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has no power of sale." Geyser-Marion Gold Mining Co. vs. Stark, supra.

Notwithstanding a conveyance is made by a trustee in contravention of the trust, to a purchaser who has notice of the trust, the deed will convey the legal title, and the transaction may be questioned only by the beneficiary and those claiming under him. (In the states where it is provided by statute that a sale in contravention of a trust is void, even the legal title may not pass.)

Robinson vs. Stone, 118 Ala. 273, 72 A. S. R. 160,

45 L. R. A. 66.

Note, 64 Am. Dec. 199.

But what is a man profited if he shall gain the legal title and lose the equitable title?

The law applicable to a purchaser from one whose evidence of title describes him as "trustee" may be summarized as follows:

1. The expressions "trustee" and "as trustee" are of the same cffect.

2. The addition of the word "trustee" does not of itself create a trust.

3. The word "trustee' gives notice that the property may be held

in trust.

4. A purchaser from one described as "trustee' must make inquiry.

5. The inquiry should be made of someone other than the

trustee.

6.

Power in the trustee to sell is not to be inferred.

7. The legal title will pass by the trustee's deed, although made in contravention of the trust (except where changed by statute).

8. The equitable title will not be conveyed or affected by a deed made in contravention of the trust to one who fails to make proper inquiry.

9. Both legal and equitable titles, freed of the trust, will pass to a purchaser who makes proper inquiry without ascertaining that the property is held in trust.

Most of the decisions herein cited are leading cases, appearing in the publications of selected cases with annotations. Many other cases in point may be found through these references.

THE DECADENCE IN LAW BOOKS

By Harry M. Hanson

The glamour of the past has ever had an appeal to man. It bears a close resemblance in character to the camouflage of the present. Both inhere in falsehood. The former was introduced into literature by Sir Walter Scott, the latter into life by the Boch. Our literature is filled with peons of praise for times and things that are past, as contradistinguished from times and things that are present. The Bible speaks of a good old age; the poet praises a good old cause, a good old rule

"A jolly place," he said, "in time of old!

But something ails it now; the spot is cursed."

The times of our fathers are declared superior to the times of today-or "the degenerate days upon which we have fallen;" the good old people of old are represented as better than the good old people of today; the sages of the past as wiser than the savants of today. And thus the pessimist goes on with his enumeration. He echoes the sentiment of William Shakespeare that "the times are sadly out of joint." There is no longer any conscience in business, or any dependence in man. The literature of today is inferior to the literature of the past—and this is undoubtedly true in so far as banal and unintelligible or senseless "free verse" is concerned, which is wholly devoid of beauty or art, music or intelligence, merely striving "for something different," and inane-rigor mortis. The prevailing decline is indicated along all the lines of human activity and conduct of man. The sermons or today are not the inspiring sermons of yesterday; and the law-books of today are not the equals of the law-books of a generation ago. But why complete the enumeration of the jerimaid, for the complaint is the verisimilitude of the wail of the intelligentia of red Bolshevism, whom we are harboring within our hospitable gates. With them nothing that is, is right; everything is open to their condemnation, complaint and criticism; iconoclasm and destruction, is all they know; there is nothing constructive in their work, nothing inspiring in their writings,—simply banal and blatant ignorance or worse. Witness the performance of the thirty melancholy intellectual morons who jumped with both feet upon American civilization recently, in a solemn and pretentious volume issued from a "red" publishing house in New York City!

Is the complaint well-founded; is the pessimism justified; are the gloomy Esserverations true? Much depends upon the wholesome experiences and stand-point, the correct observation and powers of generalization; the breadth of cultured intelligence and sound information of the individual. Are the law-books of today in truth inferior to the law-books of a generation ago? Is all the numerous out-put of the law-press―

"Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks
In Vallombrosa, where th' Etrurian shades

High over-arched imbower,"

to be accounted as negligible spawn? A trade-publication,-the mouth-piece

cf the Law-Book Trust and a propaganda sheet,—which exists for the sole purpose of boosting the law-books and filling the coffers of a great publishing house, has felt itself called upon to make the decadence in law-books the subject of a special article. This would indicate that complaints had reached the counting-house department of the institution, and possibly a falling off in the stream of sheckles that is wont to pour into its coffers. The article, it must be admitted, is on a high plane, unimpassioned, fair and truthful, with nothing remotely hinting at a boost or propaganda. Yet its very existence; the necessity for its existence; bids us take note, pause and consider the question:

Is there in fact a decadence in able and dependable law-books to which the practitioner may resort in assurance and confidence without being deluded and deceived; and if so what is the cause and what the remedy for the evil? General intelligence never stood higher than it stands today; civilization certainly has climbed to a higher rung during the last generation or so; the standard of professional accomplishment and intelligence in this country surely has "hitched up a peg"; our laws never were in a state of more general satisfaction,—if we except the Volstead law; there never were better facilities and opportunities for producing superior and worth-while law-books along all the pathways of the law, than at the present time. If there is in truth a falling-off in quality it can but be due to the "commer cialization" of the law-book business and the "prostitution" of the men following the trade or profession of writing law-books.

To intelligently consider and determine upon the justness of the accusation and complaint, it is necessary to take a brief survey of the books of the law-the English common law and continuation in America; and especially in America since the Revolution and separation from the mother country (the great foundation-head of all things legal with us), and to appraise the character and value of the law-books of former times and the law-books of today as to serviceableness and value,-not overlooking the fact of changed conditions (reforms in the laws) and changed needs. Not all the myriads of sheep-bound volumes strown all along the grand highway of the law need to be looked into and considered; only those of outstanding character and quality epoch-making or epoch-marking books-need be considered as to their character and content; and then strike a balance between the lawbooks of ye olden times and the law-books of today, in an effort to confound or confirm Mr. Pessimist.

(To be Continued.)

COURTS AND THE CONSTITUTION

By Hon. Thomas Dillon O'Brien, former Associate Justice Supreme Court of Minnesota.

The American courts, both state and federal, exercise the right to construe and interpret the Constitution and to say whether an act of Congress or of a legislature is contrary to the fundamental law. This is a tremendously important function, and there have always been those who insisted it was a dangerous power to place under the control of the judiciary.

The opponents of this system say that judges are seldom in touch with the popular will; that they are ultra conservative; that they are almost invariably chosen from corporation lawyers, prejudiced against, or at least indifferent to, public opinion, and that their previous environment and work have unfitted them to sympatahize with the people, or to understand or appreciate the need of progressive legislation. Further, that it makes the Judicial Department superior to the two others, which is of itself, they say, contrary to the Constitution.

As to these general complaints, little need be said. Judges are usually men of mature age, and naturally careful and conservative, but it is not true that they are not in accord with established public opinion or true progress, and above everything they believe in individual liberty.

Lawyers (and judges are lawyers who have graduated) have many sins to answer for, but no one will deny their love of freedom. Edmund Burke, in his speech on conciliation, said the American Colonists were much given to the study of law and that "This study renders men actue, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defense, full of resources."

A lawyer, being constantly called upon to defend the liberty and property of his client, must learn to value personal rights. He must be prepared and ready to face hostile criticism and popular prejudice. He must study history and analyze precedents. He must know men and understand human nature, for his aim is to win men to favor his contentions. He is constantly considering the rights of the individual citizen, and even though while practicing at the bar he may represent a client whose contentions are against the public welfare, once he becomes a member of an independent judiciary, his knowledge and previous study force him to become the protector of individual liberty and the public good.1

1 The American Commonwealth, Bryce, Vol. I. p. 265.

Whether the courts should have jurisdiction to declare legislative enactments repugnant to the Constitution, is the important consideration, and one naturally asks:

Is it necessary for the preservation of the Constitution, that this tremendous power should be held by the courts? In the absence of such power, would the fundamental law gradually be nullified? Would vicious, unfair and partisan legislation appear upon the statute books? Would tyrannical executives usurp arbitrary powers and destroy individual liberty?

Upon our answers to those questions must depend our view as to the wisdom and rightfulness of the judiciary possessing this power.

If we appeal to history, we find all these evil consequences following the lack of a tribunal clothed with just such judicial powers as our courts possess. The Magna Charta of England which, as already said, contained great declarations of human rights, failed for centuries to protect the liberties of the English people, because there was no independent and honest judiciary with power to enforce its provisions.2

Time after time European monarchs have been compelled, through some sudden stress of circumstances, to solemnly promise to refrain from arbitrary action, but, when the stress had passed, they resumed their tyrannical conduct. The lesson of history is unless the power to maintain the principles of liberty is vested in some independent and disinterested tribunal liberty will be destroyed.

If we approve of a written constitution and further deem it wise that its provisions should not be set aside or ignored by the legislature or by any man or body of men except the people themselves in their sovereign capacity as citizens, we must approve of and have a tribunal which has power to say when a legislative or executive act or the act of an inferior court is contrary to the fundamental law.

The provisions of the Constitution are law. A statute passed by a legislature is law. The Constitution is the higher law to which the statute must conform. If the two conflict, there must be some tribunal with power to so declare. The legislature cannot do so, for it has enacted the conflicting statute, and is without power to construe law. The executive cannot, for he is without power to construe law. This leaves only the court ot perform this function, and that department of government, being the one to which the construction of law has been confided, is the only department capable of making the decision.

That our courts are endowed with this power and that its exer2 Hurtado v. People of California, 110 U. S. 516.

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