As to the second objection, they held, that though this rent was to be paid futurely, yet it was a prefent duty, and the obligation to pay it was prefent, for the words, yielding and paying, make a covenant: and North faid, that where things are done in the fame inftant, they would transpose them, and suppose a precedency, it being to fupport common affurances, and fo they might fuppofe the covenant to pay rent, to precede the raising of the use, and then the confideration would be executed. North alfo faid, he had known it ruled several times, that a lease and release in the fame deed was a good conveyance, for priority fhould be fuppofed. As to the third, they all held that the value of the confideration was not material, for it was usual, if an estate was of the value of a thousand pounds a year, to make five fhilings the confideration in a bargain and fale for a year; and by Porter's cafe, 1 Rep. 24. a penny was fufficient to alter the use of a feoffment, and to cause the feoffee to be feised to his own ufe. Judgment was given that the word, grant, would make the land pafs by way of ufe, and that the refervation of a pepper corn was a fufficient confideration 2 Mod. 253. to raise a use. § 14. There is no neceffity for expreffing any confideration in a deed of release to a bargainee for years, because such release is a common law conveyance. § 15. In error upon a judgment given in the Court of Common Pleas, the cafe was, that Thomas Afbby 3 Shortridge v. 2 Ld. Ray. demised 798. A Leafe and not deveft an S. 6oo. Willes R.383. Whether a a Leafe and Release. demised the premises in queftion to John Griffith, for fixty-one years, referving rent. That afterwards faid Thomas Afbby, by indenture dated 28th September, in confideration of five fhillings, bargained and fold the premises, to Sir William Meadows and others, for one year, and by indenture dated 29th September, he released and confirmed the faid premises, to faid Meadows and others in fee. It was contended that this reverfion did not pass to the releasees, because there was no confideration expreffed in the release, nor any ufe declared of it. But all the court held that the eftate was well vested in the releafees; though no confideration was expreffed in the release. § 16. A conveyance by leafe and release does not devest any estate, or create a difcontinuance or forfeiture. For Littleton fays-" By force of a release "nothing shall pass but the right which he may law"fully and rightfully release, without hurt or damage to other persons who fhall have right therein after "his decease." 66 S 17. It appears to have been doubted, whether Ufe refults on there can be a refulting ufe upon a conveyance by lease and release. In the cafe of Shortridge v. LumpTit. 11. c. 4. leigh, it was held that if a leafe and release was pleaded to A. and his heirs, and no confideration appeared, nor faid to whofe ufe, it fhould be intended to be to the use of the releafee, and Mr. Juft. Powell 16. 2 Ld. Ray. 798. 2 Salk. 678. 7 Mod. 76. faid, he was not fatisfied that the nature of the conveyance would admit of a refulting ufe, though it was a conveyance much used to raise uses upon, to a third perfon, by exprefs words, yet in ftrictness it was a common law conveyance. And if a leafe were made for forty years, and a release thereupon without con fideration, or limiting of any uses, it could not be intended to be to the use of the leffor, for the very extinguishing the estate of the leffee was a good confideration. § 18. Without questioning the cafe put by Mr. Justice Powell, it may be fairly contended, that in the case of a bargain and fale for a year only, and for a nominal confideration, with a release thereon, without any confideration, the use would refult to the original owner, if no ufe was declared. For the extinguishment of a term for one year could not be demed a confideration; and therefore there could be no ground for contending against the use resulting in this cafe, as well as upon a feoffment. And the Lord Ch. Just. and Powell agreed, that if there were a particular ufe limited on a release, the reft would refult. S 19. In cafes of conveyances to ufes under the statute, it is faid that the poffeffion of the deeds appertains to the feoffees, and not to the ceftui que use, because the poffeffion of the deeds originally belonged to the feoffees to uses, in order to enable them to defend the title to the land; and although the ftatute of ufes transfers the legal eftate to the ceftui que ufe, yet it does not transfer the deeds; but this doctrine seems Idem. To whom the belong. Title Deeds I Inft. 6 a. B. 4. very questionable, as feoffees to uses have now only a feifin of an inftant, and are never called upon to defend the land. And it seems reasonable to suppose, that where a statute transfers the legal feifin of lands from one person to another; it should also transfer the title deeds of fuch lands, as they must be totally ufelefs in the hands of a perfon who has no connexion with the estate, WITH refpect to conveyances derived from the Origin and ftatute of uses, which are faid to operate by tranfmutation of poffeffion, they derive their effect from the following principles. Nature of. f. 12. Where lands are conveyed by feoffment, fine, or Tit. 11. c. 4. recovery, the legal feifin and estate becomes vefted by these conveyances in the feoffee, cognizee or recoveror. But if the owner of the estate declares his intention, that fuch feoffment, fine, or recovery, fhall enure to the ufe of a third perfon, a ufe will immediately arise to such third perfon, out of the feifin of the feoffee, cognizee, or recoveror, and the ftatute will transfer the actual poffeffion to fuch ufe, without any entry or claim. § 2. The |