terms of a statute make the paper void in the hands of any holder. In view of these decisions and the purposes of the statute, we cannot put into the statute an exception which, from the language used, the legislature may or may not have intended. If it is thought best that the statute should be so construed, the change should be made by the legislature, and not by the courts. Judgment affirmed. A Note Given in Consideration of a Gaming Contract is void in the hands of a bona fide holder: Snoddy v. Bank, 88 Tenn. 573, 17 Am. St. Rep. 918, 13 S. W. 127: Swinney v. Edwards, 8 Wyo. 54, 80 Am. St. Rep. 916, 55 Pac. 306. Compare Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 10 Am. St. Rep. 23, 18 N. E. 687; Lynchburg Nat. Bank v. Scott, 91 Va. 652, 50 Am. St. Rep. 860, 22 S. E. 487. BUGH v. CRUM. [26 Ind. App. 405, 59 N. E. 1076.] SURETYSHIP - EXTENDING TIME OF PAYMENT.—A surety on a promissory note is released, where the payee, without the surety's knowledge or consent, extends the time of payment and takes a note for the accrued interest, which bears Interest from its date, for the agreement to thus pay compound interest is a sufficient consideration for the agreement of extension. N. K. Todd, J. S. Dailey, A. Simmons, and F. C. Dailey, for the appellant. A. L. Sharpe and C. E. Sturgis, for the appellees. 466 HENLEY, C. J. This was an action by appellant against appellees upon a promissory note. Appellee Crum was principal and appellee Motz surety on the note sued on. Motz answered separately, averring the fact that he was a surety on said note and received no part of the consideration on account of his signing the same, all of which facts appellant well knew. That without the knowledge or consent of this appellee, appel. lant extended the time of payment of said note for twelve months, and as a consideration therefor appellee Crum, the principal in said note, executed and delivered to appellant a note for forty-four dollars, due one day after date, and bearing interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum from date, and attorneys' fees, and payable at the Studabaker Bank at Bluffton, Indiana. That a part of said note represented the accrued interest on the note sued on in this action. The issue tried was made upon this answer. The surety, Motz, was released. The question upon appeal is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. It is conceded that the law is correctly stated in the case of Voris v. Shotts, 20 Ind. App. 220, 50 N. E. 484, where it is said: "It is necessary to the release of a surety upon a promissory note, by reason of the extension of the time of payment of the note, that the extension should be for a definite period; that it should be for a valuable consideration; that it should be done without the consent of the surety, and that the holder of the note should have knowledge of the fact that the person seeking the release for such cause is a surety." It is admitted by counsel for appellant that the evidence 467 is sufficient in every respect, except that it wholly fails to show a valuable consideration for the extension of time of payment. The evidence shows that the principal in the note executed to the payee his note for the accrued interest, which last note bore interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum from date. The execution of the note for the accrued interest was the consideration upon which the time of payment was extended. Was this a sufficient consideration? The supreme court of this state has uniformly held that if, after a debt bearing interest becomes due, the creditor agrees to extend the time of payment for a definite period upon the payment of the interest due, there is no consideration for the promise, and the surety is not thereby released: Hume v. Mazelin, 84 Ind. 574; Starret v. Burkhalter, 70 Ind. 285; Hamilton v. Winterrowd, 43 Ind. 393; Christman v. Tuttle, 59 Ind. 155; Holmes v. Boyd, 90 Ind. 332. The rule of law as established by the above decisions is tersely stated by Niblack, J., in Holmes v. Boyd, 9 Ind. 332, as follows: "Neither the payment of interest already accrued nor a promise to pay such interest as may thereafter lawfully accrue upon a note will afford a sufficient consideration for an agreement to extend the time of payment of the note." The same rule has been established by the supreme court of Illinois: Crossman v. Wohlleben, 90 Ill. 537. But a majority of the courts of this country have held a contrary doctrine, the reasoning being well expressed by Reed, J., in McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio, 348, as follows: "It is a valuable right to have money placed at interest, and it is a valuable right to have the privilege, at any time, of getting rid of the payment of interest, by discharging the principal. By this contract, the right to interest is secured for a given period, and the right to pay off the principal, and get rid of paying the interest, is also relinquished for such period. Here, then, are all the elements of a binding contract." To the same effect, see Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240; Chute 468 v. Pattee, 37 Me. 102; Robinson v. Miller, 2 Bush, 179; Brandt on Guaranty and Suretyship, sec. 354. Adhering to the rule established by our supreme court, we must hold that the mere payment of interest and the extension of the time of payment of the principal for a definite time did not release the surety. But in this case something more was done. Under the agreement a note was given for the interest due, and this note bore interest from its date. The agreement was not simply to pay the interest due; it was to pay compound interest, and this was a sufficient consideration for the agreement to extend the time of payment, and it released the surety on the note. The payee of the note testified that he took the note for the interest, and extended the time of payment of the principal because by so doing he would get interest upon the interest due. The surety established every element necessary for his discharge. We find no error. Judgment affirmed. Release of Surety.—An extension of time, without the consent of a surety, discharges him: Jenkins v. Daniel, 125 N. C. 161, 74 Am. St. Rep. 632, 34 S. E. 239; as where the payment of a note is extended in consideration of the prepayment of interest: Hallock v. Yankey, 102 Wis. 41, 72 Am. St. Rep. 861, 78 N. W. 156; or the payment of interest semi-annually instead of annually, as stipulated for in the note: Scott v. Fisher, 110 N. C. 311, 28 Am. St. Rep. 688, 14 S. E. 799. It is otherwise where the extension of time for full payment is made in consideration for part payment: Sully V. Childress, 106 Tenn. 109, 82 Am. St. Rep. 875, 60 S. W. 499. The payment of usurious interest for time already elapsed constitutes a consideration for the extension of the time of payment of an obligation: Lemmon v. Whitman, 75 Ind. 318, 39 Am. Rep. 150. PEOPLE'S STATE BANK OF BROWNSTOWN v. JONES. [26 Ind. App. 583, 58 N. B. 852.] PATENTS-SALE OF RIGHTS-NOTE GIVEN FOR-DEFENSE.-A STATUTE relating to the sale of patent rights, which, among other things, requires the words "given for a patent right" to be inserted in any obligation taken therefor, relates to the sale of the intangible right secured by the letters patent, and not to articles manufactured under the patent. Hence, if the patentee transfers the exclusive right and privilege of selling for use a certain article for which he claims to have a patent, and takes a note therefor, it is no defense to an action thereon that the note does not contain the words quoted, or that other acts prescribed by the stat ute have not been performed. J. C. Lawler and W. T. Branaman, for the appellant. O. H. Montgomery, D. A. Kochenor, and M. B. Hottel, for the appellee. 583 COMSTOCK, J. This action was commenced in the Jackson circuit court and upon change of venue was tried in the Washington circuit court. 684 The complaint is in two paragraphs, each based on a promissory note for one hundred and fifty dollars, in the usual form, payable at a bank of this state to the order of one Wheeler, and assigned by him by written indorsement on the back thereof before maturity for a valuable consideration to the appellant. The cause was put at issue and a trial resulted in judgment for costs in favor of appellee. The answer is in two paragraphs. The first and third specifications of error challenge the sufficiency of these paragraphs respectively. The first paragraph is as follows: "The defendant, for answer to the complaint herein, says that he admits the execution of the notes sued on, and that thirty dollars is a reasonable fee for the collection of each of said notes, and that the same are due and wholly unpaid, and admits all other material averments of the complaint to be true, but he avers that said notes were executed in consideration for the sale and transfer to him by one W. J. Gooch and the Portable Pantry Company of the exclusive right and privilege of selling for use of certain portable pantries in Warren county, Indiana, until the first day of January, 1903, for which portable pantries the said W. J. Gooch claimed to have obtained letters patent of the United States. That said sale and transfer of the right to sell said alleged patented article took place and was consummated at Brownstown, in Jackson county, Indiana, on the seventh day of December, 1897, and that said W. J. Gooch had not, nor had anyone else, then and there filed with the clerk of the court of said county a copy of his alleged letters patent, nor was any affidavit filed that such letters were genuine and had not been revoked or annulled, and that he and said Portable Pantry Company had full authority to sell or barter the right so patented. Nor was any affidavit so filed giving the name, age, occupation, and residence of said alleged patentee or his agent." And, further, that there is no clause in either of said notes containing the statement "given for a patent right," and that the plaintiff knew that said notes were given for an alleged patent right at the time 585 it purchased the same. The averments of the second paragraph are, as stated in appellee's brief, "in substance and theory the same as those of the first." These answers are founded upon sections 6054, 6055, and 6056 of the Revised Statutes of 1881. Section 6055 is as follows: "Any person who may take any obligation, in writing, for which any patent right, or right claimed by him or her to be a patent right, shall form the whole or any part of the consideration, shall, before it is signed by the maker or makers, insert in the body of said written obiigation, above the signature of said maker or makers, in legible writing or print, the words 'given for a patent right."" The answers, to be good under this section, must aver facts showing that the consideration in whole or in part for which said notes were given was a patent right or a right claimed to be a patent right. Do they contain such averments? The only averment of consideration in either paragraph is "that said notes were executed in consideration for the sale and transfer to him by one W. J. Gooch and the Portable Pantry Company of the exclusive right and privilege of selling for use of certain portable pantries in Warren county, Indiana, until the first day of January, 1903." The consideration thus alleged is only the transfer of the exclusive right to sell a manufactured article, a tangible thing, for a limited time in a particular locality. In Hankey v. Downey, 116 Ind. 118, 18 N. E. 271, the supreme court distinguish between the tangible thing manufactured under a patent and the intangible right evidenced by the patent, saying, by Elliott, J., at page 119 (116 Ind., 18 N. E. 272): "The difference between the article manufactured and the right secured by the patent is clearly recognized." And at page 120 (116 Ind., 18 N. E. 272): "As there is a distinc |