servative senate. These promises, however, proved entirely elusory. The victory of Friedland saved the new conscripts from the slaughter of the Russian bayonets, only to reserve them for the Caudine forks, or the murder of the guerillas in the fields of Spain. 86. Meanwhile the prodigious activity of the Emperor was employed, during the cessation of hostilities in Poland, in the most active measures to repair his losses, organise the new levies, wring the sinews of war out of the conquered provinces, and hasten forward the conscripts as fast as they joined their depots on all the roads leading to the theatre of war. All the highways converging from France and Italy to the Vistula were covered with troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all sorts, for the use of the army. Extensive purchases of horses in Holstein, Flanders, and Saxony, provided for the remounting of the cavalry and the artillery-drivers; while enormous requisitions everywhere in Germany, furnished the means of subsistence to the unwieldy multitude who *The requisitions from the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns will give an idea of the almost incredible extent to which these exactions were carried by Napoleon at this time; and of the blind violence with which he pursued the English commerce at the very time that it had become, from his own acts, indispensable for the equipment of his troops. By an imperial decree, in March 1807, Hamburg was ordered to furnish 200,000 pairs of shoes; M. Bourrienne, the resident at Hamburg, who was charged with the execution of this order, had no alternative but to contract with English houses for these enormous supplies, which all the industry of the north of Germany could not furnish within the prescribed time; and as the same necessity was felt universally, the resuit was, that when the Grand Army took the field in June, it was almost all equipped in the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and that too at a time when the penalty of death was affixed to the importation of English manufactures of any sort! A full enumeration of all the contributions levied on Germany during the war of 1807, will be given in a succeeding chapter, drawn from official sources: the magnitude of them almost exceeds belief.-See BOURRIENNE, vii. 293, 294. were now assembled on the shores of the Vistula. Nay, so far did the provident care of the Emperor go, and so strongly did he feel the imminent danger of his present situation, that, while his proclamations breathed only the language of confidence, and spoke of carrying the French standards across the Niemen, he was in fact making the most extensive preparations for a defensive warfare, and anticipating a struggle for life or death on the banks of the Rhine. By indefatigable exertions, and forcing up every sabre and bayonet from the rear, he was ere long enabled to calculate on eighty thousand combatants ready for action on every point which might be threatened on the Passarge: but this was all he could rely on out of three hundred and thirty thousand French and their allies, who formed, or were marching to reinforce, the Grand Army. No less than sixty thousand were in hospital, or had become marauders, and had never rejoined their colours since the desperate shock at Eylau. All the fortresses on the Rhine and on the Flemish frontier were armed, and put in a posture of defence. The new levy was directed to be placed in five camps, to cover the most unprotected points of the territory of the empire; while the whole veterans in the interior were called out and organised into battalions with the coastguard, to protect the coasts of Flanders and the Channel, and overawe the discontented in Brittany and La Vendée. "It is necessary, said he, "that at the sight of the triple barrier of camps which surround our territory, as at the aspect of the triple line of fortresses which cover our frontier, the enemy should be undeceived in their extravagant expectations, and see the necessity of returning, from the impossibility of success, to sentiments of moderation." 87. Neither Napoleon nor his enemies were mistaken in the estimate which they formed of the perilous nature of the crisis which succeeded the battle of Eylau. Nothing can be more certain than that a second dubious encounter on the Vistula would have been immediately followed by a disas trous retreat beyond the Rhine. Metternich afterwards said to the ministers of the French Emperor, "We can afford to lose many battles, but a single defeat will destroy your master ;" and such, in truth, was the situation of France during the whole reign of Napoleon. It is the precarious tenure by which power is held by all those who rest for their support upon the prestige of opinion or the fervour of passion, whether democratic or military, which is the secret cause of their ultimate fall. Constant success, fresh victories, an unbroken series of triumphs, are indispensable to the existence of such an authority. It has no middle ground to retire to, no durable interests to rouse for its support; it has perilled all upon a single throw; the alternative is always universal empire or total ruin. This was not the case in a greater degree with Napoleon than any other conqueror in similar circumstances. It obtained equally with Cæsar, Alexander, and Tamerlane; it is to be seen in the British empire in India; it is the invariable attendant of power in all ages, founded on the triumphs of passion over the durable and persevering exertions of reason and interest.* It is a constant sense of this truth which is the true key to the character of Napoleon, which explains alike what the world erroneously called his insatiable ambition and his obstinate retention of the vantage-ground which he had gained; which was at once the secret reason of his advance to the Kremlin, and of his otherwise inexplicable stay at Moscow and Dresden. He knew that, throughout his whole career, he could not retain except by constantly advancing, and that the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin. manner to the interests of their own monarchy, which resulted from the disgraceful capitulations of the Prussian fortresses in the preceding autumn. When the balance quivered at Eylau, the arrival of Lestocq would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for the great successes of Davoust on the left, and the tardy appearance of Ney on the right. Whereas, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder had done their duty, these two corps would have been engaged far in the rear-Ney around the walls of Magdeburg, Davoust before Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau. Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants, held out after fifty days of open trenches against two French corps; Tarragona fell after as many. If the French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six weeks, before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been gained to organise the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoleon to a disastrous retreat from the Vistula-a striking proof of the danger of military men mingling political with warlike considerations, or adopting any other line, when charged with the interests of their country, than the simple course of military duty. 89. Benningsen's assembling of his army in silence behind the dark screen of the Johansberg forest; the hardihood and resolution of his winter march across Poland; and his bold stroke at the left wing of the French army when reposing in its cantonments, were entitled to the very highest praise, and if executed with more 88. The Polish winter campaign vigour at the moment of attack, would demonstrates, in the most striking have led to the most important remanner, the ruinous effects to the sults. His subsequent retreat in precommon cause, and in an especial sence of the Grand Army, without *When Lord Ellenborough gave his con- any serious loss, and the desperate sent to the second advance of the British to stand he made at Eylau, as well as the Cabul, in 1841, under Generals Nott and Pol- skill with which the attacks of Nalock, he said in his despatches to these gene-poleon were baffled on that memorable rals, "Recollect, a second disaster like that of the Coord-Cabul Pass will lose us our In- field, deservedly place him in a very high rank among the commanders of dian Empire. that age of glory. Napoleon's ad-rienced were sustained; the Russians vance to Pultusk and Golymin, and fronted quickly and fought desperately subsequently his march from Warsaw on every side, and from the hazardous towards Königsberg, in the depth of game the assailant suffered nearly as winter, were distinguished by all his much as the retiring party. A striking usual skill in combination and vigour proof of what so many other events in execution; but the results were during the war conspired to demonvery different from what had attend- strate, that a certain degree of native ed the turning of the Austrian and resolution will often succeed in foiling Prussian armies at Ulm and Jena. the greatest military genius, and that Columns were here cut off, communi- it was as much to the want of that cations threatened, corps planted in essential quality in his opponents, as to the rear, but no tremendous disasters his own talents, that the previous such as had previously been expe- triumphs of Napoleon had been owing. CHAPTER XLV. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR FOX'S ADMINISTRATION. 1. IF history were composed merely of the narrative of wars and campaigns, it would, how interesting soever to the lovers of adventure, or important to those intrusted with the national defence, be justly subject to the reproach of being occupied only with the passions and calamities of mankind. But even in the periods when military exploit appears to be most conspicuous, and battles and sieges seem to occupy exclusively the attention of the historian, great and important civil changes are going forward; and the activity of the human mind, aroused by the perils which prevail, and the forcible collision of interests and passions which is induced, is driven into new channels, and turned to the investigation of fresh objects of thought. It is the tendency of those periods of tranquillity, when no serious concerns, whether of nations or individuals, are at stake, to induce a state of torpor and inactivity in the national dispositions. Mankind repose after their struggles and their dangers; the arts of peace, social interests, the abstract sciences, are cultivated; the violent passions, the warm enthusiasm, the enduring fortitude of former days, pass into the page of history, and excite the astonishment or provoke the ridicule of their pacific successors. Such a period is, of all others, the most conducive to general happiness; but it is far from being that in which the greatest and most original efforts of human thought are made. Selfishness, like a gangrene, then comes to overspread the state, and generosity of feeling, equally with elevation of thought, are lost in the pursuit of private interest. The age of the Antonines in ancient, the era of the Georges in modern times, were unquestionably those when the greatest sum of general happiness prevailed in the Roman and British empires; but we shall look in vain in the authors or statesmen of either for the original thought, vigorous expression, or disinterested feeling, which characterised the stormy periods of Cæsar and Pompey, of Cromwell and Napoleon. 2. The accession of the Whig ministry to the direction of affairs was an event eminently calculated to afford full scope for the practical application, | which can exist in a free country are to the measures of the legislature, of altogether unequal to those which are those ideas of social improvement which at the command of a despotic one, the agitation and excitement of the pre- whether monarchical or democratic, ceding fifteen years had caused to take unless in those rare periods of public deep root among a large proportion ofthe excitement when the intensity of patrithinking part of the people. The men otic feeling supplies the want of powers who had now succeeded to the helm em- of compulsion on the part of the exebraced a considerable part of the aristo- cutive. Accordingly, throughout the cracy, much of the talent, and still more whole war, great difficulty had been of the philanthropy of the state. For a experienced by the British government long course of years they had been ex-in providing a proper supply of solcluded from power; and during that time they had been led, both by principle and interest, to turn their attenion to those projects of social amelioration which the French Revolution had rendered generally prevalent among the democratic classes, and which were in an eminent degree calculated to win the affections of the popular party throughout the kingdom. The period, therefore, when the leaders, by their installation in power, obtained the means of carrying their projected changes into effect, is of importance, not merely as evincing the character and objects of a party justly celebrated in English history both for their talents and achievements, but as illustrating the modification which revolutionary principles receive when adopted by the highest class of persons, long trained to the habits and speculations of a free country. 3. The composition of the army was the first matter which underwent a thorough discussion, and was subjected to a different system, in consequence of the accession of the new administration. Notwithstanding the uniform opposition which the Whigs had offered to the war, and the censures which they had in general bestowed upon all Mr Pitt's measures for increasing the naval and military establishments of the country, it had now become painfully evident, even to themselves, that the nation was involved in a contest, which might be of very long duration, with a gigantic foe, and that the whole resources of the country might be speedily required to combat for the national existence with the veteran legions of Napoleon on the shores of Britain. The means of recruiting diers for the regular army. The only method pursued was voluntary enlistment-the jealousy of a free constitution not permitting a conscription, except for the militia, which could not legally be sent out of the kingdom— and the success of the attempt to extend this system to the raising of troops of the line by balloting for fifty thousand men to compose the army of reserve, in 1803, had not been such as to hold out any inducement for a repetition of the attempt. It had not produced thirty-five thousand effective soldiers, though fifty thousand had been the number voted by parliament, and ordered to be raised. Enlistment for life was the system universally pursued-it being thought that in a country where the pay of the soldier was necessarily, from the expense of the establishment, less than the wages of ordinary workmen, to allow a power of retiring after a stated period of service was over might endanger the state, by thinning the ranks of the army at the most critical periods. To this point the attention of former administrations had frequently been directed, and a recent change had been made by Mr Pitt, which had considerably increased the annual supply of recruits by enlistment. But the new ministry introduced at once a total change of system, by the introduction of enlistments for a limited period of service. 4. It was argued in parliament by the supporters of this change, and especially by Mr Windham-" The fate of nations at all times, when contending with one another, has been determined chiefly by the composition of their armies. The times are past, if they ever existed, when one country contended against another by the general strength of its population, when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Armies are now the champions on either side to which the countries engaged commit their quarrel, and when the champion falls the cause is lost. The notion of a levy en masse or voluntary force, therefore, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. In how many instances has it ever happened that, when the army was defeated, the contest has been restored by the efforts of the people at large? The people in mass are like metal in the ore; and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block or divide a plank till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet or a saw, so the strength of a people can never, perhaps, be made capable of producing much effect in war till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that factitious and highly polished instrument called an army. What are the two events which more than any other two have decided the present fate of the world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet what were the numbers there employed, the space occupied, or the lives lost, compared to the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Yet such was the fact; millions hung upon thousands; the battles were lost, and Europe submitted to the conqueror. It was not because there did not exist in those countries, then irretrievably worsted, a brave and warlike people, animated by the strongest feelings of devotion to their sovereign, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these were there; twenty-five millions of men burning with patriotic ardour were around the Emperor; but the regular armies were defeated, and submission was a matter of necessity. 5. "Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but every one seems disposed to forget, the question is, how are they to be obtained? above all, how are we to insure to this country, what unquestionably it has never had, a never-failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers? The nature of things here yields us but the option of two things-choice or force. In the Continental monarchies recourse is usually had to the latter of these modes; and undoubtedly, wherever the power of government is such that it has nothing to do but send its officers forth to seize the peasantry and force them to become soldiers, there can be no process so easy, effectual, and certain. But every one must be conscious that this is a mode of proceeding impracticable, except in extreme emergencies, in this country. Not that the power is wanting in government of ordering such a levy, but that the measures of force we can employ are so abhorrent to public feeling, so restricted and confined by legal forms, that their effect is almost reduced to nothing. Even if it could be enforced, the real character of such a compulsory service is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes—a tax by lot. We hear every day that half measures will no longer suffice, that something effectual must be done; but if from these generalities you descend to particulars, and propose to renew the act for the army of reserve, the feeling is immediately changed, and all declare they are decidedly against any measure of the sort. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies and necessities of the times may drive us; but unless a more urgent necessity is generally felt than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, so injurious in their ultimate results, should not be resorted to till it is proved by experience that all others have failed. 6. "Voluntary enlistment, therefore, is the only resource which remains to us, and yet the experience of thirteen years' warfare has now sufficiently demonstrated that from this source, in the present state and habits of our population, it is in vain to expect a sufficient supply of soldiers. If, however, you cannot change the habits or occupations of your people, what remains to be done but to increase the inducements to enter the army? With |