. PROUTY. Joseph W. FIFER. Commissioners.