Cum post mortem, sive per mortem, sursum-redditionem, seu forisfacturam of a former lease for years with a proviso that the lessor might enter if the lessees died within the term, vacari contingat: for it commences at the end of the former term. R. per 3 J. 2 Cont. 2 Cro. 71. 6 Co. 36. (i) So, if it be to commence upon a disjunctive; it shall commence if the one part happens, though the other does not. Semb. 3 Lev. 99. (k) So, if it commences upon the death of such an one without issue. R. 1 Lev. 35. (1) So,

it is sufficient; for until that time it may depend upon an uncertainty, viz. upon a possible condition precedent before it begin in possession or interest, or upon a limitation or condition subsequent. But in case it is to be reduced to a certainty upon a condition precedent, the contingency must happen in the lives of the parties. Shep. Touch. 272. (i) If one makes a lease for years after the death of C., if C. dies within ten years; this is a good lease if C. dies within the ten years, otherwise not. Shep. Touch. 273. (4) A lease in reversion of several parcels of land, made to commence on the happening of several contingencies, shall take effect and commence respectively as those contingencies happen. Cro. Eliz. 199.

(4) 1. If a lease for years be made of land in lease for life, to have and to hold from the death of the tenant for life; or to have and to hold from Michaelmas next after the death of the tenant for life; or from Michaelmas next after the determination of the estate of the tenant for life; such leases are good. Shep. Touch. 273. -2. And even if one make a lease to begin after the death of J. S. and to continue until Michaelmas which shall be anno Domini, 1650, this is a good lease. Ibid. -3. So if a man makes a lease to B. for ninety years to begin after the death of A., on condition to be avoided upon the doing of divers acts by others; and afterwards makes another lease of the land, habendum after the determination or redemption of the former lease; it seems that this lease is certain enough. Shep. Touch. 274. -4. So if a man have a lease of land for an hundred years, and he make a lease of this land to another to have and to hold to him for forty years, to begin after his death; this is a good lease for the whole forty years, if there shall be so many of the hundred years come at the time of the death of the lessor. So if he grant all his estate or all his term, or all his interest, in the premises of the deed, and then say, to have and to hold the land, &c. to the grantee for all the residue of the term of an hundred years that shall be to come at the time of his death; by this, the whole estate and interest of the grantor in the land doth pass presently, by these words in the deed; and if in this case the lessee for an hundred years make a lease of the land, to have and to hold after his death for an hundred years, this will be a good lease for as many of the first hundred years, as shall be to come at the time of his death. Ibid.-5. So if A. makes a lease of land to B. for so many years as B. hath in the manor of Dale, and B. hath then a lease for ten years in such manor, this is a good lease for ten years. Ibid.-6. So if a lease be made during the minority of J. S. or until J. S. shall come to the age of twenty-one years, these are good leases; and if J. S. die before he come to his full age, the lease is ended. Ibid. — 7. So if a man make a lease for twenty-one years, if J. S. live so long; or if the coverture between J. S. and D. S. shall so long continue; or if J. S. shall continue to be parson of Dale so long; these and such like leases are good. Ibid. — 8. If one makes a lease to A. for twenty-one years, and after makes another lease to B. for years, to begin from the end and expiration of the aforesaid term of twenty-one years demised to A.; and then the lease to A. is determined, either by an express surrender, or by an implied surrender in law, as by A.'s acceptance of a new lease for life from the lessor; the lease to B. shall begin presently. Bac. Abr. Leases, L 1. But if the lease to B. had been to begin after the end and expiration of the aforesaid term of twenty-one years, there the lease to B. should not begin upon the surrender, forfeiture, or other determination of the first term, to A. till the twentyone years actually run out by effluxion of time. Ibid.-10. The reason of which difference is, that in the first case the word 'term' comprehends as well the estate or interest in the land, as the time for which it is demised, and therefore the second lease being limited to begin from the end and expiration of the aforesaid term of twenty-one years, whenever the term is determined the lease to B. shall begin; but in the other case the lease to B. is not to begin till after the end and expiration of the twenty-one years, which cannot be ended but by effluxion of time. Ibid.-11. So if one makes a lease to another for so many years as J. S. shall name, this at the beginning is uncertain;

G 4

So, if the commencement be defeated by any impediment, it may commence after the impediment removed: as, if a man leases to A. for twenty-one years, and afterwards to B. the same day by parol for thirty-one years; it shall not commence immediately, because he had not power to lease during the twenty-one years before granted, but as a reversion; yet it shall commence after the end of twenty-one years, for ten years. Pl. Com. 432.

(G 10.) What shall be a good determination.

The continuance of a lease ought to be certain.

And it shall be certain, where the express number of years is named, or by reference, or matter ex post facto, or construction of law, the years may be reduced to a certainty. 6 Co. 35. a.

As, if the limitation be express, for ten, twenty, or other number of years. 6 Co. 35. a.

Or, for so many years as A. has in such a manor, who has in it ten years. 6 Co. 35. b.

As A. shall name, and he names in the life of the lessor. 6 Co. 35. b.

(G 11.) When it shall be determined.

If a lease be (m) to A., B., and C. for years, if the said A., B., and Cso long live; if any of them dies, the lease determines. Per 2 J. Dal. 2. Otherwise

uncertain; but when J. S. hath named the years (in the life time of the lessor) this ascertains the commencement and continuance of the lease accordingly. Bac. Abr. Leases, L. 2.- 12. But if the lease had been made for so many years as the executors of the lessor should name, this could not be made good by any nomination; because to every lease there ought to be a lessor and lessee, and here the nomination, which ascertains the commencement, not being appointed till after the death of the lessor, makes the lease defective in one of the main parts of it, viz. a lessor, and therefore of consequence must be void. Ibid.

(m) 1. If a man makes a lease for years, without saying how many, this shall be a good lease for two years certain; because for more there is no certainty; and for less there can be no sense in the words. Bac. Abr. Leases, L. 3. - 2. So if a parson makes a lease for a year, and so from year to year as long as he shall continue parson, or as long as he shall live, this is a lease for two years at least, if he lives and continues parson so long; and after the two years, or at most after three years, but an estate at will for the uncertainty, unless livery be made. Ibid.-3. A parson made a lease of his rectory to one for three years, and at the end of those three years, for other three years, and so from three years to three years, during the life of the lessor; and held a lease for twelve years; but Doddridge J. said, that if the lease had been for three years, and so from three years to three years, and so from the said three years to three years, this had been but a lease for nine years, because the words from the said three years' tie up the relation retrospectively to the three years last mentioned, which make in all but six years, and then there are but three years more added, which make the whole but nine years; and for the words during the life of the lessor,' they cannot enlarge it to any farther certain number of years, by reason of the uncertainty of the lessor's life; and therefore beyond the twelve years or nine years it amounts only to a lease at will, unless livery were made, which must necessarily pass a freehold determinable upon the lessor's death. Ibid.-4. Yet in one book where a lease was made for three years and after the end of those three years, for other three years, and so from three years to three years, during the life of the lessor, this was held to be only a lease for nine years; because the words and so from three years,' shall be referred the three years last mentioned, for otherwise those words would exclude the three years next after the six years, and make the three last years to begin after nine years, and so make a chasm in the lease by shutting out the three years next after the six years, so as for the three last years, it should be only a future interest;

Otherwise, if it be in the disjunctive, if A., B., or C. so long live; for then it continues during the life of the survivor.

Or,

which case seems to be of a new stamp, and to thwart the preceding case as to the resolution of its being a lease for twelve years; and there Jones and Wild Js. held, that a lease from three years to three years was but a lease for three years to commence in futuro. Ibid. 5 Keb. 760. 768.-5. One made a lease for three years, and so from three years to three years until ten years be expired: and resolved to be a lease but for nine years, and that the odd year should be rejected, because that cannot come to fall within any three entire years according to the limitation, which in this case are to be taken altogether as one year, or else so much of the limitation as cannot come within that description must be rejected. Bac. Abr. Leases, L. 3.-6. One lets a stable for a week for 88. and so from week to week at 8s. a-week, as long as both parties pleased; this was held at most but a lease for three weeks certain, and for the residue at will. Ibid. 7. Where a lease is to two for forty years, if they so long live, Rolle, in his reports, (309, 310.) seems to think that this does not determine by the death of one of them; because it is an interest in both, which shall survive; but the other books are against it; because their life is but a collateral condition and limitation of the estate, which therefore is broken when one dies. This differs therefore from a lease to two persons for their lives, for that gives an estate to both for their lives, and both have an estate of freehold therein in their own right; which consequently cannot determine by the death of one of them, for then the other could not be said to have an estate for his life, as the lease at first gave it. Bac. Abr. Leases, L. 4. -8. So where one made a lease for forty years if his wife or any of their issue should so long live,' it was adjudged that the lease was not determined by the death of one of them, but should continue till all were dead, by reason of the disjunctive or, which goes to and governs the whole limitation. But had the words been if his wife and issue should so long live,' there clearly by the death of any of them within the forty years, the term had been at an end, by reason of the copulative and, which conjoins all together, and makes all their lives jointly the measure of the estate. Cro. Eliz. 270. Co. Litt. 255. a.-9. A lease was for twenty-one years, if the lessee lived so long, and continued in the lessor's service; the lessor died; and three Judges against one, held that the lease was not determined, for there was no laches in the lessee that he did not serve, but it was the act of God that prevented him: the dissenting judge held the contrary; because, he argued, it was a limitation to the estate, that it should not continue longer than he served. Cro. Eliz. 643.-10. A parol demise to hold from year to year, and so on as long as it shall please both parties, is a lease for two years, and after every subsequent year began, is not determinable till that year be ended. 2 Salk. 414. 313. 1 Wils. 262. 4 East, 32. Woodf. L. and T. 120.-11. If therefore A. demise lands to B. for a year, and so from year to year, this is not a lease for two years, and afterwards at will, but it is a lease for every particular year, and after the year is begun, the defendant cannot determine the lease before the year is ended. 1 T. R. 380. Salk. 414. b. Woodf. L. and T. 120.-12. A lease for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years; as the lessee shall think proper,' and whereon the lessee enters and continues in possession, is undoubtedly a good lease for seven years, whatever may be its validity as to the two other eventual terms of fourteen and twenty-one years. 2 Burr. 1034.-13. A lease for three, six, or nine years, determinable at the expiration of three, six, or nine years, is a lease for nine years, determinable at those periods. 3 T. R. 462.-14. And a demise 'not for one year only but from year to year,' constitutes a tenancy for two years at least, and is not determinable by a notice to quit at the expiration of the first year, 4 East, 24.-15. And where the demise was to hold for three, six, or nine years generally, without any stipulation as to the manner in which, or the party by whom the tenancy might be determined at the end of the third or sixth year; the tenancy was held to be determinable at the two earlier periods at the will of the tenant only, and by a regular notice to quit, and that as against the landlord, the demise operated as an indefeasible one for nine years. 3 Burr. 399. 9 East, 15. 17 Ves. J. 363.-16. Where a party having agreed to become tenant from year to year for the residue of a term consisting of three years and three-quarters, holds over beyond the three years, he must continue tenant for the remaining three quarters, 3 Taunt. 410.-17. Agreement to let to A. a house at a yearly rent, to continue during the life of the lessor, supposing it to be occupied by the lessee himself; or a tenant agreeable to the lessor; and held, that no interest passed under a lease to be made under this agreement to the executors, but that it must be a lease for the life of the

lessor

Or, if A. and B. or any issue of them so long live. R. Cro. El. 270. (Vide Co. L. 225. a.)

So, if a lease be for years, proviso that the lessor may enter if the lessees die within the term; it (n) does not cease by the death of the lessees, till the lessor enters. R. 2 Cro. 71. (o).

So, if a lease be for twenty-one years, and after the twenty-one years ended for other twenty-one years, and so from twenty-one years to twenty-one years till ninety-nine years are thence complete; the lessee shall have it for ninety-nine years after the first twenty-one years. R. 2 Lev. 241.

So, if a lease be to A. for one year, et sic de anno in annum, it shall be a lease only for two years. Mo. 372. (p)

(G 12.)

lessor, if the lessee occupies himself, or by a tenant agreeable to the lessee; and that upon his death the lessor may eject the executor without a notice to quit. 2 Smith, 570. 6 East, 530.

(n) Neither party can, by his own act, determine an entire demise in part. 14 East,

245.

(0) But now an entry is not requisite. Adams Eject. 144. 146.

(p) 1. A tenancy may be determined in various ways, as, with two exceptions, may be seen under the appropriate divisions of this digest. The excepted cases are where a tenancy is determined by effluxion of time, or the happening of a particular event; and where by a notice to quit.-2. Upon the first it is sufficient to observe, that when the time expires, or the particular event happens, the tenancy is at once determined, and that the landlord may immediately maintain an ejectment to recover his possession, without giving any previous notice whatever to the tenant. 1 T. R. 52. 160. 8 East, 358. 1 H. Bl. 97.-3. As to the determination of a tenancy by notice. Mr. Adams in his treatise on ejectment thus deduces its original. Until the reign of king Henry 7. even a tenant having a lease of lands for a definite period, had not a full and complete remedy when ousted of his possession. The tenants, who during those times occupied lands without any specific grant, were in a worse situation: a general occupation, that is to say, a holding by A. of the lands of B., without being limited to any certain or determinable estate, was then considered, as a holding at the will and pleasure of the owner of the land; and the tenant was liable to be ejected, at any moment, by the simple determination of his landlord's will. The same enlightened policy which secured to lessees for years the complete possession of their terms, soon extended itself also to those general holdings, then called tenancies at will; and in the reign of king Henry the 8th, (13 H. 8. 15. b.) we find it holden by the courts, that a general occupation should be considered to be an occupation from year to year; and that a person so holding should not be ejected from his lands, without a reasonable notice from his landlord to relinquish the possession. It was also at the same time settled, that this reasonable notice should be a notice for half a year expiring, at the end of the tenancy; because otherwise, although a notice, reasonable as to duration, might be given, it might operate greatly to the prejudice of the tenant by ejecting him from his lands, immediately before the harvest, or other valuable period of the year: and this rule has remained unaltered to the present day, except where a different time is established, either by express agreement, or immemorial custom. A general occupation of lands now therefore enures as a tenancy from year to year determinable, and necessarily determinable, by a regular notice to quit, (8 East, 165.) and a holding merely at the will of the landlord, according to the antient meaning of the term is an estate unknown in modern times, (Burr. 1605. 1609. Vide Co. Litt. 55. in notis. 16 Ves. 57. 2 Esp. C. 717.) Cases indeed are to be found, in which the courts have nominated the defendants tenants at will, but it does not appear, in any one of those instances, that the true relation of landlord and tenant subsisted; or that the defendant could be considered in any other light than as a trespasser, or at the most a tenant upon sufferance, (2 Esp. C. 717. 4 T. R. 680. 2 Camp. 505. 5 T. R. 471. 8 T. R. 3. et vide 2 Blk. Com. 147. 3 East, 449.) 3 East, 449.) Notwithstanding, however, the principles of this species of tenancy have been so long established, we do not find any decided cases respecting the requisites of notices to quit until within the last half century; though, certainly, since the time they first became objects of attention to our

courts,

courts, the decisions upon them have multiplied exceedingly, and they are now reduced to a clear and regular system. Adams, Eject. 105. 107. — 4. As to when a notice to quit is requisite. Where no tenancy express or implied subsists, the occupier may be ejected without one; as to which vide supra; and add, that,- 5. A tenancy from year to year cannot be determined without a legal notice to quit. 5 Taunt. 519.6. The interest, too, of such tenant is not changed by his death, but vests in his personal representative, who therefore cannot be ejected without a notice similar to that which would have been requisite to have ejected the deceased. 3 T.R. 15.-7. When however no interest vests in the representative, no notice to quit will be necessary; as where A. agreed to demise a house to B., during the joint lives of A. and B., and B. entered in pursuance of the agreement, and, before any lease was executed, died; after which B.'s executor took possession of the house; and held that A. might maintain ejectment against the executor without notice to quit; because the death of B. determined his interest, and consequently no interest vested in the executor. The court were also of opinion that the case would have been the same if the lease had been executed. 6 East, 580. Adams, Eject. 115. -8. And upon the same principle, if the ancestor die, leaving an infant heir or devisee, the infant must give the tenants from year to year, a regular notice to quit, before he can maintain ejectment against them. 2 T. R. 159. Adams, ibid. — 9. And in an ejectment brought by the lord of a manor, for an inclosure made from the waste twelve or thirteen years before, and which had been seen by the lord and steward from time to time without any objection being made, it was holden that the inclosure should be presumed to have been made by the licence of the lord, and that an ejectment could not be maintained for it without a previous notice to throw it up. 11 East, 56.-10. But a mortgagee or his assignee may recover possession against the mortgagor, or a tenant under a lease, from the mortgagor, posterior to the mortgage, without a notice. Dougl. 31. 2 East, 449. -11. As to the person by whom the notice should be given; it must be given by the person interested in the premises, or his agent properly appointed; and the courts it seems will consider in whom the real though not apparent interest exists. Thus where a feme sole lived many years separated from her husband, and during that time received to her separate use the rents of certain lands, which came to her by devise after separation, it was presumed that she received the rents, and acknowledged the tenancy, by her husband's authority; and held that the notice to quit must be given by him. Adams, Eject. 116. 1 Taunt. 367.-12. So where a lease contained a proviso that if either of the parties should be desirous to determine it in seven or fourteen years, it should be lawful for either of them, his executors or administrators so to do, upon twelve months' notice to the other of them, his heirs, executors or administrators, it was considered that the words 'executors or administrators,' were put for representatives in general, and that a notice might be given by an assignee of either party, or by the heir or devisee, as well as by the parties themselves, their executors or administrators. Adams, ibid. 12 East, 464.- 13. But where the demise was for twentyone years, if both parties should so long live, but if either should die before the end of the term, then the heirs and executors, &c. of the party so dying, might determine the lease by giving twelve months' notice to quit; it was holden that this power extended only to the representative of the party dying, and that the lease could not be determined by a notice to quit given by the lessor after the lessee's death, to his representative. Adams, 117. Willes, 45.- 14. A receiver appointed by the court of chancery is an agent sufficiently authorised to give a notice to quit. Adams, ibid. Burr. 2694.-15. As the tenant is to act upon the notice at the time it is given to him, it is necessary that it should be such as he may act upc 1 with security, and should therefore be binding upon all parties concerned at the time it is given. When therefore several persons are jointly interested in the premises, they all must join in the notice; and if any one of them be not a party at the time, no subsequent ratification by him will be sufficient by relation to render the notice valid. Adams, 118. 5 East, 491.-16. This rule seems also to be construed strictly; for where A., B. and C. were joint-tenants, and A. and B. signed and delivered a notice to the tenant on behalf of themselves and C., it was held that this notice could not be supported, even upon the rule of law that every act of one joint-tenant, which is for the benefit of co-jointtenants, shall bind them, because non constat, that the determination of the tenancy was for C.'s advantage; and although C. joined in the demise in the ejectment, it was held insufficient, for he might join in the ejectment without having originally assented to the notice. Ibid.-17. It has been ruled at Nisi Prius, that a verbal notice to quit, given by a person acting as steward of a corporation, is sufficient without evidence that he had authority for that purpose under the corporation seal. This doctrine, adds Mr. Adams, may be sound, but the reason assigned for it, namely, that the corporation, by bringing the ejectment, shew that they authorise and adopt the act of the

steward,'