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Illustrations.

[(1.) A and B violently quarrel, and throw bottles at each other at a tavern, A throwing the first bottle. The company interfering, they remain quiet for an hour, B wishing to be reconciled. A refuses, and says he will have B's blood. When B and the rest of the company leave, A calls B back in terms of insult, and fights with him with swords; B is killed. A commits murder, though the fight is on equal terms.

(2.) 2 B strikes A with his fist. A, being the stronger man of the two, throws B down on the ground, and beats out his brains with a poker. A comm ts murder.

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(3.) A and B quarrel and figlit. B, getting the best of the fight, leaves A. A throws a coal-pick at B and injures him, and then wounds him with a knife. B leaves the house, saying to A, "You have killed me." A says to a third person, "I will have my revenge." B returns to the house soon afterwards and A stabs him again and kills him. A has committed murder.

(4.) A is turned out of a house and kicked by B. A runs to his own home, between 200 and 300 yards off, returns with a knife, and meeting B, stabs him after walking quietly with him some yards. A then runs back and puts his knife in its usual place. The deliberation shown in fetching and replacing the knife are facts to be considered by the jury in deciding whether or not A committed the offence whilst deprived of selfcontrol by passion.

(5.) 5 Police-officers in charge of a police-van have in custody D, a person charged with felony under 11 Vict. c. 12. A, B, and C, and others assault the van in concert, rescue the prisoner, and shoot one of the policemen dead with a pistol. The warrant under which D was in custody was informal, but not to the knowledge of A, B, and C. A, B, and C, and the others are guilty of murder, and it would have made no difference if they had known of the irregularity of the warrant.

6 ARTICLE 282.

PROVOCATION TO THIRD PERSON.

7 Provocation to a person by an actual assault or by a

1 [R. v. Oneby, 2 Str. 766; 1 Russ. Cr. 699-700.

2 Per Parke, B. in R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817.

3 R. v. Kirkham, 8 C. & P. 115.

4 R. v. Hayward, 6 C. & P. 157.

This is the case of R. v. Allen and Others, the Fenians, who murdered Brett, the policeman. See Appendix Note IX.]

6 S. D. Art. 226.

7 [1 Russ. Cr. (5th ed.), 704-5. The passage referred to is taken from Hawkins. See Cary's Case (p. 705), which is this: "A and B were fighting in a field in a quarrel. C, A's]

[mutual combat, or by a false imprisonment, is in some cases provocation to those who are with that person at the time, and to his friends who, in the case of a mutual combat, take part in the fight for his defence. uncertain how far this principle extends.

1 ARTICLE 283.

SUICIDE-ABETTING SUICIDE.

But it is

2 A person who kills himself in a manner which in the case of another person would amount to murder is guilty of murder, and every person who aids and abets any person in so killing himself is an accessory before the fact, or a principal in the second degree in such murder.

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3 ARTICLE 284.

MANSLAUGHTER ON ONESELF.

A person cannot commit manslaughter on himself.

5 ARTICLE 285.

ACCESSORIES BEFORE THE FACT IN MANSLAUGHTER.

It seems that there may be accessories before the fact in manslaughter if the act or omission by which death is

[kinsman, casually riding by and seeing them in fight and his kinsman one of them, rode in, drew his sword. thrust B through and killed him. Coke, C.J., and the rest of the Court agreed that this is clearly but manslaughter in him (i. e. C) and murder in the other for the one may have malice and the other not." I should have said C's offence was infinitely worse than A's, and I do not think this case would be followed in the present day.]

1 S. D. Art. 227.

2 [1 Hale, P. C. 411-419. See R. v. Fretwell, L. & C. 161; R. v. Russell, 1 Moody 356. Draft Code, s. 183.] If two persons enter into an agreement to commit suicide together, and the means employed to produce death prove fatal to one only, the survivor is guilty of murder; R. v. Jessop, 16 Cox, C. C. 204.

3 S. D. Art. 228.

4 [Per Pollock, C.B., and Williams, J., in R. v. Burgess, L. & C. 258, referring to Jervis on Coroners, App. p. 322, note 4.]

S. D. Art. 229.

[caused is not such an act or omission as, but for provocation received by the offender, would have been murder.

Illustration.

1A advises B to give C a strong dose of medicine to make him feel sick and uncomfortable. B does so and C dies. B is guilty of manslaughter, and A is accessory before the fact to manslaughter.

2 ARTICLE 286.

PRESUMPTION THAT KILLING IS MURDER.

3 Every person who kills another is presumed to have wilfully murdered him unless the circumstances are such as to raise a contrary presumption.

The burden of proving circumstances of excuse, justification, or extenuation is upon the person who is shewn to have killed another.]

4 ARTICLE 287.

PUNISHMENT OF MURDER.

5 Every one who commits murder is guilty of felony, and must on conviction thereof be sentenced to death.

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6 ARTICLE 288.

PUNISHMENT OF MANSLAUGHTER.

Every one who commits manslaughter is guilty of

1 [Per Bramwell, B., in R. v. Gaylor, D. & B. 291. The text is stated doubtfully because the question has never been positively decided: Coke (3rd Inst. 55), Hale (2 P. C. 437) and East (1 P. C. 218) say that there can be no accessories before the fact in manslaughter; but the doctrine on the subject is very differently understood in these days. See R. v. Taylor, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 148. That unlawful killing with a deliberate attempt to do slight bodily harm, which happens to cause death, is manslaughter, is a comparatively modern doctrine. By Coke's definition it would be murder. Whatever it is called there may obviously be an accessory before the fact to such an act.]

2S. D. Art. 230.

3 [1 Russ. Cr. 642; R. v. Greenacre, 8 C. & P. 35.]

4 S. D. Art. 231.

5 R. S. C. c. 162, s. 2; c. 181, s. 6; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 1. Draft Code, s. 178.

S. D. Art. 232. [3 Hist. Cr. Law, 78-9. Draft Code, s. 182.]

7 R. S. C. c. 162, s. 5; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 5.

felony and liable to imprisonment for life or to a fine or to both.

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1 ARTICLE 289.

ATTEMPTS TO COMMIT MURDER.

Every one is guilty of felony, and is liable to imprisonment for life who does any of the following things with intent to commit murder; that is to say

(a.) * administers any poison or other destructive thing to any person, or causes any such poisonous thing to be so administered or taken, or attempts to administer it, or attempts to cause it to be so administered or taken;

(b.) by any means whatever wounds or causes any grievous bodily harm to any person;

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(c.) shoots at any person, or, by drawing a trigger or in any other manner, attempts to discharge at any person any kind of loaded arms;

1 S. D. Art. 233.

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2 [For the history of the provisions see 3 Hist. Cr. Law, ch. xxvii. pp. 108-120. Draft Code, s. 179.]

3 R. S. C. c. 162, ss. 8-12; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 11-15.

4 R. S. C. c. 162, ss. 8, 11; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 11, 14.

5 R. S. C. c. 162, s. 8; [24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 11. In R. v. Gray, D. & B. 303, it was held that to cause congestion of the lungs by exposing a child in a field was not causing 44 a bodily injury dangerous to life" within 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, but such a case would now fall under clause (h.), s. 15. See remarks of Cockburn, C.J., p. 306.]

mean

R. S. C. c. 162, s. 11; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 14. [The words " any other manner any other manner like drawing a trigger, e.g. applying a lighted match to a matchlock, or striking a percussion cap with a hammer; see R. v. St. George, 9 C. & P. 483, and R. v. Lewis, 9 C. & P. 523. These cases have been doubted by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved; see R. v. Brown, L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 381. In this case a man was tried for attempting to commit murder by drawing a pistol from his pocket for the purpose of committing murder with it, but his hand was seized. I held this to be an attempt to commit murder by means other than those specified in clauses (a.)-(g.); but, on the authority of R. v. St. George, that it did not constitute an offence under clause (h,), the Court held that clause (h.), s. 15, applied only to cases other than those specified in clauses (a.)(g.), s. 14, but ejusdem generis as for instance trying to push a man off a cliff or under a railway train; but that it did not apply to extend s. 14. I agreed in this view. The Court thought that R. v. St. George ought to be reconsidered, and inclined to the view that if I had held otherwise in R. v. Brown my ruling would have been upheld.]

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7" Loaded arms means arms loaded in the barrel with gunpowder or any other explosive substance, and ball, shot, slug, or other destructive material, or charged with compressed air and having ball, shot, slug or other destructive material in the barrel, although the attempt to discharge the same may fail; R. S. C. c. 162, s. 1; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 19.

(d.) 1attempts to drown, suffocate, or strangle any

person;

(e.) 2 destroys or damages any building by the explosion of gunpowder or other explosive substance;

(f) 3 sets fire to any ship or vessel or any part thereof, or any part of the tackle, apparel, or furniture thereof, or to any goods or chattels being therein;

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(g.) casts away or destroys any vessel;

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.) or who attempts to commit murder by any means other than those specified in clauses (a.)-(g.), both inclusive.

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5 ARTICLE 290.

ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT TO MURDER.

Every accessory after the fact to murder is liable to imprisonment for life.

7 ARTICLE 291.

THREATS AND CONSPIRACIES TO MURDER.

Every one is guilty of felony and liable to ten years' imprisonment who,

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(a. maliciously sends, delivers or utters, or directly or indirectly causes to be received, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or writing threatening to kill or murder any person; or

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(b.) conspires, confederates or agrees with any person

1 R. S. C. c. 162, s. 11; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 14.

2 R. S. C. c. 162, s. 9; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 12. R. v. St. George, 9 C. & P. 483; 1 Russ. Cr. 953.

3 R. S. C. c. 162, s. 10; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 13.

R. S. C. c. 162, s. 12; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 15. [This does not apply to attempts to commit suicide; R. v. Burgess, L. & C. 258.]

5S. D. Art. 233 (i.)

"R. S. C. c. 162, s. 4; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 67.

7S. D. Art. 234.

8 R. S. C. c. 173, s. 7; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 16.

R. S. C. c. 162, s. 3; 24 & 25 Vict, c. 100, s. 4.

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