of justice; but there is another point of Judges of Ecclesiastical Courts, has also nearly equal importance, which appears to been such as to give them a position in be too frequently lost sight of, namely, society, and invest them with a respect that the manner of administering justice should be such as to procure for it respect and deference in the eyes of the country. Of the three requisites in the administration of justice, viz. that it should be 1st. satisfactory to the parties litigant; 2d. expeditious, and 3d. attended with reasonable expense, the respective degrees of importance appear to us to stand in the order in which we have named them.

which the local Judges proposed to be appointed can scarcely be expected to attain ; yet experience has shewn that the time has arrived for transferring the business of these provincial Ecclesiastical tribunals to London, and it is not a little singular that the same period should have been selected for proposing an exactly opposite course in the administration of the Common Law.

The establishing Courts of inferior rank By those who have had much experience for the disposal of business of a certain with litigation and its effects, it will have amount is open to the objection that there been observed that greater annoyance is is not the same description of justice for all occasioned to a party who feels that his the suitors of the country. If it were pracappeal to the law has been unsuccessful ticable, it would be the duty of the legislaowing to the misapprehension, incapacity, ture to give the same measure of justice, or prejudice (real or supposed) of the Judge, not merely in quantity, but in quality, to than to him who thinks that he has ob- all. The nearer, however, an approach can tained justice though at a great expense. be made to this, the better, and no new inThere is something in the nature and ac-ferior tribunals should be created until the quirements of the Judge of a Superior utmost has been done in diminishing the Court which not only ensures the administration of the greatest practical amount of justice, but which also satisfies parties that they have received it in their own individual

case.

Next in advantage to having such a decision in the first instance, is the power of having recourse to it by appeal; and it is a decided objection to the bill proposed by Lord Cottenham that no appeal from the decision of the local Judge is given. One reason why the decisions of a local Judge will frequently fail to give satisfaction is, that in many instances he will become imbued with local feelings and prejudices, and in many more he will be unjustly suspected of being so. This has been felt to be an objection even to the too frequent attendance on the same Circuit of a Judge of one of the Superior Courts, and it was advanced as an argument for the abolition of the Welsh Judges. The Country Ecclesiastical Courts, too, are now about to be abolished for all purposes of litigation, because the questions decided in them, though arising within the localities in which the Courts sit, will, in the opinion of all those competent to form one on the subject, be more satisfactorily disposed of by a central tribunal in London. Many of the Judges who have presided over the Consistory Courts of the Dioceses of England have been persons of considerable attainment, and the great text-book of Ecclesiastical Law was the work of the Chancellor of the Diocese of Carlisle. The stations in the church, of the persons who have usually presided as

expense of proceedings in the Superior Courts, and in making them available to the utmost extent that is practicable in administering the justice of the country to rich and poor.

The suggestion of Master Dax, in his very able letter to the Lord Chancellor, to have a jurisdiction for causes of inferior amount within the jurisdiction of the Superior Courts, is a very valuable one, and we would impress it most particularly upon our readers, and those persons in authority who will have the conduct of the alterations now about to be made. The sitting of one Judge for the purpose of taking matters under a given amount, with the power of sending cases of difficulty to the full Court, would be attended with the double advantage of delivering the latter from business of a frivolous nature, and of securing to causes of small amount, when the question to be determined in them is important, the decision of the highest tribunal. For it must be remembered as one of the disadvantages of creating inferior Courts, to determine causes below a certain amount, that the sum to be recovered is not always a criterion of the difficulty, or even the importance of the case, and that such a distribution of the business would still leave to the superior Courts questions of a frivolous nature, whilst it would send questions of difficulty to the inferior Court, merely because they arose in actions between humble individuals.

In another suggestion in the letter of Master Dax, that in addition to the sitting

406

The Local Court Scheme.-Judgments as they affect Real Property.

AMICUS.

[Mr. Dax appears to have referred to Lord Cottenham's County Court Bill. ED.]

of a separate Court for business of a more may presume the provisions of such bill are trifling nature, much might be left to the as yet unknown. principal officers of the Courts, particularly on questions of disputed accounts, we entirely concur: the Masters of the different Courts are men of ability, and competent as practical men, to assist the Judges materially in the discharge of this important duty; indeed, the Masters have now many matters of great importance sent to them from the Bench for their decision, quite independent of their duties as taxing offi-IN concluding this series of papers, it will

cers. If it be said the Masters will not have leisure for the additional labours suggested, let others be appointed.

We have received the following letter as to the compensations to be made, if the bill should

pass:

In the abstract of the clauses of Lord Brougham's Local Courts Bill, at p. 373, ante, I do not observe any one relating to compensation to persons now holding appointments under the present system of courts of requests, county, and hundred courts. Surely these appointments will not be taken away, without an adequate remuneration, or it would work a manifest injustice, which is contrary to the spirit of the constitution. Many men now holding such appointments have sacrificed professional employment, and surely after many years service as registrars of courts, whereby they mainly depended for subsistence, they are not to be driven to work up a practice (not so easy a thing, by the bye, now-a-days) or be compelled to accept subordinate situations.

I agree that the persons from whom the judges of such a court are to be elected should extend to attorneys of fifteen or twenty years actual practice.

Another correspondent observes that Mr. Dax, in speaking on the subject of local courts, says, one great objection, in my mind, to the courts, as proposed, is this, that no counsel or attorneys are to be allowed to practise there, or if they do, they are not to be entitled to be paid for it." Surely he is mistaken as to this, for in the bill introduced by Lord Brougham (as printed in the Legal Obsesver, p. 374,) find an express provision "that any persons adinitted Barristers at Law may practise as advocates before the said judges in ordinary, and any persons admitted Attorneys of any of the Superior Courts at Westminster, may practise as advocates, attorneys, or agents, before the said judges." I certainly agree with Mr. Dax, that any provision in a local court bill, prohibiting counsel and attorneys from practising, would be an "utter denial of justice to numbers of persons," and I hope never to see such a provision; but I am not aware to what bill he refers, for it appears that his observations were made on this head before it was reported that the Lord Chancellor intended introducing a local court bill, and therefore I

JUDGMENTS AS THEY AFFECT
REAL PROPERTY.

be necessary to call attention to the recent case of Whitworth v. Gaugain, M. S., before the Lord Chancellor, 26th June, 1841, in which the question came incidentally before the Court, whether an equitable mortgagee was entitled to priority over a subsequent judgment creditor without notice, who had obtained possession of the land under an elegit.

Lord Cottenham, in this case, observed, that the judgment creditors were in possession of a legal title, although not to all intents and purposes an estate, yet a right and interest in the land, which, under the authority of an act of parliament, they had a right to hold, the elegit being the creature of an act of parliament; and that, therefore, they had a parliamentary title to hold the land as against all persons, unless a case of equity should be made to induce the Court to interfere: and the general tendency of his opinion appears to have been, that a judgment creditor without notice, in possession under his elegit, would have preference to an equitable incumbrancer with a prior charge; and, following out this principle, it seems clear that such preference would also exist as against nion of Lord Cottenham, though extra-judievery other equitable interest. This opicial, appears to be so perfectly consistent with principle, that there can be little doubt that if the point should come directly before the Court, his view will be supported. There is nothing in the opinion at variance with those cases in which judgments entered up after a binding contract for sale have been recognized by Courts of Equity as not affecting a purchaser, inasmuch as the determinations in those cases appear to have been made with reference to judg ments before execution, and consequently, whilst they constituted merely a general security upon the estates, chattels, and property of the debtor. Finch v. Earl of Winchilsea, 1 P. Wms. 282: Lodge v. Lyseley, 4 Sim. 75.

It is to be observed, that Lord Cottenham refers to the affidavit of the defendants as denying any notice of the plaintiff's equity

Judgments as they affect Real Property.-New Bills in Parliament.

407

at the time of the elegit being sued out. As, however, the 13th section of the new act makes a judgment an equitable charge on the lands from the time of its being entered up, it may be questioned whether a judgment creditor would not become a pur-jointly or severally, have, perform, and exechaser from that time, so as to make it immaterial that he had notice at the time of suing out his elegit, if he was ignorant of the previous equities when he obtained his judgment, in conformity with the rule in equity which refers notice to the period of the purchase, and not to that of getting in the legal estate. Willoughby v. Willoughby, 1.Term Rep. 763.

[der and direct that any of the inquiries and matters connected with the persons and estates of lunatics, usually referred to the masters in ordinary of the High Court of Chancery, shall be referred to such commissioners, or one of them; and such commissioners shall,

cute all the powers, duties, and authorities relating to the said inquiries, and matters so to be referred to them as aforesaid, now had, performed, and executed by the masters in ordinary of the said Court of Chancery, and tage of lunatics and their estates as the Lord such other duties for the security and advanChancellor shall from time to time order and direct.

4. Commissioners to be ex officio visitors of lunatics.-That the said commissioners shall, by virtue of their appointments to be such commissioners as aforesaid, he and become

If the proper searches are, on any occasion neglected, solicitors should always re-visitors for superintending, inspecting, and quire an indemnity against the consequences of such neglect, from the persons for whom they are professionally engaged. A form similar to the following, may with propriety be adopted:

PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS IN LUNACY.

reporting upon, under the order and direction of the Lord Chancellor, the care and treatment of all persons found idiot, lunatic, or of three visitors appointed under the 3 & 4 W. unsound mind, by inquisition, jointly with the 4, c. 36, and shall severally have, perform, and execute the like powers, duties, and authorities as are had, performed, and executed by the one of the said visitors being a barrister.

5. Commissioners to execute duties as Lord Chancellor shall order. Power to Lord Chancellor to appoint special commissioners.—That the commissioners to be appointed by virtue of this act shall execute commissions in the nature of writs de lunatico inquirendo, and shall conduct inquiries connected with lunatics or their estates, and shall perform all other duties to be committed to them by virtue of this act, either seperately or together, and at such places, and within such times, and in such manner, as the Lord Chancellor shall from time to time order and direct: Provided always, and it is hereby declared, that nothing

This bill, which we noticed last week, con- in this act contained shall be deemed or taken tains the following clauses.

standing at the bar, to be called "the Commissioners in Lunacy," and that in future all commissions in the nature of writs De lunatico inquirendo shall be directed or addressed to such commissioners, or one of them; and that such commissioners shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall jointly and severally have, perform, and execute all the powers, duties, and authorities now had, performed, and executed by commissioners named in commissions in the nature of writs de lunatico inquirendo.

2. Oath of commissioners.

to prevent the Lord Chancellor from issuing any commission in the nature of a writ de lunatico inquirendo, addressed to any fit and proper person or persons, in addition to such commissioners so to be appointed as aforesaid, if he shall, upon any occasion, deem it proper to do so.

6. Power to appoint successors to commissioners.

7. Practice. That it shall and may be lawful for the Lord Chancellor from time to time to make such orders as to him shall seem fit and proper, for regulating the form and mode of proceeding before and by the said commissioners, and the practice, and the taxation and allowance, and payment of costs, in matters in lunacy.

8. Juries. That it shall and may be lawful for the Lord Chancellor from time to time to make such order or orders as he shall deem 3. Power to Lord Chancellor to direct that fit for regulating and fixing the number of commissioners shall perform duties of masters injurymen who shall be sworn to try inquests lunacy, That it shall and may be lawful for the Lord Chancellor from time to time to or

on commissions in the nature of writs de luna-. tico inquirendo; provided that every inquisi

9. Officers, &c.-That from and after the passing of this act such officers, clerks, and messengers in the office of the said commissioners as the Lord Chancellor, with the advice and consent of the Master of the Rolls and Vice Chancellors for the time being, or one of them, shall determine to be necessary and proper, shall and may be from time to time appointed.

10. Penalty for default in delivering copies for the use of the libraries.

11. Book of registry to be kept at Stationers' Hall.

12. Party making or causing to be made a false entry in the book of registry to be guilty of a misdemeanor.

13. Entries of copyright may be made in the book of registry.

14. If any person be aggrieved by any entry in the book of registry, he may apply to the 10. Office of "clerk of the custodies" abo-Lord Chancellor, Master of the Rolls, Vice liahed. 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 111; 3 & 4 W. 4, c. Chancellor, Court of law in term, or Judge in 84. vacation, who may order such entry to be va. ried or expunged.

11. Lord Chancellor to fix tables of fees, to be paid into "suitors fee fund."

12. Fees formerly payable to Lord High Chancellor to be paid into fee fund. 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 122.

13. Salaries of commissioners. [Amount not stated in the bill.]

14. Salaries of officers, clerks, &c., and al. lowances to commissioners and secretary of lunatics.

15. Compensations to officers.

17. Act may be amended or repealed.

COPYRIGHT.

The following is an abstract of the bill brought in by Lord Mahon, Sir Robert Inglis, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Charles Howard. We are glad to see the measure in such good hands, and wish it success.

15. Remedy for the piracy of books or parts of books by action on the case. Proviso for Scotland.

16. In actions for piracy, the defendant to give notice in writing of the objections to the plaintiff's title on which he means to rely.

17. Mode of proving the publication and identity of books in proceedings for piracy.

18. No person shall import into any part of the British dominions for sale any book first composed, &c. within the British dominions and reprinted elsewhere. Penalty on importing, selling or keeping for sale any such books, forfeiture thereof, and also 101. and double the value. Books inay be seized by officers of customs or excise, who shall be rewarded.

19. Copyright in Encyclopædias, periodical works, and works published in series, to be in the publisher or conductor thereof, and proof of payment to the parties employed by him to be prima facie evidence of his property in their

1. Repeal of former acts, 8 Anne, c. 19. 41 Geo. 3, c. 107; 54 Geo. 3, c. 146 (extend-articles. Proviso securing the right of authors ing copyright in books).

2. Interpretation clause.

3. Copyright in any book hereafter to be published in the lifetime of the author to belong to the author and his assigns for the author's life, and for twenty-five years, coinmencing at his death; and if published after the author's death, to belong to the proprietor of the manuscript for thirty years from the first publication thereof.

who have reserved the right of publishing their articles in a separate form.

20. Proprietors of Encyclopædias, periodical works, and works published in series to be at liberty to enter at once at stationers' Hall, and thereon to have the benefit of the registration of the whole work.

21. The provisions of 3 & 4 W. 4, extended to musical compositions, and the term of copyright, as provided by this act, applied to the 4. In cases of subsisting copyright, the ex-liberty of representing dramatic pieces and mutended term to be enjoyed, except when it sical compositions. shall belong to an assignee for other consideration than natural love and affection; in which case it shall cease at the expiration of the present term; unless its extension shall be agreed to between the proprietor and the author.

5. Power to judicial committee of the privy council to license the republication of books, which the proprietor refuses to republish after the death of the author.

6. One copy of every book to be delivered at the British Museum.

7. Mode of delivering at the British Mu

seum.

22. The proprietor of the right of dramatic representation shall have all the remedies given by the act 3 & 4 W. 4.

23. No assignment of copyright of a dramatic piece shall convey the right of representation unless an entry to that effect shall be made in the book of registry.

24. Power to grant injunctions in case of piracy. Proviso for Scotland.

25. Mode of proving copyright, &c., in Colonial Courts.

26. Books pirated shall become the property of the proprietor of the copyright, and may be recovered by action, or seized by warrant of two justices.

8. A copy of every book to be delivered within a month after demand for the use of the following libraries: Bodleian library, pub- 27. No proprietor of copyright, commenclic library at Cambridge, Advocates of Edin-ing after this act, shall sue or proceed for any burgh, Trinity college, Dublin. infringement before making entry in the book of registry. Proviso for dramatic pieces. 28. Copyright shall be personalty.

9. Publishers may deliver the copies to the libraries instead of the Stationers' Company.

Chancery Reform.-Superior Courts: Lord Chancellor.

29. Saving the rights of the Universities and the Colleges of Eton, Westminster and Winchester.

30. Proviso for saving all rights and all contracts and engagements subsisting at the time of passing this act.

31. Act to extend to all parts of the British

dominions.

32. Act may be amended or repealed during the present session.

CHANCERY REFORM.

CONSOLIDATION OF OFFICES.

409

Chancellor has signed it: Secus, as to a decree or order made by the Master of the Rolls.

This was a motion to vacate the inrolment of a decree and of an order, made on a petition in the same cause, on the grounds of irregularity. The decree and order were pronounced by the Vice Chancellor in 1818, when the party now moving was an infant, and they were inrolled in 1840 by the adverse parties. The grounds of irregularity were, first, that the iurolment was made without the order nunc pro tunc; secondly, that the docket of the decree and order, whereof one of them had not the signature of the Vice Chancellor, the judge who pronounced them and thirdly, that although the decree and order were both set We have not time or space at present to out in the recitals, in the inrolment, and the pursue the general subject of Chancery re-order on the petition was again stated at length; form; but it may be useful to keep alive the decree was not so stated. the attention of the profession to the necessity of bringing all the offices in which the business of the Court is transacted under one roof. People are too much in the habit of thinking lightly of the loss of small portions of time, but every five or ten minutes is of consequence in dispatch-paratory to the inrolment, must be left for the ing the vast mass of business which must be got through in a few hours, at offices which are scattered in various parts of the Law District. We are sure that great advantage will arise by bringing them together in one building. There let writs of all kinds be issued, appearances entered, bills filed, answers and affidavits sworn and filed, causes set down, orders drawn up, and, in short, all the machinery of the court worked.

For the present, the courts must continue to sit, and the masters to conduct their inquiries in different places, but the time will come when Courts, Masters, Registrars, Record-keepers and all the subordinate officers will be, as it were, in the same college, and under one supervision. Then we shall see a very different state of activity from the present in all the departments of administering justice.

SUPERIOR COURTS.

Lord Chancellor.

PRACTICE.-INROLMENT.

If a decree is fully set forth by way of recital in an inrolment, it is not necessary to the validity of the inrolment to state the decree again.

The inrolment of a decree or order pronounced by the Vice Chancellor, is not irregular for want of the Vice Chancellor's signature to the docket: it is sufficient if the Lord

Mr. Wakefield, in support of the motion, after the decree and order were pronounced, cited, on the first ground of alleged irregularity, Parker v. Downing,a and the general order of court. On the second ground, he cited Mr. Daniel's Chancery Practice, a work of great accuracy, which states that the docket, pre

Vice Chancellor's signature, if the cause was heard by His Honor, or for the signature of the Master of the Rolls if the cause was heard there, after which it is taken for the Lord of irregularity he urged the reason of the thing. Chancellor's signature. On the third ground If it was necessary to repeat the order in the body of the engrossment after being stated in the recitals, as was the fact, it was necessary also to repeat the decree, which was not done.

Mr. Tinney, contrà.-It was immaterial whether this decree and order were regularly inrolled or not, as neither could be re-heard even by bill of review, Smith v. Clay. There after a lapse of twenty years and more, not is a better note of Lord Camden's judgment in that case in Brown's Reports,e than in Ambler, and it is laid down that the twenty years within which a bill of review may be brought, are to be counted from the pronouncing of the decree, not from the inrolment, and the limilimitation to writs of error in courts of law, tation is adopted in equity by analogy with the under the statute. The party moving now came of age in 1827, and the limitation after disability, was five years under the statute, or ten years here, so that as he cannot have a bill of review, he cannot have a re-hearing for any irregularity. The party is absolutely barred by lapse of time. But even on the point of form, it was clear that the decree was well inrolled, it was fully set out, and not necessary to be set out again; if the order was twice set out, it was surplusage. It is not necessary that the docket of a decree pronounced by the Vice Chancellor should be signed by