[handed a board to B, who in C's presence fixed it in a tree, and th fired at it at a distance of 100 yards, taking no precautions to pr mischief to persons in the neighborhood. One of the shots killed a in a tree about 200 yards behind the target. All were held guilty of slaughter.

1 ARTICLE 273.

DUTY OF PERSONS DOING ACTS REQUIRING SPECIAL SK OR KNOWLEDGE.

2 It is the legal duty of every person who undertai (except in case of necessity) to administer surgical medical treatment, or to do any other lawful act of dangerous character, and which requires special kn ledge, skill, attention, or caution, to employ in doing. common amount of such knowledge, skill, attention caution.]

1 S. D. Art. 217.

2 [R. v. St. John Long, 4 C. & P. 404. (Per Garrow, B.) As to caution see R. v. S Long, 2nd case, 4 C. & P. 440; see other cases collected in 1 Russ. Cr. (5th ed.) -664-7" Code, s. 162.]

[omission, but for which the person killed would not have died when he did, and which is directly and immediately connected with his death. The question whether a given act or omission is directly and immediately connected with the death of any person is a question of degree dependent upon the circumstances of each particular case.

(SUBMITTED.) But the conduct of one person is not deemed for the purposes of this Article to be the cause of the conduct of another, if it affects such conduct only by way of supplying a motive for it, and not so as to make the first person an accessory before the fact to the act of the other.

This Article is subject to the provisions contained in the next two Articles.

[discussion is introduced on the distinction between causes and conditions: a distinction of which Dr. Wharton maintains, and of which Mr. Mill (see his Logic, vol. i. p. 398, &c.) denies, the solidity. For practical purposes, I think the Article in the text is sufficient, and if this were the proper place, I should be disposed to discuss some of Dr. Wharton's positions. The latter part of the Article and the Illustration (6) intended to explain it, must, I think, be law; but I know of no direct authority on the subject. The maxim "In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur" has no doubt a bearing on the subject (see Bacon's Maxims, 35-9, and Broom's Maxims, 216-30), but it is very vague. Lord Bacon says it does not apply to "criminal acts except they have a full interruption." His illustration is,-A fires a pistol at B, and misses him, and runs away. B pursues A. A stabs B with a dagger. "If the law should consider the last impulsive cause, it should say it was in his own defence, but the law is otherwise, for it is but a pursuance and execution of the first murderous intent." Surely in this case the stab is the immediate cause of B's death; A's state of mind is another matter, and is to be inferred from facts. The law as to accessories and incitement appears to show the limit to which participation in a crime can be carried. Unless the line is drawn there it is impossible to say how far it would extend. 1llustration (6) is a prosaic version of Othello. Iago, however, in Act iv. sc. 1, says when asked to give poison, "Do it not with poison, strangle her in her bed." This would clearly make him an accessory. To take a humbler instance, the catastrophe of Oliver Twist might, perhaps, fall within Illustration (6). In ch. xlvii. of that work, Fagin, after getting Sikes to say he would murder any one who should betray him, wakes up Noah Claypole and makes him tell Sikes that the girl Nancy had betrayed him, and, as Sikes rushes out in a passion, says, " You won't be too violent, Bill; I mean not too violent for safety." I think that the whole conversation taken together would be evidence to go to a jury, that Fagin did "counsel " or "procure" the murder committed by Sikes, which would make him an accessory before the fact, but if he had confined himself to merely telling Sikes what Claypole said he had heard, it would not have been enough. After all there was only the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to prove what he said, and Claypole does not seem to have been by when the most damaging words were spoken.]

1

Illustrations.

[(1.) A substitutes poison for medicine, which is to be administered to C by B. B innocently administers the poison to C, who dies of it. A has killed C.

2

(2.) A gives a poisoned apple to his wife B, intending to poison her. B, in A's presence, and with his knowledge, gives the apple to C, their child, whom B did not intend to poison. Á not interfering, C eats the apple and dies. A has killed C.

(3.) 3 A, an ironfounder, ordered to melt down a saluting cannon which had burst, repairs it with lead in a dangerous manner. Being fired with an ordinary charge, it bursts and kills B. A has killed B.

4

(4.) * A, B, and C, road trustees under an Act of Parliament, and as such under an obligation to make contracts for the repairs of the road, neglect to make any such contract, whereby the road gets out of repair, and D passing along it is killed. A, B, and C have not killed D.

(5.) 5 A by his servants makes fireworks in a house in London contrary to the provisions of an Act of Parliament (9 & 10 Will. 3 c. 77). Through the negligence of his servants, and without any act of his, a rocket explodes and sets fire to another house whereby B is killed. A has not killed B.

(6.) A tells B facts about C in the hope that the knowledge of those facts will induce B to murder C, and in order that C may be murdered; but A does not advise B to murder C; B murders C accordingly. A has not caused C's death within the meaning of this Article.

6 ARTICLE 276.

WHEN AN ACT IS THE REMOTE CAUSE OF DEATH OR ONE OF SEVERAL CAUSES.

A person is deemed to have committed homicide, although his act is not the immediate or not the sole cause of death in the following cases—

(a.) If he inflicts a bodily injury on another which causes surgical or medical treatment, which causes death. In this case it is immaterial whether the treatment was

1 [Donellan's Case. See my Gen. View, Cr. L. 338.

2 Saunders' Case, 1 Hale, P. C. 436.

3 R. v. Carr, 8 C. & P. 163.

R. v. Pocock, 17 Q. B. 34.

R. v. Bennett, Bell, C. C. 1.]

6 S. D. Art. 220.

7 [Hale, 418; Illustrations (1), (2). Draft Code, s. 173.]

[proper or mistaken, if it was employed in good faith, and with common knowledge and skill, but the person inflicting the injury is not deemed to have caused the death if the treatment which was its immediate cause was not employed in good faith, or was so employed without common knowledge or skill.

1

(b.) 1 If he inflicts a bodily injury on another, which would not have caused death if the injured person had submitted to proper surgical or medical treatment, or had observed proper precautions as to his mode of living.

(c.) If by actual violence or threats of violence he causes a person to do some act which causes his own death, such act being a mode of avoiding such violence or threats, which under the circumstances would appear natural to the person injured.

3

(d.) If by any act he hastens the death of a person suffering under any disease or injury which apart from such act would have caused death.

(e.) If his act or omission would not have caused death unless it had been accompanied by the acts or omissions of the person killed or of other persons.

Illustrations.

(1.) 5 A wounds B in a duel. Competent surgeons perform an operation which they in good faith regard as necessary. B dies of the operation, and it appears that the surgeons were mistaken as to the necessity for the operation. A has killed B.

1 [Illustration (3). Draft Code, s. 172.

2 Illustration (4). Draft Code. s. 167.

31 Hale, 428; Illustration (5). Draft Code, s. 171.] A, a practising physician, who kept a hospital for the sick, on three successive days forced the person of B, a patient then under his control in such hospital, she being in a condition of health that rendered sexual intercourse dangerous even with her consent. B died on the sixth day after the last occasion on which she had been ravished, and her death if not caused was hastened thereby. Held sufficient evidence of murder to justify A's surrender under the Ashburton Treaty; In re Weir, 14 O. R. 389.

4 [See Illustrations (6) and (7). See also R. v. Longbottom, 1 Russ. Cr. (5th ed.) 830;3 Cox, 439. R. v. Ledger, 1 Russ. Cr. (5th ed.) 835, 6; and Mr. Greaves' note. This case is a very peculiar one.

5 R. v. Pym, 1 Cox C. C. 339; 1 Russ. Cr. 702.]