pofitory for deeds, and to which any perfon may refort, a purchaser ought to fearch, or be bound by notice of the registry, as he would of a decree in equity, or a judgment at law. The courts of equity have, however, adopted a very different conftruction of the regifter acts; and have determined, that the registering a memorial of a fecond mortgage, is not conftructive notice to the firft mortgagee, who may, therefore, advance more money on the first mortgage. Backhoufe, § 12. A. lent money on lands, the mortgage being Bedford v. duly registered, and, afterwards, B. lent money on mortgage on the fame fecurity, and his mortgage was alfo registered: and then A. advanced a further fum on the fame lands, without notice of the fecond mortgage. It was held by Lord Chancellor King, that the registering of the fecond mortgage was not conftructive notice to the first mortgagee before his advancement of the latter fums: for, though the ftatute avoided deeds not registered, as against purchasers, yet it gave no greater efficacy to deeds that were registered, than they had before. § 13. Wrightfon advanced 800 l. on a mortgage in Yorkshire, and registered his mortgage, and, after wards, Hudson lent a fum of money, and took a judgment for it, which was registered; and then Wrightfon advanced 270 1. more, but without any exprefs notice of Hudfon's judgment; though it was argued on a bill, brought by Wrighton to foreclofe, that Hudfen ought Wrightfon v. Morecock v. to redeem upon paying the first mortgage: for that, where fuch registers prevail, every incumbrance fhould be fatisfied according to the priority of its registry; and that the registering of Hudfon's judgment was a conftructive notice to Wrightfon, fufficient to deprive him of the common benefit of a court of equity, where by a first mortgagee without notice is to hold, till fubfequent incumbrances are discharged. Yet it was refolved, that these ftatutes avoid only prior charges not registered, but did not give subse quent conveyances any further force against prior ones registered, than they had before. That, to have affected Mr. Wrightfon, Hudfon ought to have given him notice when he advanced his money, and that though Wrighton might have fearched the register, he was not bound to do it: and, therefore, it was decreed, that Hudson and the mortgagor fhould be foreclosed, unless they paid off both plaintiff's fecurities. § 14. One Wilson being indebted to Morecock, and having taken a new leafe of fome lands, it was agreed by deed, that the leafe fhould ftand as a fecurity for 800l. and intereft; and the deed was registered. Wilson afterwards mortgaged the premises comprised in the leafe to Dickins, for 800 l., and delivered him the leafe. Dickins had no notice of Morecok's fecurity at the time he took the mortgage. Wilfon became a bankrupt; and Morecock filed his bill to be paid the money, agreed to be fecured on the premifes, prior to Dickins's mortgage. mortgage. Dickins filed his bill to be paid his mortgage money, or to foreclofe. The question was, whether Dickins (though he had not actual notice of Morecock's fecurity, at the time he took the mortgage) fhould be affected by a conftructive notice, arifing from the circumstance of the deed being registered at the time. It was admitted by the counsel for Morecock, that Dickins having got the legal intereft, would be entitled to priority, unless he could be affected by notice. That there was no evidence of actual notice: but it was infifted, that the registration was notice of itself; that, to give the register acts its proper and intended effect, the act of registration ought to act as notice; and it was compared to the case of judgments, of which that first docketed fhall have priority. On the other fide, it was argued for the defendant Dickins, that the registry act was made for one fingle purpose, to give preference to a purchase-deed registered, to a prior deed not registered: but the act gives no greater efficacy to deeds which are registered than they had before; and the cafe of Bedford v. Backhouse was cited for that purpose. That, in the prefent cafe, Dickins, having got the legal eftate, was entitled to be paid before a prior equitable incumbrancer, unlefs he was affected notice. That here was no actual notice; and the registration was not conftructive notice, according to the above determination. Lord Lord Camden, Chancellor.-The question is, whe ther registration is prefumptive notice to all mankind. If this was a new point, it might admit of difficulty; but the determination in Bedford v. Backhoufe, feems to have fettled it, and it would be mifchievous to disturb it. The act provides for one fingle cafe only, that is, to make unregistered deeds void against registered deeds; but there is no provifion by the act in a case where all the deeds are registered. And yet it becomes a ferious queftion, whether a court of equity should not fay, that in all cases of registry, which is a public depofitory for deeds, and to which any perfon may refort, a fubfequent purchaser ought not to search or be bound by notice of the registry, as he would of a decree in equity, or a judgment at law. It is a point in which a great deal of property is concerned, and is a matter of confequence. Much property has been fettled, and conveyances have proceeded, upon the Tit. 12. c. 3. ground of that determination. In the case of Vandebendy, in the House of Lords, the doctrine about dower prevailed; because it had been practifed in a course of conveyance. A thoufand neglects to fearch have been occafioned by that determination, and, therefore, I cannot take upon me to alter it. If it was a new case, I fhould have my doubts; but the point is closed by that determination, which has been acquiefced in ever fince. 23. Williams v. 4 Vel. Jun. § 15. In a modern cafe, it has been determined, that the registering an affignment of a mortgage is not notice. S 16. The Notice takes the away Effect of registering. $ 16. The courts of juftice have, in another inftance, confiderably weakened the operation of the register acts, by laying it down as a rule, that, where a subsequent purchaser, whose deed is registered, had notice of a prior incumbrance at the time of his purchase, although the deed, by which fuch prior incumbrance was created, be not registered, fuch prior incumbrance shall, notwithstanding, take place of the deed fo registered: for the object of the register acts Cowp. R.712. being to give notice to fubfequent purchasers, if a fubsequent purchaser has notice, at the time of his purchase, of a prior conveyance, then it is not a fecret conveyance by which he can be prejudiced, but he is in the fame fituation as if these acts had never been made for his notice of the prior conveyance is as strong as if it had been registered, and it is his own folly if he proceeds in his purchase. Lord Forbes v. Deniston, 4 Bro. Parl. S 17. The firft cafe on this fubject arofe in Ireland, where there is a general register act, fimilar to those which have been mentioned. Lord Granard being Ca. 189. tenant for life, remainder to his firft and other fons, with power of leafing, granted a leafe for three lives, at the rent of 30l. per annum; but it was not registered. His Lordship, being greatly in debt, came to an agreement with Lord Forbes his eldeft fon, by the agency of Mr. Stewart, to fell him his life eftate, upon Lord Forbes paying his father's debts, and securing him an annuity, and a jointure to his wife. The eftate was accordingly conveyed to two perfons, in trust for Lord Forbes and it was proved that, during the treaty for the purchase, Mr. Stewart, Lord Forbes's agent, VOL. IV. A a had |