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Illustrations.

[(1.) 1 A's wife in A's absence receives stolen potatoes knowing them to be stolen. The jury find that A "afterwards adopted his wife's receipt." This finding is not sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty, as it is con. sistent with A's having passively consented to what his wife had done without taking any active part in the matter.

(2.) A's wife in A's absence receives stolen goods and pays the thief 6d. on account. The thief then tells A, who strikes a bargain with the thief, and pays him the balance. A has received stolen goods knowing them to be stolen.

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(3.) B steals C's property. C finds it in B's pocket, restores it to B, and tells B to sell it at the same place where he has sold other property of C's. B sells it to A, who knows that it has been stolen. A commits no offence, as the property after being stolen has got into the owner's hands.

(4.) B steals goods from a railway to which they have been bailed. B then sends the goods to A by the same railway. A receives them, knowing them to have been stolen, from the railway porter. A policeman employed by the railway discovers, whilst the goods are in transit, that they have been stolen, and causes them to be delivered to A in order to detect them. A has committed no offence under this article.]

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5 ARTICLE 486.

RECEIVING PROPERTY FELONIOUSLY OBTAINED.

Every one is guilty of felony and liable to fourteen years' imprisonment who receives any chattel, money,

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1 [R. v. Dring, D. & B. 329.

2 R. v. Woodward, L. & C. 122. A husband can receive from a wife who steals on her own account in his absence: R. v. McAthey, L. & C. 250.

3 R. v. Dolan, Dear. 436.

4 R. v. Schmidt, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 15. Erle, C. J., and Meller, J., dissented, on the ground that the company were the innocent agent of the thieves, and that the policeman merely looked at the goods, and took no possession of them.]

5 S. D. Art. 354.

On an indictment for receiving it is necessary to prove possession and guilty knowledge; R.v. Fournier, 10 Q.L. R. 35; and there must be evidence that the goods were stolen, &c.; R. v. Perry, 26 L. C. J. p. 24, R. S. C. c. 164, s. 82; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 91. The enactment which makes stealing by a partner a felony (R. S. C. c. 164, s. 58) is not contained in the Act of the United Kingdom 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, but in 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, and it was held that it was not an offence under s. 91 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96 to receive stolen goods, the stealing not being a felony either at common law or under that Act, although it was a felony under 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1; R. v. Smith, L, R. 1 C. C. R. 266. As to 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116 [which makes stealing by a partner, &c., felony, see supra, Art. 375 ;]

valuable security or other property whatsoever, the stealing, taking, extorting, obtaining, embezzling and otherwise disposing whereof amounts to felony, either at common law or by virtue of The Larceny Act, knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen, taken, extorted, obtained, embezzled or disposed of.

1 ARTICLE 487.

RECEIVING PROPERTY OBTAINED BY THE COMMISSION OF
A MISDEMEANOR.

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2 Every one is guilty of a misdemeanor and liable to seven years' imprisonment who receives any chattel, money, valuable security or other property whatsoever, the stealing, taking, obtaining, converting or disposing whereof is made a misdemeanor by The Larceny Act, knowing the same to have been unlawfully stolen, taken, obtained, converted or disposed of.

ARTICLE 488.

RECEIVING PROPERTY OBTAINED BY OFFENCE PUNISHABLE

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ON SUMMARY CONVICTION.

Every one who receives any property whatsoever, knowing the same to be unlawfully come by, the stealing or taking of which property is, by The Larceny Act, punishable, on summary conviction, either for every

[R. v. Smith, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 206, an instructive, but I think a most unfortunate, decision. It is exactly in the same spirit as R. v. Sadi, 1 Lea. 468, in which it was held that to receive a bank note knowing it to be stolen was not felony, because bank notes are not the subject of larceny at common law. See, too, R. v. Robinson, Bell, C. C. 34, Art. 435, Illustration (1).] It is unnecessary to add that as the provisions against stealing by partners and against receiving stolen property occur, in Canada, in the same Act, the case of R. v. Smith would not represent the law here.

1 S. D. Art. 354.

2 R. S. C. c. 164, s. 83; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 95.

3 As to receiving stolen post letters see Art. 403 (h.); and stolen timber, Art. 414.

4 R. S. C. c 164, s. 84: 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 97.

offence, or for the first and second offence only, shall, on summary conviction, be liable, for every first, second or subsequent offence of receiving, to the same forfeiture and punishment to which a person guilty of a first, second or subsequent offence of stealing or taking such property is by such Act liable.

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CHAPTER XLII.

1 FORGERY IN GENERAL.

2 ARTICLE 489.

DEFINITION OF FORGERY-INTENT TO DEFRAUD.

[FORGERY is making a false document, as defined in Article 490, with intent to defraud.

An intent to defraud is presumed to exist if it appears that at the time when the false document was made there was in existence a specific person, ascertained or unascertained, capable of being defrauded thereby, and this presumption is not rebutted by proof that the offender took or intended to take measures to prevent such person from being defrauded in fact; nor by the fact that he had, or thought he had, a right to the thing to be obtained by the false document.

The presumption may be rebutted by proof that at the time when the false document was made there was no person who could be reasonably supposed by the offender to be capable of being defrauded thereby; but it is not necessarily rebutted by proof that there was no person who could in fact be defrauded thereby.

It is uncertain whether, in the absence of any evidence as to the existence of any person who can be defrauded by a false document, an intent to defraud will or will not be presumed from the mere making of the document.

An intent to deceive the public or particular persons, but not to commit a particular fraud or specific wrong

1 [3 Hist. Cr. Law, 180-188.] 2S. D. Art. 355.

3 The wilful alteration, for any purpose of fraud or deceit, of any document or thing written, printed or otherwise made capable of being read, or of any document or thing the forging of which is made punishable by R. S. C. c. 165, shall be held to be a forging thereof; R. S. C. c. 165, s. 3.

upon any particular person, is not an intent to defraud within the meaning of this Article.

1 Illustrations.

(1.) 2 A makes a false receipt, the effect of which, if the receipt were genuine, would be to render B accountable to C for a larger sum than B has in fact received on C's account. A is presumed to have intended to defraud, although the receipt was not used in fact, and was probably not intended to be used in fact for the purpose of increasing B's liability.

(2.) A imitates a Bank of England note with intent to defraud any person to whom it may be passed, but without specially intending to defraud the Bank of England. This is an intent to defraud.

(3.) A makes a false acceptance to a bill of exchange, and puts it in circulation, intending to take it up, and actually taking it up before the bill is presented to the acceptor for payment. This is forgery with intent to defraud.

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(4.) A being directed by his master to fill up a blank cheque with an amount to be ascertained, and to take up a bill with the proceeds, fills it up for a larger amount and keeps the difference on a claim that it was due to him for salary. Here there is an intent to defraud.

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(5.) A pays to his credit at a bank a false promissory note. The bank hold guarantees for a much larger amount. Notwithstanding this, the inevitable conclusion is that he meant to defraud.

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(6.) A signs B's name without his authority to two deeds of transfer of railway shares, by one of which the shares purport to be transferred by C to B, and by the other to be transferred from B to D. The circumstances are such that no one can be defrauded by these deeds. This rebuts the presumption of an intent to defraud raised by the writing of B's name.

(7.) A imitates a cheque in B's handwriting and name on a bank at

See also Illustrations, Art. 490.

2[R. v. Boardman, 2 Moo. & Rob. 147.

324 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 44, would now apply interms to such a case. In R. v. Mazagora ' R. & R. 291, the judges held that the jury ought in such a case to have found an intent to defraud the Bank of England.

4 R. v. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499; and in the case stated by Coleridge, J., in R. v. Todd, 1 Cox, C. C. 57.

5 R. v. Wilson, 1 Den. 284.

6 Compare R. v. James, 7 C. & P. 553, with R. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582-5. I have taken the very words of Patteson, J. "Inevitable conclusion" is a little less strong and distinct than" conclusive presumption of law," an expression which the judge seems to have shrunk from.

7 This is a barely possible supposition, though Cresswell, J., held that it was so in R. v Marcus, 2 C. & K. 356. Rolfe, B., held otherwise in R. v. Hoatson, 2 C. &. K. 777, se e note.

8 R. v. Marcus, 2 C. & K. 356.

9 R. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 499.]