The rule to be deduced from the best considered cases seems to be that a railway is an entirety, and that under the general language of a statute no lien attaches to a particular section or part of the road essential to its operation and maintenance for public purposes; but that, under the general language of such statutes, a lien may be enforced against such structures and property of the corporation as are not essential to the operation and maintenance of the railway for the public purposes for which it was established. In addition to the authorities cited, see National etc. Works v. Oconto etc. Co., 52 Fed. 43, 68 Fed. 1006; 2 Jones on Liens, 2d ed., secs. 1618, 1619; 3 Elliott on Railroads, secs. 1066-1075. In one of these sections Mr. Elliott says: "The courts will not presume that the legislature intended to subject the public to the annoyances and inconveniences 644 which would necessarily attend the enforcement of a mechanic's lien against a railroad under a general mechanic's lien law, and will not so construe it, unless such an interpretation is clearly required": Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1066.

The distinction between the cases where liens cannot be enforced against a particular structure or section of a railway, essential in its operation and maintenance for the public purposes for which it was established, and the cases where the lien may be enforced against a particular structure belonging to such corporation, but not so essential to its operation and maintenance, and hence which may be taken from the corporation without destroying or impairing its corporate franchises, has not always been observed in this court. The question is not whether the legislature may, in its wisdom, authorize the enforcement of such lien in any case, but whether the general language of our statute shall be so construed as to authorize a pro tanto destruction of the corporate functions created as an entirety, and primarily for the benefit of the public. In other words, courts are not authorized, in the construction of such general language, to repeal pro tanto the charter of a corporation so created primarily for the public benefit, especially in violation of a well-established rule of construction of such general statutes so far as public rights are concerned. Such rule was not observed in Carney v. La Crosse etc. R. R. Co., 15 Wis. 503, and the more recent case of Purtell v. Chicago etc. Co., 74 Wis. 132, 42 N. W. 265. In the case at bar it is admitted that the defendant was engaged in carrying out and completing its contract with the city by means of its plant and

appliances "other than the new power-house" in question. In other words, it is admitted that the new power-house, against which the lien is sought to be enforced, was not essential to the operation and maintenance of the defendant's system of street railways, and an electric light and power plant for the public purposes for which the defendant corporation was established. It follows 645 from what has been said that the plaintiff is entitled to such lien.

By the Court. The order of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to overrule the demurrer and for further proceedings according to law.

Bardeen, J., took no part.

Mechanic's Lien-Public Building.— Mechanics' liens can be created against public buildings only when the right is expressly conferred by the statute: Atascosa County v. Angus, 83 Tex. 202, 29 Am. St. Rep. 637, 18 S. W. 563; Mayrhofer v. Board of Education, 89 Cal. 110, 23 Am. St. Rep. 451, 26 Pac. 646; monographic note to La Crosse etc. R. R. Co. v. Vanderpool, 78 Am. Dec. 696. Such a lien against a public building cannot be enforced by a sale of the property when its use is necessary to the administration of governmental affairs: Noonan v. Hastings, 101 Ky. 312, 72 Am. St. Rep. 419, 41 S. W. 32.

Mechanic's Lien-Quasi Public Buildings.-The property of an electric light corporation is subject to mechanics' liens: Badger Lumber Co. v. Marion etc. Co., 48 Kan. 187, 30 Am. St. Rep. 306. 30 Pac. 117. A railroad is not subject to such liens, though its buildings may be. A stable used by a horse railroad company is subject to a mechanic's lien: See the monographic note to La Crosse etc. R. R. Co. v. Vanderpool, 78 Am. Dec. 698.

INDEX TO THE NOTES.

ARRESTS for past offenses, when must be justified by warrant,
692.

for violating a municipal ordinance, when justified without a
warrant, 690, 691.

force which may be used in making, 696.

misdemeanors, arrest for without warrant, when justifiable,
688-690.

misdemeanors other than breaches of the peace, arrest for with-
out warrant, 688.

misdemeanors, resisting arrest for, when justifiable, 699.

official character, officer should make known before attempt-
ing, 696.

official character, want of knowledge of may justify resistance
to, 699.

policemen, authority of to make, 680.

resistance to is not justified by the innocence of the person
sought to be arrested, 698, 700.

resistance to lawful is not justified, 698.

resistance to without a warrant, when justifiable, 698.

resisting because of void warrant, 697.

resisting because of want of knowledge of the official character

of the person attempting, 702.

resisting, force which may be used in, 700.

resisting, what is not, 699.

unlawful may be lawfully resisted, 698, 699.

what officers have authority to make, 680.

without warrant, constitutionality of statutes authorizing, 683,

without warrant, felonies which justify, 684.

without warrant, for breaches of the peace, 685.

without warrant, statutes enlarging right to make, 682.

without warrant, when may be lawfully resisted, 698.

without warrant, when justified, 681, 682.

BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, premium, fixing at a
rate per cent on the loan, 809.

CARRIERS, acceptance of conditions on tickets, when presumed
though they are not signed, 397-405.

of passengers for ocean voyages, conditions on tickets of, 402.
passenger, conditions attempting to limit liability of or to vary
contract, 397-402.

See Railways.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES on fixtures, when prevents their becom-
ing a part of the realty, 881.

CHILDREN, en ventre sa mere, conveyances to, when vold, 238.
en ventre sa mere, estates in remainder may be conveyed to, 240.
unborn, conveyances to, 237.

CONDITIONAL SALES of fixtures preserve their character as
realty, 882.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, community property, legislature cannot
destroy the husband's power to dispose of, 438.
curtesy initiate, validity of statutes abolishing, 445.
dower rights which the legislature may impair, 438.
dower, statutes impairing rights of, 446, 447.

husband's rights in wife's lands are vested, 438, 440.

married women, choses in action of, husbands have no vested
interest in, 441.

married women, husbands' interest in property of cannot be im-
paired by statute, 441, 443.

married women statutes, effect of as against their husbands'
property rights, 439, 443.

repealing a statute cannot impair vested rights, 438.

statutes permitting wives to convey without the consent of
their husbands, 440.

vested rights, expectant estates are not protected as, 437.

vested rights, rights of property are, 437.

vested rights, what are protected from legislative Impairment,
438.

watercourses, pollution of, whether may be authorized by stat-
ute without making compensation, 924-926.

CONVEYANCE, essentials of, 236.

grantee is indispensable to, 238.

in trust for persons not in being, 241.

of future estates may be to persons not in being, 239.

of future estates other than those in remainder cannot be made
to child en ventre sa mere, 240.

of future estates to persons not in being must be based on au
Intermediate estate in possession, 240.

of remainders may be to a child en ventre sa mere, 239, 240.

to a child en ventre sa mere, when vold, 238.

to a corporation prohibited from acquiring real property, 239.
to a deceased person and his heirs, 237.
to a deceased person is a nullity, 237.
to a deceased person or his heirs, 238.

CONVEYANCE, to a fictitious person is vold, 238.

to an existing person by a fictitious name, 238.

to a woman and her children includes all children then in esse,
237.

to children, in whom vests title, 237.

to children living and children to be born, effect of, 236.

to corporations not in existence, 239.

to person not in being, reasons for holding void, 236.

to person not in being, when void, 236.

to the estate of a designated person, 239.

to the heirs of a living person, 238.

to the inhabitants of a designated town gives no title to futurs
inhabitants, 237.

to unborn child is void, 236, 237.

CORPORATIONS, foreign, when cease to be liable to be sued on

service of process within the state, 388.

not in existence, conveyances to, 239.

prohibited from acquiring real property, conveyances to, 239.
stockholders, right of to sue in behalf of, 381.

CURTESY INITIATE, abolition of by statute, when valid, 445.
estate by, when not subject to legislative impairment, 444.
statutory changes in character of, 444.

what statutes abolish, 446.

DECEASED PERSON, conveyance to and his heirs, 287.
conveyance to is invalid, 237.

conveyance to or his heirs, 238.
DEFINITION of condonation, 137.
of policemen, 680.

DIVORCE, cause for, ceasing pendente lite, 137-139.
conditions in wills in favor of, 150.

condonation which will defeat right to, 137.

desertion continuing so as to give cause for cannot be atoned
by offer to return, 138.

discretion of courts to refuse, 137.

domicile of wife after a divorce a mensa et thoro, 32.

domicile of wife, rules for determining in suits for, 30.

habitual intemperance ceasing before suit for is brought, 188.
DOMICILE OF WIFE. See Husband and Wife.

DOWER, eminent domain, proceeding in destroys wife's right of,

448.

legislative control of during the life of the husband, 446, 447.
right of is a mere expectancy during the life of the husband,
446.

right of is controlled by law existing at husband's death, 448.
right to, when becomes vested, 448.

statutes creating rights of are not construed retrospectively,
447.

Am. St. Rep., Vol. LXXXIV-61