suddenly departed from him; the reign of idolatry passed away; he was "beheld to fall like lightning from heav en." In that hour, the foundation of every Pagan temple shook; the statue of every false god tottered on its base; the priest fled from his falling shrine; and the heathen oracles became dumb forever.

Death also, the last foe to man, was the victim of this hour. The formidable appearance of the spectre remained, but his dart was taken away; for, in the hour when Christ expiated guilt, he disarmed death, by securing the resurrec tion of the just. When he said to his penitent fellow-sufferer, "To-day thou shalt be with me in Paradise," he announced to all his followers, the certainty of heavenly bliss. He declared "the cherubims" to be dismissed, and the "flaming sword" to be sheathed, which had been ap pointed, at the fall, "to keep from man the way of the tree of life." Faint, before this period. had been the hope, indistinct the prospect, which even good men enjoyed "of the heavenly kingdom. Life and immortality were now brought to light." From the hill of Calvary, the first clear and certain view was given to the world, of the ev erlasting mansions. Since that hour, they have been the perpetual consolation of believers in Christ. Under trouble, they sooth their minds; amidst temptations, they sup port their virtue; and. in their dying moments, enable them to say, "O'death! Where is thy sting? O grave! Where is thy victory ?"

SECTION II.

ELOQUENCE OF THE SENATE.

I.-Speech of the Earl of Chesterfield, in the House of Lords, February 22, 1710, on the Pension Bill.

MY LORDS,

T is now so late, and so much has been said in favor

IT

of the motion for the second reading of the Pension Bill, by Lords much abler than I am, that I shall detain you but a very short while with what I have to say upon the subject. It has been said, by a noble Duke, that this bill can be looked on only as a bill for preventing a griev

ance that is foreseen, and not as a bill for remedying a grievance that is already felt; because it is not asserted, nor so much as insinuated, in the preamble of the bill, that any corrupt practices are now made use of for gaining an undue influence over the other House. My Lords, this was the very reason for bringing in the bill. They could not assert, that any such practices are now made use of, without a proof; and the means for coming at this proof is what they want, and what they propose to get by this bill. They suspect there are such practices, but they cannot prove it. The crime is of such a secret nature, that it can very seldom be proved by witnesses; and therefore they want to put it to the trial, at least, of being proved by the oath of one of the parties; which is a method often taken, in eases that can admit of no other proofThis is, therefore, no argument of the grievance not being felt; for a man may, very sensibly, feel a grievance, and yet may not be able to prove it.

That there is a suspicion of some such practices being now made use of, or that they will soon be made use of, the many remonstrances from all parts of the united kingdoms are a sufficient proof. That this suspicion has crept into the other House, their having so frequently sent up this bill, is a manifest demonstration, and a strong argument for its being necessary to have some such bill passed into a law. The other House must be allowed to be better judges of what passes, or must pass, within their own walls, than we can pretend to be. It is evident, they suspect that corrupt practices have been, or soon may be, inade use of, for gaining an undue influence over some of their measures; and they have calculated this bill for euring the evil, if it is felt, for preventing it, if it is only foreseen. That any such practices have been actually made use of, or are now made use of, is what I shall not pretend to affirm; but I am sure I shall not affirm the contrary. If any such are made use of 1 will, with confidence vindicate his Majesty. I am sure he knows nothing of them. I am sure he will disdain to suffer them; but I cannot pass such a compliment upon his ministers,'nor upon any set of ministers that ever was, or ever will be, in this nation; and therefore, I think I cannot more faithfully, more effectually. serve his present Majesty, as well as his successors, than by putting it out of the power of ministers to gain any corrupt influence over either House of

[PART II. Parliament. Such an attempt may be necessary for the security of the minister; but never can be necessary for, must always be inconsistent with, the security of his master; and the more necessary it is for the minister's security, the more inconsistent it will always be with the king's, and the more dangerous to the liberties of the nation.

To pretend, my Lords, that this bill diminishes, or any way encroaches upon the prerogative, is something very strange. What prerogative, my Lords? Has the crown a prerogative to bribe, to infringe the law, by sending its pensioners into the other House? To say so, is destroying the credit, the anthority of the crown, under the pretence of supporting its prerogative. If his Majesty knew that any man received a pension from him, or any thing like a pension. and yet kept his seat in the other House, he would himself declare it, or withdraw his pension, because he knows it is against law. This bill, therefore, no way diminishes or encroaches upon the prerogative of the crown, which can never be exercised but for the public good. It diminishes only the prerogative usurped by ministers, which is never exercised but for its destruction. The crown may still reward merit in the proper way, that is, openly. The bill is intended, and can operate only a gainst clandestine rewards, or gratuities given by ministers. These are scandalous, and never were, nor will be, given but for scandalous services.

It is very remarkable, my Lords, it is even diverting, to see such a squeamishness about perjury upon this occcasion, amongst those, who, upon other occasions, have invented and enacted multitudes of oaths. to be taken by men, who are under great temptations, from their private interests, to be guilty of perjury. Is not this the case of almost every oath that relates to the collection of the publie revenue, or to the exercise of any office? Is not this perjury one of the chief objections made by the Dissenters against the Test and Corporation Act? And shall we show a less concern for the preservation of our constitution, than for the preservation of our church? The reverend bench should be cautions of making use of this argument; for, if they will not allow us an oath for the preservation of the former, it will induce many people to think they ought not to be allowed an oath for the preservation of the latter.

By this time, I hope. my Lords all the inconvenienees pre tended to arise from this bill, have vanished; and

therefore, I shall consider some of the arguments brought to show that it is not necessary. Here I must observe that most of the arguments made us of for this purpose, are equally strong for a repeal of the laws we have already in being against admitting pensioners to sit and vote in the other House. If it be impossible to suppose, that a gentleman of great estate and ancient family, can, by a pension, be influenced to do what he ought not to do; and if we must suppose, that none but such gentlemen can ever get into the other House, I am sure the laws for preventing pensioners from having seats in that House are quite unnecessary, and ought to be repealed. Therefore, if these arguments prevail with your lordships to put a negative upon the present question, I shall expect to see that negative followed by a motion for the repeal of those laws; nay, in a few sessions, I shall expect to see a bill brought in, for preventing any man's being a member of the other House, but such as have some place or pension under the crown. As an argument for such a bill, it might be said that his Majesty's most faithful subjects ought to be chosen Members of Parliament, and that those gentlemen will always be most faithful to the King, that receive the King's money. I shall grant, my Lords, that such gentlemen will be always the most faithful, and the most obedient to the minister; but for this very reason I should be for excluding them from Parliament. The King's real interests, however much he may be made by his ministers to mistake it, must always be the same with the people's ;but the minister's interest is generally distinct from, and often contrary to both therefore, I shall always be for excluding, as much as possible. from Parliament, every man who is under the least inducement to prefer the interest of the minister, to that of both king and people; and this I take to be the case of every gentleman, let his estate and family be what they will, that holds a pension at the will of the minister.

Those who say, they depend so much upon the honor, integrity and impartiality of men of family and fortune, seem to think our constitution can never be dissolved, as long as we have a shadow of a Parliament. My opinion, my lords, is so very different. that, if ever our constitution be dissolved, if ever an absolute monarchy be established in this kingdom, I am convinced it will be under that shadow. Our constitution consists in the Houses of Parliament be

ing a check upon the crown, as well as upon one another. If that cheek should ever be removed, if the crown should, by corrupt means, by places, pensions and bribes, get the absolute direction of our two houses of Parliament, our constitution will from that moment, be destroyed. There would be no occasion for the crown to proceed any farther. It would be ridiculous to lay aside the forms of Parliament; for under that shadow, our king would be more ahsolute, and might govern more absolutely, than he could do with. out it. A gentleman of family and fortune, would not, perhaps, for the sake of a pension, agree to lay aside the forms of government; because, by his venal service there, he earns his infamous pension, and could not expect the continuance of it, if those forms were laid aside; but a gentleman of family and fortune may, for the sake of a pension, whilst he is in Parliament, approve of the most blundering measures, consent to the most excessive and useless grants, enact the most oppressive laws, pass the most villanous accounts, acquit the most heinous criminals, and condemn the most innocent persons, at the desire of that minister who pays him his pension. And if a majority of such House of Parliament consisted of such men, would it not be ridiculous in us to talk of our constitution, or to say we had any liberty left.-This misfortune, this terrible condition, we may be reduced to by corruption; as brave, as free a people as we; the Romans, were reduced to it by the same means; and to prevent suck a horFid catastrophe, is the design of this bill.

If people would at all think, if they would consider the consequences of corruption, there would be no occasion, my Lords, for making laws against it. It would appear so horrible, that no man would allow it to approach him. The corrupted ought to consider, that they do not sell their vote, or their country only; these, perhaps, they may disregard; but they sell likewise themselves; they becomie the bond slaves of the corrupter, who corrupts them, not for their sakes, but for his own. No man ever corrupted. another, for the sake of doing him a service. And therefore, if people would but consider, they would always reject the offer with disdain. But this is not to be expected. The histories of all countries, the history even of our own country, shows it is not to be depended on. The proffered bribe, people think, will satisfy the immediate craving of some infamous appetite; and this makes them swallow