if so, that element has not been, so far as 619 we are aware, separately discussed nor considered by this court. The statutes upon this subject do not, in terms at least, furnish any guide in this matter; they merely provide that the wrongdoer in such cases shall pay "just damages," not exceeding five thousand dollars.

There are, however, certain considerations arising out of the nature and character of this kind of legislation in our state, and out of the nature of death as one of the harmful consequences of an injury, that may serve as guides in coming to a right conclusion in this matter. From the beginning our legislation of this kind was intended to subserve at least two purposes: 1. It was designed to make persons and corporations whose negligence might injuriously affect the lives and limbs of others more careful and circumspect, by continuing their liability for the results of their negligence even after the death of the victim, and by making them liable in damages, to a limited extent, for death, as one of the consequences of that negligence. In this aspect of it, this legislation may be said to be of a punitive or penal character: Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, 273, 65 Am. Dec. 571; 2. This legislation was also, and mainly, designed to make some compensation in money for mere loss of life, which compensation, as part of the estate of the injured party, should go to certain designated persons; not full compensation of this kind for such a consequence, but "just damages," not exceeding a prescribed amount. In this last aspect of it, this legislation plainly contemplates that the extent of such loss may be greater in one case than another; or, to put this in a different way, that the value of the life to the injured party-or, what is the same thing, to his estate-in terms of money may be greater in one case than in another.

Under our decisions the loss of life is not to be estimated from the standpoint of the statutory beneficiaries; their loss, if any, arising from the death, cannot be taken into account: Goodsell v. Hartford etc. R. R. Co., 33 Conn. 51; McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157, 29 Am. St. Rep. 181, 22 Atl. 1083. This being so, the only other thing that can be done is to estimate the loss from the standpoint 620 of the party injured, and thus, in a sense, take the value of his life to him as one of the elements in measuring the damages. But in what sense shall the value of his life to him be taken as such an element? Shall it be what the man thought or imagined his life was worth to

him-that is, what a man would take in exchange for his life? Clearly not. In that aspect of the injury there can be no measure for it, because a man's life to himself, no matter what his age or condition of health or expectancy of life may be, outweighs in value the universe. In that sense it is folly to talk of the value of any life being worth less than the maximum sum prescribed by the statutes. Our statutes, in providing compensation in part for death alone, as the consequence of a negligent act, do not proceed upon any such view of the value of life as this, else would they have provided for a fixed sum as damages in each case; but they proceed, in part, at least, upon the theory that a loss of earning capacity by death is a loss to a man's estate, which may be greater or less according to circumstances, and so, within a maximum limit, a sliding scale of damages is provided. Under these statutes the right to recover a limited compensation for death alone, as one of the results or consequences of a wrong inflicted upon a man in his lifetime, survives to, or is vested in, his executors or administrators for the benefit of certain designated beneficiaries, and is thus in a certain sense made a part of his estate, regarded as that aggregate of rights and possessions which a man leaves at his death. This legislation seems to regard the life of a person injured as having a greater or less value, according to circumstances, to him, or, what is the same thing in this connection, to his estate; and one of its objects in awarding damages for mere loss of life is to compensate his estate, in the sense above explained, for that loss; and in cases like the present, that loss, thus measured, may be the chief or only element to be considered in fixing the extent of the defendant's liability. We do not mean to say that this would be the only element to be considered in cases like the one at bar, but only that ordinarily in them it might or would be the principal element.

621 It is unnecessary here to decide what other elements, if any, may properly be considered in such cases, for we think the trial court took, as the measure of damages in this case, the loss to the estate of Davis in the sense above explained, and it does not appear that in fixing the quantum of damages it considered any other element. It is true, the court says that it took as the measure of damages "the value of the deceased's life, at the time of the injuries, to himself"; and it is true that this language is somewhat ambiguous; it may mean that the court took as the measure of damages what a man would take in exchange for his life, or it may mean that the court measured the

damages by the loss to the estate of the decedent in the sense above explained. We think this last is what the court did, and what it meant to say it did, for it heard, and, we are bound to presume, considered, evidence which it would neither have heard nor considered if it had proceeded upon the other view of the extent of the loss. But it is said that a loss of this kind is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be estimated pecuniarily, and is, in its nature, incapable of judicial determination. We think there is nothing in this claim.

Injuries, in the sense of wrongful invasions of a right, may be considered as of two kinds: 1. Pecuniary; and 2. Nonpecuniary. Pecuniary injuries are such as can be, and usually are, without difficulty estimated by a money standard. Loss of real or personal property, or of its use, loss of time, and loss of services, are examples of this class of injuries. Nonpecuniary injuries are those for the measurement of which no money standard is or can be applicable. As the books phrase it, damages in such cases are "at large." Bodily and mental pain and suffering are familiar examples of this class. It is within this last class that injury arising from loss of life falls, under our statutes. There is no more legal difficulty in estimating damages for loss of life in cases like the present than there is in estimating damages for bodily or mental pain and suffering, or for maim or disfigurement, or for injured feelings; and yet damages for this sort of injury are being constantly estimated and awarded by the courts in proper cases. The difficulty, or even impossibility, of estimating with certainty in money the amount of injury in this class of cases is never considered a reason for refusing redress: Cook v. Bartholomew, 60 Conn. 26, 22 Atl. 444; Post v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 72 Conn. 362, 44 Atl. 547; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Allen, 53 Pa. St. 276; Ballou v. Farnum, 11 Allen, 73.

622

In the view we have taken of this case, the rulings upon evidence of which the defendant complains were correct, and the rulings upon the claims of law made by the defendant were also correct.

There is no error.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

An Action for Wrongful Death is not barred by the fact that the death was instantaneous: See the monographic note to Brown v. Electric Ry. Co., 70 am. St. Rep. 677. The measure of damages in such actions is, in general, the amount of pecuniary assistance and support which those entitled to recover might reasonably have expected to receive from the deceased had

he lived. In estimating the value of the life, the jury may take into consideration the age and health of the deceased at the time of his death: See the monographic note to Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Goodykoontz, 12 Am. St. Rep. 378, 379. Consult, also, the recent cases of Florida etc. R. R. Co. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 79 Am. St. Rep. 149, 25 South. 338; Matter of Meekin, 164 N. Y. 145, 79 Am. St. Rep. 635, 58 N. E. 50.

GARLAND v. GAINES.

[73 Conn. 662, 49 Atl. 19.]

EVIDENCE.-LETTERS DULY MAILED

SUMED to have been received by the addressee.

ARE PRE

EVIDENCE THAT A WRITTEN LEASE was sent to the nonresident lessee and came back with his name affixed thereto, and that he subsequently occupied the leased premises, is prima facie proof of the execution of the lease by him.

PLEADINGS-INSUFFICIENCY OF ANSWER.-An allegation by a defendant that he has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to his execution of a written instrument in suit does not comply with a statute requiring him, if he intends to controvert the execution of such instrument, to deny it specifically. In such case the plaintiff need not prove the alleged execution of the instrument.

THE FAILURE TO AFFIX INTERNAL REVENUE STAMPS to a lease as required by United States statute does not render it inadmissible in evidence in the state courts.

LEASE.-GUARANTY OF PAYMENT OF RENT and performance of covenants by the lessee during the full term of the lease, made in consideration of the lease of the premises, is an absolute, and not a conditional, undertaking, upon which the guarantor is liable immediately upon the default of the lessee.

GUARANTY-CONSIDERATION.-If a guaranty for the performance of the covenants of a lease is executed contemporaneously therewith, and is an essential ground of the credit extended to the lessee, that is sufficient consideration for the contract of guaranty.

GUARANTY-DELIVERY.-If a guaranty for the performance of the covenants of a lease is executed subsequently to the lease, it must be deemed to have been made contemporaneously with it, if delivered at the same time and before the lessee is permitted to occupy the leased premises.

H. L. Hotchkiss and H. W. Asher, for the appellant.

W. P. Judson, for the appellee.

663 HALL, J. It appears from the finding that the plaintiff leased to the defendant's son, Thomas J. Gaines, Jr., who is alleged to have been at that time a minor, a one-third interest in certain rooms in New Haven, to be occupied by him with two other students from September 29, 1898, to June 29,

1899. Being unwilling to rent the rooms to the son without the guaranty of his father for the payment of 664 the rent, the plaintiff, on the 15th of June, signed in duplicate a lease and sent the same to Thomas J. Gaines, Jr., to be executed by him and to have the guaranty at the foot of the lease signed by his father, they both being out of the state. In July, 1898, the lease was returned to the plaintiff with the names of the son and of the defendant signed, respectively, to the lease and the guaranty, the latter, under the date of July 23, 1898, at New York, where the defendant resided. Thomas J. Gaines, Jr., with the two other students, took possession of the rooms September 29, 1898, and occupied them a few weeks, when, on account of illness, he went away, informing the plaintiff that he would be gone for a few weeks. He did not return, and the two other students, under similar leases to that above described, occupied the rooms until the end of the term.

In November and in December, in reply to letters from the plaintiff requesting payment of the rent which by the lease. was payable each fourth week of the term, the defendant wrote, in one letter, that he would inquire into the matter and send check, and in the other, that his son would not be able to return to college during the term, and asking for a rebate of one-half the rent.

On July 1, 1899, plaintiff's attorney wrote the defendant stating the amount of the rent due on the lease executed by his son, that the defendant was guarantor thereon, and asking him what he intended to do regarding it, and informed him that he should bring suit unless he heard from him. It is fairly implied from the finding that this letter was duly mailed. It is therefore to be presumed that it was received. It did not appear that he replied to it. No part of the rent due from Thomas J. Gaines, Jr., has been paid, although demanded both of him and of the defendant.

The guaranty signed by the defendant and made a part of the complaint is as follows: "In consideration of the letting of the premises above described, I, Thomas J. Gaines, of New York, hereby guarantee the payment of said rent and performance of the agreement of the lessee for the full term of this lease." "665 No United States internal revenue stamp was affixed to the lease until the assignment of the case for trial.

Counsel for defendant objected to the admission of the lease and guaranty in evidence, upon the ground that there was no proof of the execution of the same either by said Thomas J.