superior, or who commits any act of insubordination, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 654. Every parent, guardian, or other person, who upbraids, insults, or abuses any teacher of the public schools, in the presence or hearing of a pupil thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanor. [New section, approved March 30, 1874; in effect July 1, 1874. TITLE XVI. GENERAL PROVISIONS. SECTION 654. Acts made punishable by different provisions of this code. 655. Acts punishable under foreign law. 656. Foreign conviction or acquittal. 657. Contempts, how punishable. 658. Mitigation of punishment in certain cases. 659. Aiding in misdemeanor. 660. Sending letters, when deemed complete. 661. Removal from office for violation or neglect of official duty by public officers. 662. Omission to perform duty, when punishable. 665. Restrictions upon the preceding sections. 666. Second offense, how punished after conviction of former offense. 667. Second offenses, how punished after conviction of attemp to commit a state prison offense. 668. Foreign conviction for former offense. 669. Second term of imprisonment, when to commence. 670. When term of imprisonment commences, etc. 671. Imprisonment for life. 672. Fine may be added to imprisonment. 673. Civil rights of convict suspended. 674. Civil death. 675. Limitations on two preceding sections. 676. Person of convict protected. 677. Forfeitures. 678. Valuation of property to be estimated in gold coin. 654. An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code, may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. In the cases specified in sections 648, 667, and 668, the punishments therein prescribed must be substituted for those prescribed for a first offense, if the previous conviction is charged in the indictment and found by the jury. 1. Increased Punishment.-Sec. 666, n. 1, 667, n. 2. 2. Once in Jeopardy.-Sec. 687, n. 655. An act or omission declared punishable by this code is not less so because it is also punishable under the laws of another state, government, or country, unless the contrary is expressly declared. 1. Crimes, Jurisdiction of.-Sec. 777, n. 1. 656. Whenever on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a criminal prosecution under the laws of another state, government, or country, founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he is on trial, he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a sufficient defense. 1. Once in Jeopardy.-Sec. 687, n. 1. 2. Crimes, Jurisdiction of.--Sec. 777, n. 1. 657. A criminal act is not the less punishable as a crime because it is also declared to be punishable as a contempt. 658. When it appears, at the time of passing sentence upon a person convicted upon indictment, that such person has already paid a fine or suffered an imprisonment for the act of which he stands convicted, under an order adjudging it a contempt, the court authorized to pass sentence may mitigate the punishment to be imposed, in its discretion. 659. Whenever an act is declared a misdemeanor, and no punishment for counseling or aiding in the commission of such act is expressly prescribed by law, every person who counsels or aids another in the commission of such act is guilty of a misdemeanor. 1. Accessories.-Secs. 30, 31, and 32, and notes. 660. In the various cases in which the sending of a letter is made criminal by this code, the offense is deemed complete from the time when such letter is deposited in any post-office or any other place, or delivered to any person, with intent that it shall be forwarded. 1. Extortion.-Sec. 518, n. 1. 2. Threatening Letters. In the case of Rex v. Williams, 2 Camp. 506, where the indictment was for sending a libelous letter, the court said: "There was a sufficient publication in Middlesex, by putting the letter into the post-office there with intent that it should be delivered to the prosecutor elsewhere. Had it never been delivered, the defendant's offense would have been the same." See 2 Whart. Crim. L. (8th ed.), sec. 1666, a. 661. In addition to the penalty affixed by express terms, to every neglect or violation of official duty on the part of public officers, state, county, city, or township, where it is not so expressly provided, they may, in the discretion of the court, be removed from office. 662. No person is punishable for an omission to perform an act, where such act has been performed by another person acting in his behalf and competent by law to perform it. 1. Indictable Omissions.--Sec. 26, n. 12. 663. Any person may be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime intended or attempted was perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt, unless the court, in its discretion, discharges the jury and directs such person to be tried for such crime. 664. Every person who attempts to commit any crime, but fails, or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration thereof, is punishable, where no provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempts, as follows: 1. If the offense so attempted is punishable by imprisoment in the state prison for five years, or more, or by imprisonment in a county jail, the person guilty of such attempt is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail, as the case may be, for a term not exceeding one half the longest term of imprisonment prescribed upon a conviction of the offense so attempted. 2. If the offense so attempted is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for any term less than five years, the person guilty of such attempt is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year. 3. If the offense so attempted is punishable by a fine, the offender convicted of such attempt is punishable by a fine not exceeding one half the largest fine which may be imposed upon a conviction of the offense so attempted. 4. If the offense so attempted is punishable by imprisonment. and by a fine, the offender convicted of such attempt may be punished by both imprisonment and fine, not exceeding one half the longest term of imprisonment and one half the largest fine which may be imposed upon a conviction for the offense so attempted. 665. The last two sections do not protect a person who, in attempting unsuccessfully to commit a crime, accomplishes the commission of another and different crime, whether greater or less in guilt, from suffering the punishment prescribed by law for the crime committed. 666. Every person who, having been convicted of any offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, commits any crime after such conviction, is punishable therefor, as follows: 1. If the offense of which such person is subsequently convicted is such that, upon a first conviction, an offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for any term exceeding five years, such person is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than ten years. 2. If the subsequent offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for five years, or any less term, then the person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten years. 3. If the subsequent conviction is for petit larceny, or any attempt to commit an offense which, if committed, would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years, then the person convicted of such subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years. 1. Increased Punishment.-In People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, it was held, that to subject a person to an increased punishment for a second offense, under this section, was not putting him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Similar decisions have been rendered in other states under like statutes. Rand v. Com., 9 Gratt. 743; Ross' case, 2 Pick. 170; Plumbly v. Com., 2 Metc. 413; see sec. 667, n. 2. At the session of the legislature of 1880, section 969, which pointed out the manner that a former conviction should be pleaded, was repealed. In People v. Carlton, 7 Pac. C. L. J. 108, it was held that the charge of a previous conviction could be made in an information as well as in an indictment, but the way that it should be set forth in an indictment or information, section 969 having been repealed, was not pointed out. In People v. Johnson, Id. 168, notwithstanding the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge of former conviction, it was held proper for the prosecution to ask him on cross-examination, for the purpose of impeaching him, whether he had not been previously convicted of such offense. In People v. Delany, 49 Cal. 394, the defendant pleaded "guilty of the offense charged in the indictment," which charged the offense of petit larceny committed after a previous conviction for petit larceny, and it was held that she must be sentenced for a felony. 667. Every person who, having been convicted of petit larceny, or of an attempt to, commit an offense which, if perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, commits any crime after such conviction, is punishable as follows: 1. If the subsequent offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the court, such person is punishable by imprisonment in such prison during life. 2. If the subsequent offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for any term less than for life, such person is punishable by imprisonment in such prison for the longest term prescribed, upon a conviction for such first offense. 3. If the subsequent conviction is for petit larceny, or for an attempt to commit an offense which, if perpetrated, would be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, then such person is punishable by imprisonment in such prison not exceeding five years. 1. See sec. 666, n. 1. 2. In Ex parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal. 432, this section was held not to be objectionable as an ex post facto law, because the first offense was committed before the section was adopted. The section provides for the punishment of certain offenses, and makes the degree of punishment dependent upon whether the person has ever before been convicted of a similar offense, and it makes no difference whether such first offense was committed prior to adoption of the law or not. "By the rule announced in the code, any person in the situation of the prisoner-that is, any person who had already been convicted of the offense of petit larceny who should again, and subsequently to the taking effect of the code, commit the offense of petit larceny, is to be deemed a felon, and punished by imprisonment in the state prison. The act to be punished is, however, only that act done by the prisoner after the code took effect; and, therefore, in no sense can the code be said to become ex post facto when applied to the case of the prisoner." 668. Every person who has been convicted in any other state, government, or country, of an offense which, if committed within this state, would be punishable by the laws of this state by imprisonment in the state prison, is punishable for any subsequent crime committed within this state in the manner prescribed in the last two sections, and to the same extent as if such first conviction had taken place in a court of this state. 1. Secs. 666, n. 1, 667, n. 2. 669. When any person is convicted of two or more crimes before sentence has been pronounced upon him for either, the imprisonment to which he is sentenced upon the second or other subsequent conviction must commence at the termination of the first term of imprisonment to which he shall be adjudged, or at the termination of the second or other subsequent term of imprisonment, as the case may be. 670. The term of imprisonment fixed by the judgment in a criminal action commences to run only upon the actual delivery |