Page images



A New York corporation owned and operated steamships plying between

that port and Brazil. A Pennsylvania company was in the habit of
supplying these ships with coal as ordered, charging the New York
company therefor upon its books, and as further security for the
running indebtedness, filed specifications of lien against the vessels
under a statute of New York. Subsequently the New York company
began to employ in their business other steamers under time charter
parties which required the charterers to provide and pay for all coals
furnished them, and the Pennsylvania company supplied these ships
also with coals, knowing that they were not owned by the New York
company, and understanding, although not absolutely knowing, and
not inquiring about it, that the charterers were required to provide
and pay for all needed coals. None of such coals were supplied under
orders of the master of a chartered vessel, but the bills therefor were
rendered to the New York company, which, when the supplies were
made owed nothing for the hire of the vessels. The coals were not
required in the interest of the owners of the chartered vessels. Pro-
ceedings having been taken in admiralty to enforce liens for coal
against the vessel, Held, (1) That as the libellant was chargeable
with knowledge of the provisions of the charter party no lien could
be asserted under maritime law for the value of the coal so supplied ;
(2) Without deciding whether the statute of New York would be
unconstitutional if interpreted as claimed by the libellant, it gives no
lien where supplies are furnished to a foreign vessel on the order of
the charterer, the furnisher knowing that the charterer does not repre-
sent the owner, but, by contract with the owner, has undertaken to
furnish such supplies at his own cost. The Kate, 458.






See ConstitUTIONAL LAW, 1 to 9.

Chapman v. United States, 164 U. S. 436, followed. Prather v. United

States, 452.
Chase v. United States, 155 U. S. 489, followed. United States v. King, 703.
Davis v. Texas, 139 U. S. 651, followed. Nordstrom v. Washington, 705.
Draper v. United States, 164 U. S. 240, followed. Nordstrom v. Washing-

ton, 705.
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, followed. Wiscon-

sin v. Baltzell, 702.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, followed. Nordstrom v. Washing-

ton, 705.
Jacobs v. George, 150 U. S. 415, followed. Henry v. Alabama & Vicksburg

Railroad, 701.
McElroy v. United States, 164 U. S. 76, followed. Cohen v. United

States, 702.
McNalty v. California, 149 U. S. 645, followed. Nordstrom v. Washing-

ton, 705.

Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, followed. Wilson v. United States, 702.
Royai, ex parte, 161 U. S. 29, followed. Washington v. Coovert, 702.
Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, followed. Tucker v. McKay, 701.
Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, followed, Craemer v. Washington, 704;

King v. Washington, 704.
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, followed. Nordstrom v. Washington, 705.
United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604, followed. United States ex rel.

Long v. Lochner, 701.
Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, followed. Washington v. Coovert, 702.
Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606, followed. Wisconsin v. Baltzell, 702.

National BANK, 2;
Direct Tax REFUNDING ACT, 2; Public Land, 1.


Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, distinguished from this case.
v. Florida, 650.



See FrauDS, STATUTE OF, 3.



See Fees, 1, 2, 3, 4.



1. In actions in the Court of Claims interest prior to the judgment cannot

be allowed to claimants, against the United States; but the provisions
of Rer. Stat. & 966 peremptorily require it to be allowed to the United
States, against claimants, under all circumstances to which the statute
applies, and without regard to equities which might be considered

between private parties. United States v. Verdier, 213.
2. S. contracted with the United States, in 1888, to erect a custom-house

at Galveston. H. was his surety on a bond to the United States for
the faithful performance of that contract. The contract gave the gov.
ernment a right to retain a part of the price until the work should be
finished. In consideration of advances made, and to be made, by a
bank, S. gave it in 1890, written authority to receive from the United
States the final contract payment so reserved. The Treasury declined
to recognize this authority, but consented, on the request of the con-
tractor, to forward, when due, a check for the final payment to the
representative of the bank. Later S. defaulted in the performance of
his contract, and H., as surety, without knowledge of what had taken
place between the bank, the contractor and the Treasury, assumed per-
formance of the contract obligations, and completed the work, disburs-
ing, in so doing, without reimbursement, an annount in excess of the
reserved final payment. The bank and H., each by a separate action
sought to recover that reserved sum from the government. The cases
being heard together it is Held, that, a claim against the government
not being transferable, the rights of the parties are equitable only, and
the equity, if any, of the bank in the reserved fund, being acquired in
1890, was subordinate to the equity of H. acquired in 1888. Prairie
State Bank v. United States, 227.

See Public LAND, 5, 6.



1. In a suit, brought in a Circuit Court of the United States by an alien

against a citizen of the State in which the court sits, claiming that an

act about to be done therein by the defendant to the injury of the
plaintiff, under authority of a statute of the State, will be in violation
of the Constitution of the United States, and also in violation of the
constitution of the State, the Federal courts have jurisdiction of both
classes of questions; but, in exercising that jurisdiction as to questions
arising under the state constitution, it is their duty to be guided by
and follow the decisions of the highest court of the State; (1), as to
the construction of the statute; and (2), as to whether, if so con-
strued, it violates any provision of that constitution. Loan Associa-
tion v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 657, shown to be in harmony with this decision.

Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 112.
2. The statute of California of March 7, 1887, ta provide for the organiza-

tion and government of irrigation districts, and to provide for the
acquisition of water and other property, and for the distribution of
water thereby for irrigation purposes, and the several acts amendatory
thereof having been clearly and repeatedly decided by the highest
court of that State not to be in violation of its constitution, this court

will not hold to the contrary. Ib.
3. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104, cited and affirmed to the

point that “whenever by the laws of a State or by state authority a
tax, assessment, servitude or other burden is imposed upon property
for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or of some more
limited portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode
of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary
courts of justice, with such notice to the person, or such proceeding in
regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the
judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of
his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be

to other objections.” 16.
4. There is no specific prohibition in the Federal Constitution which acts

upon the State in regard to their taking private property for any but

a public use. 16.
5. What is a public use, for which private property may be taken by due

process of law, depends upon the ticular facts and circumstances

connected with the particular subject matter. Ib.
6. The irrigation of really arid lands is a public purpose, and the water

thus used is put to a public use; and the statutes providing for such

irrigation are valid exercises of legislative power. Ib.
7. The land which can be properly included in any irrigation district

under the statutes of California is sufficiently linnited to arid, un-

productive land by the provisions of the acts. 16.
8. Due process of law is furnished, and equal protection of the law given

in such proceedings, when the course pursued for the assessment and
collection of taxes is that customarily followed in the State, and when
the party who may be charged in his property has an opportunity to
be heard. Ib.

9. The irrigation acts make proper provisions for a hearing as to whether

the petitioners are of the class mentioned or described in them;
whether they have complied with the statutory provisions; and
whether their lands will be benefited by the proposed improvement.
They make it the duty of the board of supervisors, when landowners
deny that the signers of a petition have fulfilled the requirements of
law, to give a hearing or hearings on that point. They provide for
due notice of the proposed presentation of a petition; and that the
irrigation districts when created in the manner provided are to be
public corporations with fixed boundaries. They provide for a gen-
eral scheme of assessment upon the property included within each
district, and they give an opportunity to the taxpayer to be heard
upon the questions of benefit, valuation and assessment; and the ques-
tion as to the mode of reaching the results, even if in some cases the
results are inequitable, does not reach to the level of a Federal consti-
tutional problem. In all these respects the statutes furnish due
process of law, within the meaning of that term as used in the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Ib.
10. The granting, by a trial court, of a nonsuit for want of sufficient evi-

dence to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff is no infringement of the

constitutional right of trial by jury. Coughran v. Bigelow, 301.
11. The taking by a State of the private property of one person or cor-

poration, without the owner's consent, for the private use of another,
is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article
of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Missouri

Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 403.
12. A statute of a State, by which, as construed by the Supreme Court of

the State, a board of transportation is authorized to require a railroad
corporation, which has permitted the erection of two elevators by
private persons on its right of way at a station, to grant upon like
terms and conditions a location upon that right of way to other private
persons in the neighborhood, for the purpose of erecting thereon a
third elevator, in which store their grain from time to time, is a
taking of private property of the railroad corporation for a private
use, in violation of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Con-

stitution of the United States. lb.
13. The legislature of Kentucky, by an act passed in 1834, created the

Covington and Lexington Turnpike Road Company with authority to
construct a turnpike from Covington to Lexington. One section pre-
scribed the rates of tolls which might be exacted; another provided
" that if at the expiration of five years after the said road has been
completed, it shall appear that the annual net dividends for the two
years next preceding of said company, upon the capital stock expended
upon said road and its repairs, shall have exceeded the average of four-
teen per cent per annum thereof, then in that case, the legislature re-
serves to itself the right, upon the fact being made known, to reduce

« PreviousContinue »