tion shake in their boots as they reflect on what we might have lost had their former conduct harmonized with their present doctrines. 11. I believe that the final court of adjudication of a physician's right to practice, logically is the State Board, but I believe that the Board should restrict itself absolutely to the question of the candidate's fitness to practice. Sooner or later, somebody will be man enough to fight for his rights. It is nobody's business where, how, at what time of day, in how many hours or from whom one has acquired either a medical or a general education, providing the same can by examination be proven satisfactory. 12. Is it difficult to watch, regulate and control the State Boards? Yes, but not so difficult as it is to watch three times their number of medical schools. 13. I believe that, with non-political, non-oligarchic. properly constituted and operated State boards as the sole test of medical education, well conducted independent colleges would thrive and the "mushroom" institutions would die out. If they did not, no harm would accrue; their defective graduates would never get out of the melting pot. 14. I believe that, as matters now are going, medicine will scon be a rich man's game. Poor boys cannot compete with men who can afford to wait till the age of thirty or thereabouts before making their own way in the world, and I believe in the industrious poor boy in medicine as against the pampered son of the rich. 15. I believe that the time never was more favorable than now for the development of a limited number of prosperous, high grade independent schools of medicine. No business man would ask for a better opportunity to buck a trust than is now being offered by the Medico-Political-Commercial Octopus. I hope that the profession a large will resist to the last extremity the attempt of the Octopus to monopolize medical teaching by stamping out the independent schools of medicine. PROPOSED CHANGES IN REALTY LAW By Frank C. Hackman of the Seattle, Washington, Bar. (Continued from last number.) Continuing the discussion, initiated in the preceding issue of THE Lawyer and BANKER, of proposed reforms in realty law, certain of them remain to be considered. One is that it be made "mandatory" upon a court, when granting a decree of divorce, to adjust and determine all property rights of the parties, and, where real estate is affected, that a record of the decree be required to be made in the office where deeds are recorded. This proposal is said to speak for itself. Does it? Certainly not in respect of what is meant by the words "mandatory" as used. It has been held that courts do not possess authority, in the absence of a statute conferring it, to make awards or division of real property belonging to either party to a divorce suit. But in some jurisdictions courts of equity have assumed the power of restoring to the wife the whole or a portion of the property which by the marriage became vested in the husband, or which belonged to the wife before marriage, but which the husband has secured by unfair means, or which the husband had been aided in acquiring by the earnings or savings of the wife, and in other cases. In many jurisdictions, however, statutes have been enacted which confer authority upon courts, when granting a divorce, to make a division or restoration, of the property of the parties, or which empowers the courts to make such disposition thereof as shall appear from the circumstances of the case to be equitable, just and reasonable. There are also in force statutes which declare the effect of a decree of divorce upon the property of the parties; as, for example, where it is provided that an estate held by husband and wife as joint tenants shall, after divorce, be held by them as tenants in common. Generally, where a decree of divorce makes no disposition of the parties' property rights, their separate property becomes their individual property, and, where the community system prevails community property becomes their common property. Statutes conferring authority upon courts to make awards or divisions of property in divorce suits when sought by either or both parties; or which, in the absence of a voluntary or judicial adjustment, declare the effect of a divorce upon the parties' property, appear to accomplish all that is necessary. The function of a court is to set tle controversies upon issues presented to it. Where the parties to a divorce suit do not make an issue respecting property rights, it does not appear that it should be mandatory upon the court to make any decree concerning them. Without evidence upon the matter any judgment of the court thereon would be an arbitrary and not a judicial act. Statutes governing the recording sysem do not commonly authorize the recordation of judicial decrees, whether rendered in divorce or other suits, in the office where conveyances are recorded. Of course there is no necessity for that kind of a record of a decree in the country in which the suit was prosecuted. But when a decree affects the title to land situate in another or other counties, a certified transcript of it should be admissable to record there, with like necessity therefor and effect as notice that applies to conveyances. Pecuniary judgments are not liens on the debtor's real estate in all states, and where they are the manner in which the lien is effected and its duration varies. Where a judgment is a blanket or general lien on all the real property of the debtor, and particularly where the rule of idem sonans is applied to judgment records, considerable inconvenience and risk of loss is imposed on purchasers, mortgagees and others charged to ascertain the existence or non-existence of judgments against the person with whom they are about to deal. And an owner is also subjected to inconvenience and often expense when he wants to sell or mortgage his own property. He is frequently compelled to prove he is not the person named as debtor in anywhere from one to a hundred or more judgments, The blanket lien system no doubt operates to "smoke out" many a judgment debtor to the benefit of his creditor. But the work of "smoking out" and liability for any accidental or other mistake in the process is imposed upon third parties. It has, therefore, been proposed that the blanket lien system be abolished, and that a judgment creditor be entitled to a lien only on such property of his debtor as he shall describe in a record he be required to make. No doubt this system would eliminate many uncertainties that now exist in addition to achieving the particular result that is sought. Statutes of limitations appear to be highly favored as curative of divers title ills, and the tendency is to multiply their number. Proposals for reform in realty law are, therefore, certain to include one or more limitation measures. And so among the group under consideration is the proposal that a period of ten or fifteen years be adopted as the limitation to an action for the recovery of lands, at least where the existing period is longer, and that there be no exception in favor of minors, the insane, or other persons laboring under disability. The provisions of the statutes of limitations applicable to adverse possession vary greatly among the states, ranging from sixty years in an eastern state to five years in certain western states, while ten years is the bar in possibly one-third of the states, and fifteen years is the bar in nine. Owing to the fact that so large a number of jurisdictions have adopted the term of ten years, that term would seem most feasible for extended adoption, at least by those states having a longer period. And it has been urged that the limitation be without any exception or saving clause of the usual character in favor of those under disability. The gist of the argument in this behalf is that there will thereby be eliminated the uncertainty that such clause injects into titles by limitation, and that the greater security of titles that would be brought about by an absolute limitation is worthy of more consideration than possible instances of hardship that, as a result, may be imposed on minors, the insane and others under disability. One other limitation is included among the measures in the group under consideration,—a limitation of ten years, or a shorter period, after the maturity of a mortgage, as a bar to any recovery on it, unless it be renewed of record. In support of this it has been said that the records in every county are incumbered with old, unsatisfied or unreleased mortgages, which, though discharged in fact in most instances, constitute clouds on the titles they affect, because of doubt and uncertainty as to the fact of full or of partial payment, and that the proposed measure would remedy this difficulty. It is rather odd that in some of the eastern states the records of ancient, unreleased mortgages are common and vexatious problems. The writer has observed that at a meeting in one of these states where the matter mentioned was discussed, quite a number present favored securing the enactment of a statute embodying the suggestion here ander consideration. There appeared, however, to be no agreement as to what period of years would be a proper limitation,-periods ranging from twenty years up to fifty years being advocated. In sharp contrast therewith, the statutes of limitation applicable to mortgages in force in certain states fixes six years from date of maturity. It must be noted that mortgages do not always, at least in some jurisdictions, contain statements of the terms of the obligations they are given to secure, so that the records of such mortgages do not en able one to ascertain their dates of maturity, and, therefore, from what date, in any particular case, the statute of limitation began or will begin to run. It would seem that any notice that may be required by a statutory provision of the kind suggested should be prescribed by the statute as to form and content, and be in the form and nature of a renewal or an extension of the mortgage. If this is not done notices may be recorded that are not of a proper character or type, or which may be indefinite and uncertain, and create only new difficulties. It is manifest from the character of the proposals considered that they have been made with a view to remedying some of the imperfections in record evidence of land titles. They deal with but a few of the host of imperfections that exist, and some of the measures offer but partial remedies, and it is not apparent that all would be universally effective. For example, the proposal that a married person be permitted to convey his or her separate property, as a solution of the problems which records so frequently present as to the marital status of grantors, would not effect that result in some of the states where the community system prevails. It is wholly needless to seek to change the laws of any state governing the property rights of persons merely to effert the solution of some problem in the matter of record titles which those rights may occasion. Indeed, changes for that purpose would be without justification. The property rights of persons should not be framed to fit the recording system, but the latter should be made to accord with the former. So it is wholly needless, for example, to seek to abolish the law, where it exists, requiring the joinder of spouses in the execution of conveyances, and to substitute therefor a law giving full power and control over property to the one or the other spouse, merely because the latter law would do away with record title problems as to the marital status of grantors. There are other solutions. Why not abolish wills because they so frequently contain terms, conditions, etc., which a supreme court alone can interpret with certainty and finality. Some measures, it is well to observe, but substitute new problems for those they are aimed to cure. As an illustration one may take the Arkansas statute quoted in the preceding installment of this article. It provides that the words "trustee," or "as trustee" or "agent" following the name of a grantee "without other language showing a trust, shall not be deemed to give notice to or put on inquiry any person dealing with said land that a trust or agency exists," etc. Clearly, |