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STATUTE.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATutes.

1. Statutes granting privileges or relinquishing rights of the public are to
be strictly construed against the grantee. Wisconsin Central Railroad
Co. v. United States, 190.

2. An intention to surrender the right to demand the carriage of mails
over subsidized railroads at reasonable rates, assumed in construing
a statute of the United States, is opposed to the established policy of
Congress. Ib.

3. The punctuation of a statute is not decisive of its meaning. Ford v.
Delta & Pine Land Co., 662.

See DIRECT TAX REFUNDING ACT, 2.

B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED JURISDICTION, A, 1, 2, 12; B, 6;

STATES, 1;

CORPORATION;

CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 6, 27;

C; D; E, 1;

MAILS, TRANSPORTATION OF,
MORTGAGE, 2, 3;

DIRECT TAX REFUNDING ACT, NATIONAL Bank, 1;

2;

1, 3, 4;

FEES, 5, 6;

PUBLIC LAND, 3, 4, 12, 14, 15.

C. STATUTES OF STATES ANDd TerritorieES.

Alabama.

Arizona.

Arkansas.

California.

Florida.

Georgia.

Iowa.

Kentucky.

See JURISDICTION, A, 9.

See TAX AND TAXATION, 3 to 10.
See LOCAL LAW, 1.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 7, 9;
JURISDICTION, A, 3.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14.
See TAX AND TAXATION, 1.

See PUBLIC LAND, 15.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.

Massachusetts. See NATIONAL BANK, 1.

Mississippi.

Montana.

New Mexico.

New York.
Texas.

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TAX AND TAXATION.

1. Section eighteen of the act of the legislature of Georgia of December
14, 185, providing that no municipal or other corporation shall have
power to tax the stock of the Central Railroad and Banking Com-
pany of Georgia, but may tax any property, real or personal, of said
company within the jurisdiction of said corporation in the ratio of
taxation of like property, when construed in connection with other
legislation on that subject, permits municipal corporations to tax such
property within their respective jurisdictions in the ratio of taxation
of like property. Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Wright, 327.
2. While, in the absence of any words showing a different intent, an
exemption of the stock or capital stock of a corporation may imply,
and carry with it, an exemption of the property in which such stock
is invested, yet, if the legislature uses language at variance with such
intention, the courts, which will never presume a purpose to exempt
any property from its just share of the public burdens, will construe
any doubts which may arise as to the proper interpretation of the
charter against the exemption. Ib.

3. In proceedings in Arizona to enforce the collection of taxes assessed
upon real estate, a printed copy of the delinquent list, instead of the
original filed in the office of the county treasurer, was offered in evi-
dence. To the introduction of this objection was made, but not upon
the ground that the original was the best evidence, or that the copy
offered was not an exact copy. In this court it was for the first time
objected that the list, as filed in this case, was not a copy of the origi-
nal. Held, that this court would not disturb the judgment of the
court below on such technical grounds, apparently an afterthought.
Maish v. Arizona, 599.

4. For the hearing of the objections of the appellants against the assess-
ment of the tax the court convened on the 14th of March. The
notice published by the tax collector was that the sale would begin
on the 20th of March. On March 15 a judgment was entered direct-
ing the sale on the 20th of all the property, to which no objection
had been filed. As to those parties making objections (and included
among them were the present appellants) the case was set down for
hearing at a subsequent day, and a trial then had; but the judgment
was not entered until the 7th day of May, 1892, and the order was to
sell on the 13th day of June. Held, that the purpose and intention
of the act being the collection of taxes, but only of such taxes as
ought to be collected, and judicial determination having been invoked
to determine what taxes were justly due, the fact that the court took
time for the examination and consideration of this question did not
oust it of jurisdiction. Ib.

5. In Arizona the delinquent tax list is made by law prima facie evidence
that the taxes charged therein are due against the property, as well
the unpaid taxes for past years as those for the current year. Ib.

6. It was the intention of the legislature of Arizona, and a just inten-
tion, that no property should escape its proper share of the bur-
den of taxation by means of any defect in the tax proceedings, and
that, if there should happen to be such defect, preventing for the
time being the collection of the taxes, steps might be taken in a
subsequent year to place them again upon the tax roll and collect
them. lb.

7. The testimony does not sustain the contention that the board of equali-
zation raised the value of appellants' property arbitrarily and without
notice or evidence. Ib.

8. A party in possession under a perfect Mexican grant, that is, a grant
absolute and unconditional in form specific in description of the land,
passing a certain definite and unconditional title from the Mexican
government to the grantee, has a possessory and equitable right suffi-
cient to sustain taxation, although the grant may not have been con-
firmed. lb.

9. A court cannot strike down a levy of taxes said to be for the payment
of interest on bonds illegally issued in violation of statutory law, with-
out a full disclosure of all the indebtedness, the time when it arose, and
the circumstances under which it was created. Ib.

10. To warrant the setting aside of an assessment as unfair and partial,
something more than an error of judgment must be shown, something
indicating fraud or misconduct; as matters of that kind are left largely
to the discretion and judgment of the assessing and equalizing board,
and if it has acted in good faith its judgment cannot be overthrown.
lb.

11. Exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed, and no claims for
them can be sustained unless within the express letter or the necessary
scope of the exempting clause; and a general exemption is to be con-
strued as referring only to the property held for the business of the
party exempted. Ford v. Delta & Pine Land Company, 662.

12. The exemption from taxation conferred by the 19th section of the
act of the legislature of Mississippi of November 23, 1859, c. 14, upon
the railroad company chartered by that act, does not extend to prop-
erty other than that used in the business of the company, acquired
under the authority of a subsequent act of the legislature in which
there was no exemption clause. Ib.

13. A clause in a statute exempting property from taxation does not
release it from liability for assessments for local improvements. Ib.
14. It has been held in Mississippi not only that special assessments for
local improvements do not come within a constitutional limitation as
to taxation, but also that the construction and repair of levees are to
be regarded as local improvements for which the property specially.
benefited may be assessed; and this rule is in harmony with that
recognized generally elsewhere to the effect that special assessments
for local improvements are not within the purview of either con-

stitutional limitations in respect of taxation, or general exemptions
from taxation.

Ib.

15. Under authority granted by the act of March 16, 1872, c. 75, of the
legislature of Mississippi, the auditor conveyed to the Selma, Marion
and Memphis Railroad Company the lands in question here, by deeds
which recited that they had been "sold to the State of Mississippi for
taxes due to the said State," and that the company had paid into the
state treasury two cents per acre “in full of all state and county taxes
due thereon to present date." No reference was made in those deeds
to levy taxes on assessments. Held, that those deeds were no evidence
of the prior payment and discharge of such levy taxes and assess-
ments. lb.

16. The decision of the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Green v. Gibbs,
151 Mississippi, 592, followed as it was by subsequent decisions of that
court, is not only binding upon this court, but commends itself to the
judgment of this court as a just recognition of the force of legislative
contracts. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;

DIRECT TAX REFUNDING ACT.

WAIVER.

See JURISDICTION, B, 5;

MAILS, TRANSPORTATION OF, 1.

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