IN Rules. Shep. Tou. 253. 'N the construction of deeds, there are two forts of General rules; one general, and applicable to every kind of deed: the other particular, and applicable only to fome one kind of deed, or to fome particular part of a deed. Plowd. 154. 160. § 2. With refpect to the first fort, it is a maxim of 1 lnft. 36 a. the highest antiquity in the law, that all deeds fhould be conftrued favourably, and as near the apparent intention of the parties as poffible, confiftent with the rules of law. Benigna funt facienda interpretationes chartarum propter fimplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. § 3. If, 2 Saund. 167. § 3. If, however, the intention of the parties be contrary to the rules of law, it will then be otherwise; for it would be highly improper and inconvenient to permit private perfons to contradict the general rules of law. Thus, if a perfon conveys lands to another and his heirs for 21 years, the executor of the grantee, and not his heir, will be entitled to the land; because it is a rule of law, that a term for years is but a chattel. § 4. Quoties in verbis nulla eft ambiguitas, ibi nulla expofitio contra verba fienda eft. So that, where the intention is clear, too minute a ftrefs ought not to be laid on the strict and precife fignification of words; Ink. 381. according to another antient maxim, qui hæret in litera, hæret in cortice. 1 Intl. 183 a. S 5. Mala grammatica non vitiat chartam ; fo that, neither bad Latin, nor bad English, will make a deed void. § 6. The conftruction ought to be made on the entire deed, and not merely upon any particular part of it. Ex antecedentibus et confequentibus fit optima interpretatio: and, therefore, every part of a deed ought, if poffible, to take effect, and every word to operate. § 7. A deed is always conftrued most strongly against the grantor. Verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem; et qælibet conceffio fortiffime contra donatorem interpretanda eft. For the principle of felfintereft 3 intereft will make men fufficiently careful not to preju dice their own intereft, by ufing words of too extenfive a meaning; and all manner of deceit is hereby avoided in deeds; for men would always affect ambiguous expreffions, if they were afterwards at liberty to put their own conftruction on them. § 8. Where general words ftand alone in a release, unqualified by any recitals, they fhall be conftrued most strongly against the releafor; but where there is a particular recital in a deed, and thofe general words of release are inferted, the generality of the words fhall be qualified by the recital. Handfon, § 9. A releafe was executed in purfuance of an Henn v. award, in which a release of all demands was inferted. It was contended, that the words were fufficient to release a growing rent; but it was determined, that they should not have fo extenfive an effect, because they were qualified by a particular recital. § 10. A diftinction must, however, be made, in cafes of this kind, between an indenture and a deed-poll. For the words of an indenture executed by both parties, are to be confidered as the words of both. But, in a deed-poll, they are the words of the grantor, and shall be taken most strongly against him. § 11. If the words of a deed will bear two different 1 Inft. 42 a fenses, the one conformable to law and juftice, and the other against it, that fenfe fhall be preferred, which is conformable to law and juftice: for it is alfo a maxim VOL. IV. Ee of Idem 183 a. F Inft. 226. Tit. ti. ch.4. Words fometimes rejcaed. Smith v. 3 Atk. 135. of law, quod legis conftructio non facit injuriam. Thus, if a tenant in tail makes a leafe for life generally, it fhall be for the life of the tenant in tail; for, otherwise, it would operate as a wrong. § 12. It is a rule of law, that no man fhall raife a fee-fimple to his own right heirs as purchasers. For, where an ancestor, by any fort of conveyance, appoints that, at his death, his heirs fhall by gift from him come to that very inheritance which the law of defcent cafts upon them, it is conftrued as a vain and fruitless attempt to give that to the heirs, which the law itself vests in them. Thus, Lord Coke fays, if a man make a gift in tail, or leafe for life, the remainder to his own right heirs, this remainder is void, and he hath the reverfion in him. § 13. Where there are any words in a deed that appear to be evidently repugnant to the other parts of it, and to the general intention of the parties, they will be rejected as infenfible: for the words are not the principal things in a deed, but the intent and defign of the parties. S 14. Thus, where lands were limited to the use of A. for 99 years, if he fhould fo long live, and from and after the death of A., or other fooner determination of the estate limited to him for 99 years, to the use of trustees and their heirs during the life of A., to preferve contingent remainders. It was determined by all the Judges of the Court of King's Bench, that the words, "and from and after the death of A." fhould be be rejected as infenfible, and repugnant to the fubfequent words. And this dtermination was affirmed in the House of Lords, by the advice of all the Judges. 6 Bro. Parl. Ca. 351. § 15. An evident omiffion or mistake will be fup- Omiffions plied in a deed: and, therefore, in a cafe, where the supplied. name of the bargainor was omitted in the operative part of a bargain and fale, yet it was fupplied. § 16. Nathaniel Lord Say and Sele conveyed his eftate to B: K. for the purpose of making him a tenant to the præcipe, by a deed of bargain and fale, which was worded in the following manner: "Witneffeth, "that, for and in confideration of 5 s. by the faid B. K. "to the faid Lord S. and S. in hand paid, as alfo for "the cutting off all intails, &c. and for fettling and "affuring the fame to the faid Lord and his heirs, "doth bargain, fell, and confirm, unto the faid "B. K." &c. The Court of King's Bench was of opinion, that this deed paffed the freehold, becaufe fuch was the plain intention of it. Upon a writ of error in the Houfe of Lords, it was contended, that this bargain and fale could not convey any estate, because it was not mentioned therein, that any person did bargain and fell the lands in queftion. There appeared, indeed, the words bargain and fell, but it was not faid who bargained and fold, and, confequently, Lord S. did not bargain and fell. On the other fide, it was argued, that it appeared prima facie E e 2 that |