magistrate as having respect to "outward justice only. He differed from many of his followers, so called, in his views on these matters. He rebuked the puritans of his day for looking to the civil power to deliver them from "the yoke of antichrist, by bow, and by sword, and by battle," instead of using the weapons of truth and of the spirit. And in re ference to the advancement of Christ's kingdom, he differed from Barrowe and Greenwood, who thought that the magistrate might compel to the hearing of the word. "It is the conscience," said he, " and not the power of man, that will drive us to seek the Lord's kingdom.” Notwithstanding this, some expressions of his have been thought to wear a dubious aspect.* The following have been referred to as examples :"Neither durst Moses, nor any of the good kings of Judah, force the people, by law or by power, to receive the church government; but after they received it, if then they fell away, and sought not the Lord, they might put them to death." Again :-"If the magistrate be of their flocks, why should they tarry for them? Unless they will have the sheep force the shepherd unto his duty. Indeed, the magistrate may force him, but it is shame to tarry till he be forced.” The inference that has been drawn from these passages is, that "while he claimed for the church a perfect independence of the civil power, he yet allowed the magistrate a coercive authority in cases of acknowledged duty." We think the inference scarcely conclusive. The first passage is the narration of an historical fact, and does not, in itself, implicate Browne in the principle of civil procedure adverted to. The * Broadmead_Records, Hist. Introduction, p. xxxvii, second depends for its force altogether upon the kind of emphasis put upon the word "may." Browne may have said, "the magistrate may force him," in an ironical, or even satirical humour, without asserting that the magistrate might do so lawfully. On the whole, we are inclined to think that these isolated passages are not sufficient to warrant the exception that has been made against the comprehensive views entertained by Browne.* We are confirmed in this opinion by Giffard's animadversions on Browne's writings. "He maketh many arguments," says Giffard, "to prove that princes are not to be stayed for, nor yet to have to do, by public power, to establish religion. Which opinion of his, is such abridging the sacred power of princes, and such horrible injury to the church, contrary to the manifest word of God, that if there were nothing else, it is enough to make him an odious and detestable heretic, until he show repentance."+ With all deference, then, to the judgment of others, we are compelled to regard Robert Browne as the first in this country to advocate liberty of conscience on the broad ground of the distinction between matters civil and religious. There can be little doubt, *Orme, in his Memoirs of Dr. Owen, p. 74, says, "To the Brownists are to be ascribed the first correct views of religious liberty." Mr. Brook, author of the Lives of the Puritans, says, "Notwithstanding all that has been said, it does appear that the first dissemination of these enlightened principles belongs, not to the baptists, but, in truth, to Robert Browne." MS. letter, October 27, 1847. + Giffard's Answer to the Brownists, p. 104; Stillingfleet, p. 78. As we have already affirmed, in the first chapter of the last volume, there were advocates of liberty of conscience, under one form or another, in every age; but not in connexion with Congregational Independency. See Appendix A. also, that the early Brownists held the same views as their leader, since they are so referred to in the contemporaneous writings of the day. The Barrowists were in this, and in some other respects, another class of men; as the separatists in Holland were a third, and the rigid puritans in England a fourth. All of them, together with the baptists, were Congregational Independents; but they did not all hold the same views in respect to the scriptural power of the magistrate in matters of religion. The Barrowists, following the two leaders whose names have been mentioned, were very far wrong on this point. "The magistrate," said Greenwood, "ought to compel the infidels to hear the doctrine of the church, and also, with the approbation of the church, to send forth meet men, with gifts and graces, to instruct the infidels."* "The prince," says Barrowe, "is charged, and in duty ought to see the ministers of the church do their duty, and teach the law of God diligently and sincerely." At the same time, both Greenwood and Barrowe would have the magistrate keep to God's laws and ordinances, and refrain from making any of their own. "A godly prince," says Barrowe," is bound to God's law; made the keeper thereof, not the controller; the servant, not the Lord."+ Johnson, and the separatists in exile, were an offshoot from the Barrowists, and held the same erroneous views. "We condemn not," said Johnson, "reformation commanded and compelled by the magis *Conferences, p. 59; Broadmead Records, Historical Introduction, p. xlii. This work has done good service on this question; although in error on some points, as we have shown, and have yet to show. † Brief Discovery, pp. 218, 219. trate, but do unfeignedly desire that God would put it into the heart of her majesty, and all other princes within their dominions, to command and compel a reformation, according to the word of the Lord." At the same time, he limits the power of the magistrate, as Barrowe had done, to the execution of God's laws only, and would have it confined to what is external. "Princes," he says, "may and ought, within their dominions, to abolish all false worship, and all false ministries whatsoever; and to establish the true worship and ministry appointed by God in his word; commanding and compelling their subjects to come unto, and practice no other but this. Yet must they leave it unto God to persuade the conscience, and to add to his church, from time to time, such as shall be saved."* Robinson entertained the same defective principles. "That godly magistrates," he said, "are by compulsion to repress public and notable idolatry, as also to provide that the truth of God, in his ordinance, be taught and published in their dominions, I make no doubt; it may be also, it is not unlawful for them, by some penalty or other, to provoke their subjects universally unto hearing for their instruction and conversion; yea, to grant they may inflict the same upon them, if, after due teaching, they offer not themselves unto the church."+ Jacob and the rigid puritans were of the same. mind. "Though we affirm," he said, "that the church government is independent, and immediately derived from Christ, yet we affirm also, that the civil magistrate is ever therein supreme governor civilly. And though nothing may be imposed on the Chris * Answer to Jacob, pp. 198, 199. † Justification of Separation, pp. 242, 243. tian people of a congregation, against their wills, by any spiritual authority, for so only we intend, yet we affirm withal, that the civil magistrate may impose on them spiritual matters, by civil power; yea, whether they like or dislike, if he see it good." And then, referring to the rigid puritans as associated with him, he adds, "This we all gladly acknowledge. Wherein we refer ourselves to that which we have publicly written and protested in this behalf, in An Humble Supplication, or Petition for Toleration, 1609; and Offer of Conference, 1606.”* After this admission on the part of Jacob himself, it would be more than futile to attempt to prove that the petition for toleration, referred to in this passage, was a petition for liberty of conscience on the broadest grounds, or for "mutual toleration among all Christians." Neither is the plea which it sets up, "the ground on which all that has ever followed is rested."+ The petition is for liberty to be granted to Jacob and his party to follow their own convictions of what was scripturally right, and nothing more. The civil authority over religion and religious worship is admitted; and the papists are expressly excluded from the toleration sought, not merely on political, but also on religious grounds. It is evident that while Jacob understood Congregational Independency, he did not understand what we have designated Aggregate Independency. He permitted Cæsar to interfere not only with "the things of Cæsar," but also with "the things of God." Nor do we find that he ever obtained more correct views on this subject in his later years. The Confession of Faith of 1616, is * An Attestation, &c., p. 115. |