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from the layman's point of view, tends to emphasize the judgment : unproved. That there is a high degree of general probability for some form of parallelism between the development of the individual and that of the race would probably, we repeat, be conceded by all. But the terms of the parallelism are undecided, the epochs indefinite, the evidence of corresponding stages full of gaps and ambiguities.

How, then, shall we look at the weight of authority which heralds the doctrine from many quarters and from thinkers as diverse as Goethe, Kant, Pestalozzi ? The truth seems to be that the prominent men who refer to the theory or use it in their educational schemes have simply seized upon the conception in a loose, constructive fashion, without careful research or critical examination of evidence. An authority is not one whose dictum is to be taken without convincing reasons, but one who has demonstrated his ability to give such reasons.

In this sense, no one of the older philosophers and educators is an authority on culture epochs. Some of the most famous whose names are quoted, as Goethe and Darwin, have but casually discussed or questioned the doctrine, while others, as Ziller and Hartmann, have been occupied in accurately dividing the years of childhood among the culture epochs rather than in finding a warrant for doing so.

Some authorities, again, have apparently cherished the theory because it was to their minds the vehicle of a stronger conviction that the faculties of children ought to be developed according to some order. It seems, indeed, to be true that valuable conceptions have been reached thru the culture-epoch theory which might have been delayed without it, tho their truth is quite independent of it. But that is, of course, no more an argument for the doctrine than the facts discovered by the Chaldæans about eclipses are an argument for astrology. If authority is to count at all in our attitude toward recapitulation as a tenable theory, it must be simply to strengthen the undefined analogy between race and child which no one is disposed to question.

If the evidence for the theory, both as presented by its earlier advocates and as construed from the modern evolutionary and sociological point of view, is insufficient to recommend the culture epochs as a definite teaching, we have further to ask whether the application of the doctrine has proved itself so valuable, or at least so promising, as to incline us to dispense with proof. The difficulty of interpreting the theory is, of course, obvious. The child is to be guided thru the epochs traversed by the race. But epochs of what ? Progress and development are far too abstract and general terms to direct us in fitting the race series to the individual series and concluding from the one to the other. That the correspondence should be a thorogoing one is manifestly impossible. If all the stages of race development were repeated by the individual, some of them must be touched so rapidly as to be negligible. But all students of the subject admit the short circuiting by which the individual, receiving thru natural selection or transmission of acquired characters the benefit of habit and accommodation, omits stages which were essential in the development of his ancestors. These short-cuts, it would appear, vary so extensively in different individuals that their occurrence alone would make it impossible to reason from race to child without constant modifications and exceptions. One marked illustration of the modification of the alleged parallel series is the relation between sensory and motor activity in the child and in adults of the earlier race. The receptive, sensory side of the child's nature unfolds under the stimulus of complex culture products and a highly developed ready-made language, while the productive, motor side lags far behind, the muscles and glands being of slower growth than the central nervous system. Thus, while the race has fed on its own culture products, even nature having in a sense grown along with man, the child has developed on products indefinitely in advance of his own active powers. But if the course of development in the individual as compared with that of the race is subject to short-cuts, foreshortening, shifting, and various marked changes of function and relation, what phase or aspect of growth shall we fix on to serve as basis for a comparison of stages ? How has this difficulty been met by culture-epoch theorists?

Herbart supposed that the doctrine should be applied to the matter of instruction in history, literature, and language, and reached the some what amusing conclusion that Greek and Latin should be taught before French and Italian, and that Roman history — perhaps the least congenial of records to children — should precede modern historical tales. Her bart's dominant belief that the child should assimilate in order the traces of moral culture in the race was developed by Ziller, who, after a happy course in the Odyssey and Robinson Crusoe, led the children from the heroic and individual epoch thru the various stages of relation to the community represented by the patriarchs, judges, kings, the life of Christ, and the history of the apostles, ending in the Reformation and the catechism. Vogt took something from the Procrustean caste of the system by avoiding the attempt of Herbart, Ziller, and Hartmann to assign a particular year to each epoch, and Beyer broadened the conception by attempting to apply it to nature study — a field which Herbart had believed to be quite outside the principle; but otherwise the general features of the Herbartian scheme were retained, with, however, one important element of progress. This is the tendency to transfer the emphasis from the selection of proper culture products to study of the progressive movement of the mental life. Vogt made extensive studies in child nature in order to determine the characteristic phases of child development during the first fourteen years of life. But this new attempt, it is plain, has its value quite distinct from any question of recapitulation. So also Rein, caring little for the mere material imparted in comparison with the quality of action and desire aroused, offers principles of guidance which are really based on study of the child in his relation to the ends of education, not in his relation to the development of the race. And, in general, it is impossible to review the history of the culture-epoch theory without discovering that, other things being equal, the theorists have contributed to pedagogical wisdom just in proportion as they have given over the attempt to get at the child thru the race and have addressed themselves to the slow and difficult task of getting knowledge about children at first hand. It is doubtful whether from Herbart to Baldwin all the schemes constructed according to the principle of recapitulation are worth, either in substance or in stimulus, one careful study of some phase of the child mind; and it is certain that the best thing about the culture-epoch theory is that it forgets itself and outgrows itself in singleminded study of children.

And, after all, the uselessness of the culture-epoch generalization in the field of concrete, practical investigation to which it has helped to lead is only what we should expect. There is no royal road to definite gains in education. Wide-embracing hypotheses like evolution and recapitulation enlarge our grasp, gratify our reason, strengthen our sympathies, give meaning to life; but they do not rectify our civilization nor provide us with school curricula. It is, indeed, easily possible, putting aside practical claims, to exaggerate the extent to which the reason may be comforted by the explanation which the theory of recapitulation is supposed to give of the mysteries of childhood. If it is the ordinary manifestations of child life which we wish to understand, we are, of course, putting our difficulty back into a more inaccessible region when we say : “ The child mind moves in this fashion because the primitive mind did so before it." If it is an explanation of the less common, inore individual, or more transient traits that we require, we run a risk of violating the law of parsimony when we advance reasons drawn from the remote past without having first exhausted the possibilities of recent causation.

The hypothesis of culture epochs is not, then, one from which, even if admitted, we could reason deductively; it is not yet defined with sufficient sharpness nor interpreted with sufficient certainty. We cannot teach or withhold anything at any period of the child's development simply because the race learned or did not learn it at a supposed corresponding period. The end of education is supplied in part by the demands of the civilization of which the child is to become a part ; his own needs, the order of his development, and the subject-matter suited to its various phases can in the last resort be determined only by child study and by experimental psychology. The impression seems to be growing among us that the threefold root of the principle of sufficient reason for everything pedagogical is biology, sociology, and psychology. If this means that the three are equally closely related to the problems of education, we must demur. Sociology may help to determine the end and the subject matter as a whole; biology may clear up what psychology is of itself unable to explain; but the standard of reference is always the child, and the final arbiter and interpreter of data from whatever source, as well as the organon of knowledge about the mental elements and the laws that govern their connection, is psychology pursued under experimental conditions.

Whether or not the theory of recapitulation has in some degree made up for the errors and the barrenness which mark its chief applications by suggesting questions and pointing out what to look for, is matter of special investigation into the recent records of practical pedagogy. Since students of the new psychology have necessarily given themselves, in the first decades of the history of the science, to structural work, while the doctrine of evolution, with its allied theories, has seemed to shed generous light on the dark problems of psychogenesis, it would be small wonder if educators, somewhat blinded by the sudden illumination, should have turned aside after what prove to be strange gods. But wliatever has been the service or the need of the culture-epoch theory in the past, it ought not to be required for practical use now that child study is in the way of defining its problems more precisely; and we may expect that in another decade those who have done pioneer work in structural psychology will be using the experimental method for the establishment of a sound basis of pedagogy - a basis which, as has been said, can acquire stability in no other way. Of course, as a supposition to be tested for theoretical validity, the culture epochs retain their interest. But as a practical working hypothesis, to be set in operation by the teacher and approved by the result, they are untenable and unnecessary.

Since, however, a general correspondence between race and individual development is admitted by all, we cannot reproach those who cling to the theory as suggestive and stimulating, provided they are not seduced by the charm of wide generalizations into admitting it as a guiding principle. If it be conceded that the doctrine cannot in ever so slight a degree take the place of experimental psychology, cannot be reasoned from deductively or used as a working hypothesis in practical pedagogy, we may welcome it as a point of view for all the value it may have in widening our conceptions or in teaching patience with the imperfect stages of child-growth.





Purpose, the child of instinct and reason, is the more or less deliberate, conscious tension of the soul toward some definite object. This object is derived primarily from some experience in sensuous life- some experience retained in the memory, revived in the imagination, or lifted by the creative inferences of reason and fancy into the region of more or less ideal aspiration.

Purpose hungers and thirsts for achievement. From this it derives sustenance. Without this it must perish. For the sake of this it stimulates anew reason and creative fancy, that it may invent the means of

In experiment and research it appeals afresh to sensuous experience. In the records of the past it looks for related precedents. In patient and laborious drill it gains needed skill and endurance. In impassioned eloquence it enlists the sympathy and help of others. prayer it appeals to the Supreme Ruler for aid, demands even the impossible in its conceit. There is not a phase in the life of the soul that is not touched to the quick by the purpose that has taken possession of the soul.

In the discussion of the development of purpose it becomes necessary to indicate in a few words my fundamental point of view as to the meaning of life and education, the nature and place of will in mental life, and of purpose in will. That this cannot and should not be done in the guise of formal definitions appears from the fact that the terms involved partake of the infinite, and therefore of the undefinable. Nevertheless it may be done with sufficient definiteness to secure a fair mutual understanding as to the tendency of my thought.

In their application I shall limit my terms to "man.” I make this reservation in order to guard the discussion from trespassing upon speculative grounds in connection with such terms as “life,"“soul," "evolution,” “self-activity," and "will." These terms are indispensable and will prove supremely helpful, if we steer clear of the maelstroms which hurl their victims to the dizzy heights of metaphysical speculation.

Life is a process of self-realization. The innermost essence of life is the instinct of self-expansion. Life is a process of becoming, a continuous growing toward what may lie more or less vaguely concealed in the depths of instinct, or stand revealed more or less clearly on the ideal heights of self-conscious will. Perhaps the most satisfactory term for this process is "evolution": the establishment of inner possibilities in the actual ; the revealing of the eternal in the temporal, of the spiritual in the

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