Opinion. to render it readily capable of identification by the owner; the amount of the tax extended against the owner did not embrace any of the tax on the residue of the 527 acre tract not owned by such owner, and was only the correct amount of the tax properly assessable against the 33314 acre parcel of land, as the court below found, as aforesaid. Thus was given, first to the Plumbers Soapstone Company, and subsequently to all later owners of the 3334 acre parcel of land, down to and including the plaintiff in error, notice of the parcel of land assessed and the correct amount of the taxes assessed against it, and for which the Commonwealth, before and after it was returned delinquent, held a lien upon, such land; and the payment by any of such owners, at any time, of the amounts as assessed against such parcel of land, and for which it was returned delinquent, would not have required the payment of any tax on the residue of the original tract of 527 acres. Hence the assessment was not invalid because of insufficiency of its description of the property or of the designation of the amount of the tax thereon. [8] A number of authorities are cited for the plaintiff in error to the effect that where a tract or lot of land belongs to two or more persons the assessment of the whole tract and the extension of the tax on the whole to one of the persons is an illegal and void assessment. The authorities cited which so hold are 26 R. C. L., p. 360; Miller v. City of Lincoln, 94 Neb. 577, 143 N. W. 921; State Finance Co. v. Myers, 16 N. D. 193, 112 N. W. 76, 78; State Finance Co. v. Beck, 15 N. D. 374, 109 N. W. 357, 358; Johnson County v. Tierney, 56 Neb. 514, 76 N. W. 1090, 1093; Bradford v. Durham, 54 Or. 1, 101 Pac. 897, 135 Am. St. Rep. 807; Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass. 29, 96 Am. Dec. 687; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489, 71 N. W. 880; Frazier v. Prince, 8 Okl. 253, Opinion. 58 Pac. 751; Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504, 79 N. W. 1049; Lancy v. Boston, 186 Mass. 128, 71 N. E. 302; McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276, 21 So. 103. But these authorities so hold on the ground, which is expressed in the case of Johnson County v. Tierney, as follows: "Where the land owned by one person is assessed with the land of another, under one aggregate valuation, so that neither can determine the amount of the tax for which his property is liable, the uniform holding of the courts is that the entire tax is void." (Italics supplied.) It is manifest from what we have said above that these authorities have no application to the instant case. [9] 2. But if we should be in error in the conclusion reached above from the meagre record before us of the facts of the case, and if it were true that the assessments and delinquent lists for 1906 and 1907 did not extend the tax for the definite amounts of $79.72 and $194.90 for those years respectively, but for some larger amount (which is not stated in the certificate of facts before us), on the valuation of the whole 527 acres (which fact also is not stated in the certificate of facts before us); still, the said $79.72 and $194.90 were unquestionably the taxes for the years mentioned "due upon the real estate mentioned in the petition;" and section 2456 of the Code, under which the petition in this case was filed, gave the court jurisdiction to enter the order it did as to the taxes so "due," although they may not have been theretofore legally assessed. The statute, in substance, provides the method for the assessment by the court of the taxes which are "due," but which may have not been theretofore properly assessed; and the applicant for relief under such statute subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the court to require him to pay the taxes found by the court to be so "due" Opinion. as the condition upon which he is allowed to thereafter hold the land free and clear of any tax lien therefor. The order under review will be affirmed. Affirmed. Syllabus. Richmond. W. C. BRUNNER V. J. A. Cook, ET ALS. November 16, 1922. 1. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES ADJUDICATA-Estoppel-Issues not Determined in Prior Suit-Action on the Same or Different Demands.— There is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. Thus, where the second action is upon the same claim or demand as the first, the judgment in the first action, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action, and concludes the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. But where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, then the judgment in the first action operates as an estoppel only as to the points or questions which were actually litigated and determined. 2. JUDGMENTS and Decrees-Demurrer-Decision on Demurrer as Decision on the Merits.-Where a general demurrer which denies the right of the plaintiff to recover on the cause of action alleged is sustained, the decision is a decision on the merits. 3. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES ADJUDICATA-Inquiry on Appeal as to Whether Decision in First Action was Correct.-Where the same cause of action presented in the second suit was presented in the first suit, and there decided upon demurrer adversely to the complainant, the appellate court cannot inquire in the second suit whether the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the bill in the first suit, for the first litigation is finally ended. 4. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES ADJUDICATA-Suits by Materialman Against General Contractor and Landowner-Mechanic's Lien-Case at Bar. In the instant case, complainant filed his bill against a general contractor and a landowner in the circuit court of Roanoke, alleging that he furnished building materials for the construction of a building by the general contractor for the landowner, and an assignment by the general contractor to him for the sum of $1,533.88, due the con Opinion. tractor by the landowner, and prayed for a judgment for the amount due by virtue of the assignment, and for general relief. To this bill the landowner filed his plea of res judicata, setting up that the complainant had filed his bill in the corporation court of the city of Roanoke, alleging the same building contract, the indebtedness for building material, and that he had a mechanic's lien, the personal liability upon the part of the landowner for the building material furnished, and also the landowner's liability because of the order for $1,533.88, and the dismissal of this bill upon demurrer. These facts sufficiently appeared from the record. Held: That the plaintiff was concluded by the final decree in the suit in the Corporation Court, and could not reopen the identical issues which were finally there determined. Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of the city of Roanoke. Decree for defendants. appeals. The opinion states the case. Jas. A. Bear, for the appellant. Complainant Affirmed. Morris L. Masinter and C. S. McNulty, for the appellees. PRENTIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The appellant filed his bill in the Circuit Court of Roanoke city against J. A. Cook and G. W. Austin, appellees, in August, 1919, alleging that as a dealer in lumber and building materials he supplied Austin as general contractor with material for the construction of a building for Cook, for which Austin became indebted to him in a considerable sum, and that by reason of an accounting had between Austin and Cook, the owner, on or before October 8, 1917, Austin gave an order or assignment in writing for the sum of $1,533.88 |