certain extent; but only in those cases in which | London or New York, because, in the one case, the States themselves, as well as individual citi- it is an act of foreign, and, in the other, of inzens, are subject to the restraints of the higher terstate commerce, both of which are subject to law of the Constitution. And this interference regulation by Congress alone. will be very limited in its operation. It will It would not be difficult, however, to show only prevent the levy of a tax, or the require- that the tax authorized by the State of Tennesment of a license, for making negotiations in see in the present case is discriminative against the conduct of interstate commerce; and it may the merchants and manufacturers of other well be asked where the State gets authority States. They can only sell their goods in Memfor imposing burdens on that branch of busi-phis by the employment of drummers and by ness any more than for imposing a tax on the means of samples; whilst the merchants and business of importing from foreign countries, manufacturers of Memphis, having regular or even on that of postmaster or United States licensed houses of business there, have no occaMarshal. The mere calling the business of a sion for such agents; and if they had, they are drummer a privilege cannot make it so. Can not subject to any tax therefor. They are taxed the State Legislature make it a Tennessee privi- for their licensed houses, it is true; but so, it is lege to carry on the business of importing goods presumable, are the merchants and manufacturfrom foreign countries? If not, has it any bet-ers of other States in the places where they reter right to make it a state privilege to carry on interstate commerce? It seems to be forgotten, in argument, that the people of this country are citizens of the United States, as well as of the individual States, and that they have some rights under the Constitution and laws of the former, independent of the latter, and free from any interference or restraint from them.

side; and the tax on drummers operates greatly to their disadvantage in comparison with the merchants and manufacturers of Memphis. And such was undoubtedly one of its objects. This kind of taxation is usually imposed at the instance and solicitation of domestic dealers, as a means of protecting them from foreign competition.

To deny to the State the power to lay the tax, And in many cases there may be some reaor require the license in question, will not, in any son in their desire for such protection. But perceptible degree, diminish its resources or its this shows in a still stronger light the unconstijust power of taxation. It is very true that if tutionality of the tax. It shows that it not the goods when sold were in the State, and part only operates as a restriction upon interstate of its general mass of property, they would be commerce, but that it is intended to have that liable to taxation; but when brought into the effect as one of its principal objects. And if a State in consequence of the sale they will be State can, in this way, impose restrictions upon equally liable; so that, in the end, the State interstate commerce for the benefit and prowill derive just as much revenue from them as tection of its own citizens, we are brought back if they were there before the sale. As soon as to the condition of things which existed before the goods are in the State and become part of the adoption of the Constitution, and which its general mass of property, they will become was one of the principal causes that led to it. liable to be taxed in the same manner as other If the selling of goods by sample and the emproperty of similar character, as was distinctly ployment of drummers for that purpose, injuriheld by this court in the case of Brown v. Hous-ously affect the local interest of the States, ton, 114 U. S. 622 [29: 257]. When goods are Congress, if applied to, will undoubtedly make sent from one State to another for sale, or, in such reasonable regulations as the case may deconsequence of a sale, they become part of its mand. And Congress alone can do it; for it is general property, and amenable to its laws; pro- obvious that such regulations should be based vided that no discrimination be made against on a uniform system applicable to the whole them as goods from another State, and that they country, and not left to the varied, discordant be not taxed by reason of being brought from or retaliatory enactments of forty different another State, but only taxed in the usual way States. The confusion into which the comas other goods are. Brown v. Houston, qua merce of the country would be thrown by being supra, Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676 subject to state legislation on this subject, would [25: 754]. But to tax the sale of such goods, be but a repetition of the disorder which preor the offer to sell them, before they are brought vailed under the Articles of Confederation. into the State, is a very different thing, and seems to us clearly a tax on interstate commerce itself.

It is strongly urged, as if it were a material point in the case, that no discrimination is made between domestic and foreign drummersthose of Tennessee and those of other States; that all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the difficulty. Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the State. This was decided in the case of The State Freight Tax Cases [supra]. The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another State, for the purpose of introducing them into the State in which the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce. A New Orleans merchant cannot be taxed there for ordering goods from

To say that the tax, if invalid as against drummers from other States, operates as a discrimination against the drummers of Tennessee, against whom it is conceded to be valid, is no argument; because the State is not bound to tax its own drummers; and if it does so whilst having no power to tax those of other States, it acts of its own free will, and is itself the author of such discrimination. As before said, the State may tax its own internal commerce; but that does not give it any right to tax interstate commerce.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is reversed, and the plaintiff in error must be discharged.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite, dissenting: I am unable to agree to this judgment. case, as I understand it, is this:

The

In January, 1879, the State of Tennessee purpose. To all intents and purposes he had abolished the charter of the City of Memphis his goods with him for sale, for what he sold and created the Taxing District of Shelby County was like what he exhibited as the subjects of as its successor. By a statute passed April 4, sale. I am unable to see any difference in prin1881, to provide means for the support of the ciple between a tax on a seller by sample and Taxing District, it was, among other things, a tax on a peddler; and yet I can hardly believe enacted "That all drummers and all persons it would be contended that the provision of the not having a licensed house of business in the same statute now in question, which fixes a Taxing District, offering for sale or selling license fee for all peddlers in the District, would goods, wares, or merchandise therein by sample, be held to be unconstitutional in its applicashall be required to pay to the county trustees tion to peddlers who came with their goods the sum of ten dollars per week, or twenty-five from another State and expected to go back dollars per month, for such privilege; and no li- again. cense shall be issued for a longer period than three months."

As the law is valid so far as the inhabitants of the State are concerned, no inhabitant can Sabine Robbins, a citizen of Ohio, employed engage in this business unless he pays the tax. by the firm of Rose, Robbins & Co., also citi- If citizens of other States cannot be taxed in zens of Ohio, engaged in business as merchants the same way for the same business, there will at the City of Cincinnati, in that State, has been be discrimination against the inhabitants of convicted of a violation of this statute because Tennessee and in favor of those of other States. he solicited trade for his firm in the Taxing This could never have been intended by the District, by the use of samples, without a li- Legislature, and I cannot believe the Constitucense. This it is now decided was wrong, be- tion of the United States makes such a thing cause the statute under which the conviction necessary. The Constitution gives the citizens was had, in so far as it applies to the business of each State all the privileges and immunities in which Robbins was engaged, is a regulation of citizens in the several States; but this cerof interstate commerce, and, therefore, repug-tainly does not guarantee to those who are doing nant to the commerce clause of the Constitution business in States other than their own imof the United States. To this I cannot give munities from taxation on that business to my assent. which citizens of the State where the business is carried on are subjected.

The license fee is demanded for the privilege of selling goods by sample within the Taxing This case shows the need of such authority District. The fee is exacted from all alike who in the States. This Taxing District is situated do that kind of business, unless they have "a on the western boundary of Tennessee. To get licensed house of business" in the District. into another State it is only necessary to cross There is no discrimination between citizens of the Mississippi River to Arkansas. It may be the State and citizens of other States. The tax said to be an historical fact that the charter of is upon the business, and this I have always Memphis was abolished and the Taxing Disunderstood to be lawful, whether the business trict established because of the oppressive debt was carried on by a citizen of the State under of Memphis, and the records of this court whose authority the exaction was made, or a furnish abundant evidence of the heavy taxcitizen of another State, unless there was dis- ation to which property and business within crimination against citizens of other States. the limits of both the old corporation and the In Osborne v. Mobile, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 481 [21: new have been for many years necessarily sub472], it is said "The whole court agreed that jected. Merchants in Tennessee are by law a tax on business carried on within the State, required to pay taxes on the amount of their and without discrimination between its citizens stocks on hand, and a privilege tax besides. and the citizens of other States, might be con- Under these circumstances it is easy to see that stitutionally imposed and collected." And I if a merchant from another State could carry cannot believe that if Robbins had opened an on a business in the District by sending his office for his business within the Taxing Dis- agents there with samples of his goods to secure trict, at which he kept and exhibited his sam-orders for deliveries from his stock at home, ples, it would be held that he would not be liable to the tax; and this whether he stayed there all the time or came only at intervals. But what can be the difference in principle, so far as this question is concerned, whether he takes a room permanently in a business block of the District where, when he comes, he sends his boxes and exhibits his wares, or engages a Toom temporarily at a hotel or private house and carries on his business there during his stay? Or even whether he takes his sample boxes around with him to his different customers and shows his wares from them? In either case he goes to the District to ply his trade and make his sales from the goods he exhibits. He does not sell those goods, but he sells others like them. It is true that his business was to solicit orders for his principals, but in doing so he bargained for them, carried on business for them in the District by means of the samples of their goods, which had been furnished him for that

he would enjoy a privilege of exemption from taxation which the local merchant would not have unless in some form he could be subjected to taxation for what he did in the locality. The same would be true in respect to all inhabitants of the State who were sellers by sample in this District, but who had no place of business there And so they, like citizens of other States, were required to pay for the privilege. Thus all were treated alike, whether they were citizens of Tennessee or of some other State, and under these circumstances I can see no constitutional objection to such a taxation of citizens of the other States for their business in the District.

I have treated the case as a conviction of a "drummer" for selling goods by sample. That is what Robbins was found guilty of, and that is what this statute makes an offense. The li cense is only required of "drummers and all persons not having a licensed house of business in the Taxing District, offering for sale or sell

ing goods, wares or merchandise therein by sample." The Supreme Court of Tennessee decided that this means nothing more than that any person who sells by sample shall pay the tax, and to that I agree. It will be time enough to consider whether a nonresident can be taxed for merely soliciting orders without having samples when such a case arises. That is not this case.

Mr. Justice Field and Mr. Justice Gray concur in this dissent.

GEORGE W. CORSON, Piff. in Err.,

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND.

(From Lawyers' ed. U. S. Reports, Bk. 30, p. 799.) A State cannot levy a license tax or impose any other restriction upon the citizens or inhabitants of other States for selling or seeking to sell their goods in such State before they are introduced

therein.

(Argued and submitted April 5, 1886. Reargument ordered May 10, 1886. Reargued and submitted Nov. 5, 1886. Decided March 7, 1887.)

Md. 251. Reversed.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. Henry D. Loney and S. T. Wallis, for plaintiff in error:

adopt such a system. Action upon it by separate States is not, therefore, permissible." County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691 (26: 238).

Nor is the application of this principle to bevaried or escaped by the substitution of a license for direct taxation of the merchandise sold and transported.

Cook v. Pa. 97 U. S. 570 (24: 1016); Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 678 (25: 755).

The State of Maryland has no more right to tax the goods of a New Yorker, in New York, than those of an Englishman, in London. Nor can the temporary stay or residence of the foreign citizen in Maryland, without change of his residence or place of business, and without any removal of his goods to Maryland, render the taxation of those goods, by the latter State, any that illegal taxation is one of those deprivationsmore allowable. This court has already held of property which are within the scope of constitutional protection.

R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U. S. 7 Wall. 262 (19: 88); State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 300 (21: 179); Hagar v. Recla mation Dist. 111 U. S. 701 (28: 569).

Messrs. Charles B. Roberts, Atty-Gen. of Maryland, and Charles J.M. Gwinn, for defendant in error:

The court of Appeals of Maryland decided, ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the in this cause, that the provisions of the MaryState of Maryland. Reported below, by in this cae, entended by the Maryland Act of 1880, chapter 349, under which the particular indictment was found, required that all persons, whether residents or nonresidents of the State of Maryland, before offering to sell or selling, by sample in that State, packages of tea or other merchandise stored within the limits of any other State, should obtain the license so to do from the State of Maryland, which was required by article 56 of the Code of that State, as amended by the Act of 1880, chapter 349. The construction thus given by the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the scope of the license laws of Maryland, which are in controversy here, is authoritative in this court.

The power of Congress to regulate commerce between the States, whether legislatively exercised or not, in respect to any specific matter in controversy, is held to be exclusive without exception; save in matters of a local character and without any national bearing or application.

Christy v. Pridgeon, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 196,. 203 (18: 322, 325); Aicardi v. State, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 635, 639 (22: 215, 216); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33, 34 (27: 359, 365); Flash v. Conn, 109 U. S. 371, 379 (27: 966, 970).

Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (29: 257). Of course, the case now under consideration belongs to the sphere of national commerce and control, if it is at all within the scope of the constitutional provision. The license here is imposed upon citizens and residents of other States than Maryland, contracting in respect to property situate beyond the limits of Maryland, and to be transported to that State, under the contract, by the usual channels of interstate It is in general within the constitutional commerce. If the legislation impeached inter-power of every State to tax occupations, within feres with the commerce, by which the goods the control of a State, by requiring persons who sold and being in New York are to be trans- wish to pursue them, to obtain, before doing ported to Baltimore, for the purpose of being so, a license from certain designated officers. mingled with the mass of property in Maryland, and before they are so mingled, it is plainly a state regulation of commerce and forbidden by the Constitution.

Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 281 (23: 347, 349).

"Commerce with foreign countries and among the States, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation, and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities. For the regulation of commerce, as thus defined, there can be only one system of rules applicable alike to the whole country; and the authority which can act for the whole country can alone

Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U. S. 8 How. 80 (12: 995); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 278 (23: 348).

Such license is a tax. No employment thus under state control is absolutely exempt from the liability to be thus taxed. "The necessities of the goverment may require that the lowest employment, as well as the most lucrative, shall contribute to its support; and, if any are exempted, motives of policy will govern the discrimination."

Cooley, Tax. 1st ed. 385; Burr. Tax. § 77; License Tax Cases, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 472, 473(18: 501).

The selling of goods by sample within any particular State is conducting a business in

such State. As a business it is subject to taxation, unless there be some constitutional reason exempting it from the burden.

Cooley, Tax. 1st ed. 384; McCulloch v. Md. 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 428, 429 (4: 607); State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 319 (21: 186); Shepherd v. Sumter Co. Comrs. 59 Ga. 535.

The provisions of the Maryland Code, which are in controversy in this case, as amended by the Maryland Act of 1880, chapter 349, were not in violation of article 4, section 2, subsection 1, of the Constitution of the United States, because their provisions apply equally to citizens of the State of Maryland and to citizens of the other several States.

The same principles apply to this case which were considered in that of Robbins, and the same result must be declared.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and the plaintiff in error must be discharged.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite concurring:

Mr. Justice Field, Mr. Justice Gray, and myself agree to this judgment, but on different grounds from those stated in the opinion of the court. It is not denied that the Statute of Maryland requires a nonresident merchant desiring to sell by sample in that State to pay for a license to do that business a sum to be ascertained by the amount of his stock in trade Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 679 (25: 755). in the State where he resides and in which he This difThe vendor appropriated the specific quanti- has his principal place of business. ties of teas sold for the benefit of the vendee, fers materially from the Statute of Tennessee, and engaged that such specific quantities which was considered in Robbins v. Taxing Disshould be shipped to him. The vendee as-trict of Shelby County, just decided, and is in sented to the appropriation made by the vendor and upon his terms. The property in the goods therefore passed to the vendee.

Chitty, Cont. 11 Eng. ed. 357; Gillett v. Hill, 2 Cromp. & M. 535; Dixon v. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; 27 E. C. L. 90; Thompson v. Balt. &

0. R. R. Co. 28 Md. 405.

There was not only a constructive but also an actual delivery of the property in Maryland. Magruder v. Gage, 33 Md. 348; Kribs v. Jones, 44 Md. 406.

Under such circumstances the effect of the sale to Kenney of the particular tea, and of its shipment to him as a purchaser, was to bring the property, thus sold and shipped, within the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland; to incorporate and intermix it with the mass of property in the State; to deprive it of its distinctive character as an import, and to subject it to the taxing power of that State.

Howell v. State, 3 Gill, 23; Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U. S. 4 Pet. 564 (7: 956); Brown v. Md. 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 441-2 (6: 686); Perrear v. Commonwealth, 72 U. S. 5 Wall. 479 (18: 609); Waring v. Mayor, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 122-3 (19: 346); Woodruff v. Parham, Id. 139 (19: 387).

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court:

This case does not differ materially from that of Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County, [ante, 45], just decided. The Code of Maryland, as amended in 1880, provides that "No person or corporation other than the grower, maker or manufacturer shall barter or sell, or otherwise dispose of, or shall offer for sale any goods, chattels, wares, or merchandise within this State, without first obtaining a license in the manner herein prescribed." A violation of this law was made an indictable offense; and the plaintiff in error, a citizen and resident of New York, was indicted for offering to sell and for selling by sample, in the City of Baltimore, without license, certain goods for a New York firm, to be shipped from New York directly to the purchaser. The plaintiff in error demurred to the indictment, but it was sustained both by the court of original jurisdiction and by the Court of Appeals of Maryland on writ of error. The constitutionality of the law was duly raised, and the law was sustained.

its effect, as we think, a tax on commerce among the States. The charge for the privilege to the nonresident is measured by his ca pacity for doing business all over the United States, and without any reference to the amount done or to be done in Maryland.

JAMES C. FARGO, As President of the
MERCHANTS DISPATCH TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY, Piff. in Err.,

v.

WILLIAM C. STEVENS, As Auditor-General of The STATE OF MICHIGAN.

(From Lawyers' ed. U. S. Reports, Bk. 30.) *1. A state statute which levies a tax upon the gross receipts of railroads for the carriage of freights and passengers into, out of, or through the State, is a tax upon commerce among the States, and therefore void.

2.

3.

While a State may tax the money actually within the State, after it has passed beyond the stage of compensation for carrying persons or property, as it may tax other money or property within its limits, a tax upon receipts for this class of carriage specifically is a tax upon the commerce out of which it arises; and, if that be interstate commerce, it is void under the Constitution.

The States can not be permitted, under the guise of a tax upon business transacted within their borders, to impose a burden upon commerce among the States, when the business so taxed is itself interstate commerce.

(Submitted December 9, 1886. Decided April 4, 1887.) IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. Reversed.

The history and facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Ashley Pond, for plaintiff in error: Taxation by the State of Michigan, of an association organized and domiciled in the State of New York, based upon the estimated gross earnings of its cars within the State of Michigan, while engaged solely in traffic which cross

*Head notes by Mr. Justice MILLER.