and had had sufficient experience to know the usual and best methods of lifting and lowering derricks. The witness was permitted, over the appellant's objection, to answer the following question: "Now, from what you have said as to the size of this rope, and said as to its being old and worn, more in some places than in others, I will ask you to state to the jury whether that rope was sufficient to lower the mast pole of that derrick, basing your answer on what you have said on the witness-stand, and from your long experience in handling derricks." The witness answered that the rope was not in shape to let that derrick down, was not sufficient in strength.

It was not necessary, we think, for the witness to be shown to have skill or experience in the making of ropes, to authorize the acceptance of his opinion as to the sufficiency in strength of the particular rope for the use to which it was put in lowering the particular derrick, the witness basing his opinion upon the facts first stated by him, including his own experience. After the best description that could have been given by witnesses of the rope and the derrick, the conclusion of the jury would be in some measure based upon conjecture, and the honest opinion of a man so qualified would conduce to greater certainty: See Porter v. Pequonnoc Mfg. Co., 17 Conn. 249; Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227, 241, 22 Am. Rep. 441; Bennett v. Meehan, 83 Ind. 137 566, 43 Am. Rep. 78; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544, 14 N. E. 572, 16 N. E. 197.

A number of other supposed errors in the admission and the exclusion of testimony are argued by counsel. The matters so presented have been carefully examined by us without finding any ground for reversal, and the questions involved are not of such importance as to require further notice here.

There is also some brief discussion of the instructions. There is some want of agreement between the record and the reference thereto in the appellant's brief, and the appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of our rules relating to the discussion of instructions. In the introduction of the evidence a number of models of derricks were used, and the references thereto in the examination of the witnesses and in their answers to the questions of the attorneys are in many instances unintelligible as they appear in the record.

We have bestowed much time upon the voluminous bill of exceptions containing the evidence in our effort to determine the question extensively argued by counsel as to whether or not the case made by the evidence was substantially different from

the cause of action set forth in the complaint. The mode of lowering the mast as shown by the evidence was not accurately described in the pleading. A wire rope, called in evidence the main fall, which was fastened to the mast near the top thereof, extended northward, and, passing over a drum, was operated by steam power, and the slackening of this rope by this method permitted the mast to descend southward. This rope did not break. The rope, by the breaking of which the injury was caused, was a slack rope made of hemp or grass used in connection with block and tackle, as alleged in the complaint, for gradually slackening the guy, a wire rope which extended westward, instead of northward, as stated in the complaint. The guy which extended eastward was fastened without means of slacking. 138 The idle guy, which struck the appellee, was a wire rope which extended from the top of the mast toward the southwest to a point where it was fastened, so that by the descent of the mast it became slackened and fell to the east with the mast. The rope which broke and the use which was made of it were described in the complaint as they were proved on the trial, except as above indicated. There was a variance, but it does not seem to have been one of such character that the appellant could be regarded as having been misled in the preparation of its defense. We cannot conclude that there was a fail

ure to prove the substantial averments of the complaint. Judgment affirmed.

Witness.-An opinion may be given by a nonexpert as to matters with which he is specially acquainted, but which cannot be specially described: Bennett v. Meehan, 83 Ind. 566, 43 Am. Rep. 78. On opinion evidence as to the condition of a tool in using which a servant is injured, see Johnson v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 96 Mo. 340, 9 Am. St. Rep. 351, 9 S. W. 790; Kent v. Yazoo etc. R. R. Co., 77 Miss. 494, 78 Am. St. Rep. 534, 27 South. 620.

Master and Servant-Safe Appliances.-On the duty and liability of a master to his servant respecting safe appliances with which to work, see the monographic notes to Buzzell v. Laconia, Mfg. Co., 77 Am. Dec. 218-225; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Swett, 92 Am. Dec. 213-221. Consult, also, the recent cases of Bibich v. Lake Superior Smelting Co., 123 Mich. 401, 81 Am. St. Rep. 215, 82 N. W. 279; Purdy v. Westinghouse etc. Mfg. Co., 197 Pa. St. 257, 80 Am. St. Rep. 816, 47 Atl. 237. The fact that a servant has as good an opportunity as his master to know of defects involving risks does not necessarily charge him with contributory negligence. He has a right to rely on his master's inquiry, because it is the latter's duty to inquire, and he may assume that proper inquiry has been made by the master: Starr v. Kreuzberger, 129 Cal. 123, 79 Am. St. Rep. 92, 61 Pac. 641,

EVERMAN v. HYMAN.

[26 Ind. App. 165, 28 N. E. 1022.]

REWARDS-ACTION FOR-KNOWLEDGE OF OFFER NOT ESSENTIAL.-When a reward is offered for the return of stolen property, the one who returns it can sustain an action for the reward, without alleging in the complaint that his services were rendered with a knowledge of the reward offered, and in consideration of the offer.

APPEAL-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-FORM OF, NOT MATERIAL.-A bill of exceptions is not required to be in any particular form, and is not invalid because it lacks the usual formal beginning.

APPEAL-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-DATE OF PRESENTATION.-A failure to state, in a bill of exceptions, the date of its presentation for the judge's signature is not material where the bill is shown to have been signed and filed within the time allowed by the court.

APPEAL BILL OF EXCEPTIONS - INDORSEMENT.It is not necessary to the filing of a paper that it should be indorsed as having been so filed. It is filed when it is delivered to the proper officer, and by him received to be kept on file. Hence, the absence of a file-mark on a bill of exceptions is not material where the clerk's certificate shows that the bill was filed.

APPEAL-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.-A JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE that a bill of exceptions contains all the evidence given in the cause is sufficient, though it follows the reporter's certificate that "this was all the evidence given in the cause."

REWARDS-"CAPTURE" OF THIEF-GIVING INFORMATION IS NOT.-One is not entitled to a reward for the "capture" of a thief simply because he has informed an officer where the thief can be found, although the officer goes at once and makes an arrest. A reward offered for a "capture" is not a reward offered for information.

REWARDS-PUTTING OWNER INTO POSSESSION BEFORE ACTION.-One who sues to recover an unpaid reward for the "return" of a stolen horse is not obliged, before bringing suit, to put the owner in possession of the animal. Hence, there is no error, in such an action, for the court to refuse to submit to the Jury an interrogatory as to whether the plaintiff did do so.

L. D. Boyd, for the appellant.

W. C. Smith, G. W. Julien, C. R. Pollard, and R. C. Pollard, for the appellee.

166 NEW, C. J. This was an action by the appellee against the appellant for the recovery of a reward offered by the latter.

The complaint is in three paragraphs: 1. That a horse was stolen from the appellant, for the return of which he offered by handbill a reward of one hundred dollars; that thereupon the appellee rescued said horse from the thief and returned.

the same to the appellant, who refuses, upon the appellant's demand, to pay said reward. 2. That a horse was stolen from the appellant, who offered, by handbill, for the capture of the thief one hundred dollars; that thereupon the appellee captured said thief, and placed him in the custody of the sheriff of the county where said horse was stolen; that the appellant has refused upon the demand of the appellee to pay said reward. 3. The third paragraph of the complaint is a combination of the first and second paragraphs, and asks judgment for two hundred dollars.

With each paragraph of the complaint is filed a copy of the offered reward, as follows: "Stolen-From the stable of the undersigned on Sunday morning, July 28th, a large dapple gray horse, high carriage, bridle scalds about the head, scar on hind foot made by rope halter, flat feet, no shoes. $100 reward for the return of the horse and $100 reward for the capture of the thief. William Everman, Burlington, Indiana."

Demurrers to the first and second paragraphs of the complaint were overruled and exceptions saved. The third paragraph of the complaint was not demurred to. The appellant answered by a denial. There was a general verdict for the appellee, together with answers to interrogatories submitted by the court to the jury at the request of the appellant.

167 The first alleged error of the court below is predicated upon the overruling of the demurrers to the first and second paragraphs of the complaint. It is also assigned as error that the court erred in overruling a demurrer to the third paragraph of the complaint. The record, however, does not disclose a demurrer to the third paragraph.

The only objection urged by the appellant to the first and second paragraphs of the complaint is, that there is a failure to allege that the services rendered by the appellee were with a knowledge of the reward offered by the appellant, and in consideration of said offer being made.

In Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199, it was held that a person performing the services for which a reward was offered was entitled to the reward, although he did not know, at the time of the performance, that the reward had been offered, and therefore could not have been influenced or induced to act from the offer. The same case is cited as authority in Board etc. v. Wood, 39 Ind. 345. See, also, Auditor v. Ballard, 9 Bush, 572, 15 Am. Rep. 728, where Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199, is quoted from with approval.

In Harson v. Pike, 16 Ind. 140, it was decided that it was not necessary that notice should be given to the party offering the reward that his proposal was being acted upon. It is there said that no authority is known for requiring such notice, nor is its effective purpose perceivable. The same question is decided the same way in Hayden v. Souger, 56 Ind. 42, 26 Am. Rep. 1, the court saying that notice of the acceptance of the offer was not one of the conditions on which the offered reward was to be paid: See notes to this case as published in 26 Am. Rep. 1. See, also, Reif v. Paige, 55 Wis. 496, 42 Am. Rep. 731, 13 N. W. 473.

In Wentworth v. Day, 3 Met. 352, 37 Am. Dec. 145, it was said: "If the loser of property, in order to stimulate the vigilance and industry of others to find and restore it, will make an express promise of a reward, either to a particular person, or in general terms to anyone who will return it to him, and, 168 in consequence of such offer, one does return it to him, it is a valid contract. Until something is done in pursuance of it, it is a mere offer, and may be revoked. But if, before it is retracted, one so far complies with it as to perform the labor for which the reward is stipulated, it is the ordinary case of labor done on request, and becomes a contract to pay the stipulated compensation."

In Russell v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170, it is shown that five hundred dollars was offered for the arrest of a murderer. Stewart made the arrest, and it was held that he was entitled to the reward, although he had no knowledge of the offer of a reward when he made the arrest.

In Eagle v. Smith, 4 Houst. 293, the action being for a reward offered for a return of lost goods, it was held that the party who had performed the prescribed condition, by finding and returning the goods to the owner, was entitled to recover, although he did not know at the time he returned them that any reward had been offered.

In Williams v. Carwardine, 4 Barn. & Adol. 621, it was held that although the information which was given by the plaintiff, and which led to the discovery and conviction of the murderer, was given from other motives than the reward offered, it was the opinion of all the judges that the informer was entitled to recover the reward. Denman, C. J., said: "The plaintiff, by having given information, which led to the conviction of the murderer of Walter Carwardine, has brought himself within the terms of the advertisement, and therefore is entitled to