terward paid. It is in evidence that, immediately following this suit, which was brought December 1, 1891, Dr. Chalmers made threats that he would blast the reputation of Sheehy; he circulated the story that he had treated Sheehy for a loathsome disease, and on December 3d brought suit against Sheehy for two thousand dollars for medical services, alleged to have been rendered in 467 treating him for a constitutional disease, and there is evidence tending to show that this was by way of reprisal, and was without merit, for a jury gave Sheehy the verdict, and he recovered judgment for costs. Sheehy promptly brought his action for defamation of character, upon learning of the reported slanderous statements by Chalmers. A witness, who had known Chalmers many years, and had been his friend up to the commencement of the slander suit, testified: "I had a conversation with Dr. Chalmers after the commencement of the slander suit, and before October 3, 1893, in relation to the slander suit. . . . . He came to my office one night at 8 o'clock, and stayed there until 12 o'clock, and we talked over different matters, and among other things talked over this slander suit. .... I told him he was very foolish, and would have to pay for it in the end-that he had property-and then he remarked, 'He will never get a damned cent of my property. I will fix it so that he will never get a dollar out of it.'

Other facts appeared, showing that the court was justified in believing that Chalmers' intention was to put the property where Sheehy could not reach it, should he recover; and as it was all the property he had, he would thus prevent Sheehy from collecting anything if he succeeded in obtaining judgment. If we could assume the law to be as claimed by appellants, Chalmers' deed to his wife might have accomplished its evidently fraudulent purpose, but as the law is otherwise, we must hold the effort to have been abortive; the deed was void, and the court did not err in so finding.

There are no errors of law alleged to have occurred at the trial which seem to call for special notice.

The order should be affirmed.

Haynes, C., and Gray, C., concurred.

For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the order is affirmed.

Harrison, J., Van Dyke, J., Garoutte, J.

Hearing in bank denied.

Fraudulent Conveyance.-Where a defendant, in an action for slander, after the words are spoken, but before the action is brought, conveys his land without consideration to defeat any judgment that the plaintiff may recover, the conveyance is fraudulent: Shean v. Shay, 42 Ind. 375, 13 Am. Rep. 366. See, also, Helms v. Green, 105 N. C. 251, 18 Am. St. Rep. 893, 11 S. E. 470.

Fraudulent Conveyance.-The statute of limitations in an action to subject property to the payment of plaintiff's judgment does not begin to run at the date of the conveyance, but only on the recovery of the judgment: Brown v. Campbell, 100 Cal. 635, 38 Am. St. Rep. 314, 35 Pac. 433. See, further, Weaver v. Haviland, 142 N. Y. 534, 40 Am. St. Rep. 631, 37 N. E. 641.

ESTATE OF FAIR.

[132 Cal. 523, 60 Pac. 453, 64 Pac. 1000.]

TRUSTS, WHAT FORBIDDEN.-An express trust to convey real property is, in California, void, because forbidden by its Civil Code.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION.-In construing a will, technical informalities, or grammatical errors, or words which, in legal language, are inapt to express the evident intention of the testator, must be construed as though the proper legal phraseology had been employed; but there must be some language to effectuate that which a litigant claims to have been the intention of the testator.

WILLS CONSTRUCTION-INTENTION OF TESTATOR. In construing a will the intention of the testator must be found in the will itself, and is not to be collected by conjecture dehors the will. If the language of the instrument is unambiguous and perfectly clear, there is no field for the play of construction. If the testator has clearly expressed one intention, the court cannot impute to him another, but the intention must clearly appear to be lawful. The court can, in no instance, make a new will for the testator.

TRUSTS SEPARATION OF VOID AND VALID PROVISIONS.-If an estate is created subject to several trusts, one of which is void, and the other valid and legally separable from the other, the estate vests, unaffected by the void trust; but if the creation of the estate depends upon the execution of a void trust, it can never come into existence.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-TRUSTS.-Whether there is in a will a direct grant of remainders, or a mere trust to convey at a future time, so that no estate is to vest until the execution of the conveyance, is to be determined by the intention of the testator as expressed in his will.

TRUSTS AND USES-ESTATE VESTING IN BENEFICIARY-EXECUTION OF INVALID TRUST.-Under the California statute of uses and trusts, no legal estate vests in the beneficiary, and under any view of such statute an invalid trust to convey cannot be deemed executed. The English statute of uses

being repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the whole system of conveyancing and registry in force in such state, is not in operation therein.

TRUSTS IN WILLS-INVALID DEVISE IN TRUST TO CONVEY.-A trust created by will in trustees to transfer and convey real property to named beneficiaries is vold, and cannot be construed as creating an estate in remainder in the beneficiaries in the absence of other words in the will, which, without the aid of the invalid trust, would devise any estate to such beneficiaries.

TRUSTS UNDER WILLS-INVALID TRUST TO CONVEY -ESTATES IN REMAINDER.-Rules applicable to vested remainders, under valid devises, do not apply where there is no such devise, but only a trust to convey, vesting no present estate in the beneficiaries, who may be alive at the time contemplated for the conveyance under the trust, and who can acquire no right other than one to enforce the execution of such conveyance.

TRUSTS.-POWER IN TRUST TO CONVEY is a trust to convey, within the meaning of the California statute of uses and trusts, and, not being within any category of valid trusts enumerated in such statute, is thereby forbidden and void.

TRUSTS-SEPARATION OF VALID AND INVALID.-An Invalid trust to convey to certain beneficiaries who shall be living at the time of the conveyance, after the expiration of a trust for the lives of the testator's children, carries with it the otherwise valid trust for the lives of such children, and renders the whole trust void.

WILLS-SEPARATION OF VALID AND INVALID CLAUSES.-If there are valid and invalid clauses in a will, the valid ones cannot stand if the invalid ones are so interwoven therewith that they cannot be eliminated without interfering with and changing the main scheme of the testator.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION.-If the language of the provi sions of a will is plain and unambiguous, courts are not permitted to wrest it from its natural import in order to save it from condemnation. Courts cannot force the construction of a sentence, or even a word, in order that a particular result may be reached. WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-EXPRESSED INTENT CANNOT BE CHANGED.-The legal effect of the expressed intent of a testator in his will cannot be varied under the guise of correction, because he misapprehended its legal effect. If only an illegal mode of executing the intent is expressed, the court cannot substitute a legal mode.

TRUSTS-POWER TO CREATE-VOID TRUST TO CONVEY.-The power conferred by statute upon the creator of a trust to "prescribe to whom the real property to which the trust relates shall belong in the event of the failure or termination of the trust," and to "transfer or devise such property subject to the execution of the trust," does not authorize a void trust to convey property to be transformed into a valid trust not otherwise in any manner expressed.

WILLS-TRUSTS

DISINHERITING CHILDREN.-The law does not favor the tying up of vast estates by will for a long period by trusts or schemes which include the disinheritance of the testator's children.

Pierson & Mitchell, W. M. Pierson, R. Y. Hayne, G. W. McEnerney, V. R. Paterson, Rodgers & Paterson, and J. L. Robinson, for the appellants.

Knight & Heggerty, Garber, Boalt & Bishop, J. Garber, C. S. Wheeler, Wilson & Wilson, W. F. Herrin, H. L. Gear, and Lloyd & Wood, for the respondents.

525 GAROUTTE, J. This is an appeal from a decree of partial distribution.

Upon the former decision of this case, Mr. Justice McFarland rendered the following opinion, which is now adopted as the opinion of the court upon the questions therein discussed:

"It seems to be necessary, at the expense of brevity, to state the fifteenth clause of the will here in full. By the preceding clauses a large number of legacies in money are given to various persons, consisting mainly of brothers and sisters of the decedent, and certain of their children. The said fifteenth clause— and we put in italics the words which are most important in arriving at a conclusion-is as follows:

""Fifteenth. All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, property, and effects, real, personal, and mixed, whatsoever, and wheresoever situated, I give, devise, and bequeath unto my trustees hereinafter named, and to the survivors of them, and to their successors in office, in trust, for the following uses and purposes; that is to say:

526

""To have and to hold the same, in trust, during the lives of my daughters, Theresa A. Oelrichs and Virginia Fair, and of my son, Charles L. Fair, and during the life of the survivor of them, and upon the death of such survivor to transfer and convey to the children or descendants of my said daughter Theresa the one-fourth part of said trust property and estate, and to the children or descendants of my said daughter Virginia the one-fourth part of said trust property and estate, and the remaining one-half of said trust property and estate to transfor and convey, in equal shares, to my brothers and sisters, and to the children of any deceased brother or sister by right of representation. (The language of this clause is taken from the Civil Code of the state of California, section 1386, subdivision 3, as it now exists, and shall bear the same construction as said subdivision of said section, subject, however, to the provisions of paragraph 'sixteenth' of this will.) In case either of my daughters die, leaving no children, or descendants, the one-fourth part of said trust property and estate herein directed to be

transferred and conveyed to her children or descendants shall be transferred and conveyed to the children or descendants of my >ther daughter, and if there be none, the same shall be transferred and conveyed to my brothers and sisters, and to the children of any deceased brother or sister by right of representation, as aforesaid.

"In trust, further, during the life or lives of my said daughters and son, and the survivor of them, to hold, manage, and control the said trust property and estate, and monthly to pay over the net income derived therefrom to my said daughters and son in equal proportions, and upon the death of either of my said daughters, to pay over the one-third of said net income to which she, if living, would be entitled, to her children or descendants, if any there be, otherwise to my surviving daughter, and upon the death, during the life of my said son, of said surviving daughter, leaving children or descendants, then to her said children or descendants, and if she leaves no children or descendants, then said portion of said net income to become a part of the rest and residue of my estate, and to be disposed of as such under the provisions of this will, and upon the death of my said son, to pay over the one-third of said net income to which he, if living, would be entitled, to my said two daughters, in equal proportions, or to the survivor of them.'

"One or two of the other clauses of the will should be briefly noticed. By the seventeenth clause the appellants Angus and others are declared to be the trustees mentioned in the fifteenth clause; and they are authorized to sell any of the trust property, to invest and reinvest the proceeds of sales, to 527 apply the proceeds to the improvement of other portions of the property, to purchase or acquire other property, to lease any portion of the property, and to borrow or lend such money as they may deem advisable, and to secure repayment of loan by mortgage and other liens, to make compromises and settlements, and to handle the property generally as they may see fit. By clause nineteenth, it is provided that in case of the death, resignation, etc., of any one of the trustees, the remaining trustees, or any two of them, shall have authority to fill the vacancy by a declaration in writing, 'and the title to the trust property and estate shall vest in such new trustee, jointly with the others, without the necessity of formal or any conveyance to such new trustee.' By clause twenty-one the testator declares as follows: 'I make no provision for any children of my son, Charles L. Fair, whether born before or after this will, nor any provision for my